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Enforcing Environmental Policy (EEP) - 
News from the EEP Network 
The last issue of ELNI Newsletter reported on the 
start of the EEP Network, which was set up with the 
financial support of the European Commission on 
the 1st July 2000 and will run for three years until 
June 2003. The Network 'Enforcing Environ-
mental Policy'  (EEP-Network) is a European Re-
search Training Network on the instruments of 
environmental policy in the areas of climate protec-
tion and air pollution. 
It associates six European research teams working 
on environmental law and economics: ELRC (Envi-
ronmental Law Research Centre, University of 
Frankfurt, coordinator of the EEP), CIRED (Inter-
national Research Centre on the Environment and 
the Development, Nogent sur Marne), CERDEAU 
(Centre for Study and Research on Environmental 
and Planning Law, University of Paris I), FEEM 
(Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan), FIELD 
(Foundation for International Environmental Law 
and Development, London) and the Institute for 
Applied Ecology (Öko-Institut, Darmstadt office).  
The EEP Network aims to enhance the scientific 
knowledge of the functioning and effectiveness of 
various instruments in the field of climate change 
and air pollution policies on the local and the inter-
national level. It also shall promote the develop-
ment and the implementation of other instruments 
to complement or supplement legislation at an ap-
propriate level in Europe. 
Within the network, six young economic and law 
researchers from various European countries have 
been appointed to work on the common research 
project. The kick-off workshop and the second 
plenary workshop of the EEP Network took place in 
Frankfurt in September 2000 and in Nogent-sur-
Marne in January 2001. All documents related to 
these workshops can be downloaded from the EEP 
homepage http://www.uni-frankfurt.de/fb01/eep . 
As a part of the training programme offered to the 
young researchers, a two-day workshop was organ-
ised in April in London. The young researchers had 
the opportunity to discuss their research plans and 
the current status of their research work with exter-
nal experts, among them senior experts as well as 
other young researchers, who also presented papers. 
The debates were chaired by Prof. Eckard Re-
hbinder, University of Frankfurt, and Prof. Philippe 
Sands, Foundation for International Environmental 
Law and Development (FIELD). Various legal and 
economic aspects of air pollution and climate 
change were discussed, ranging from command and 
control approaches, trade permits, taxes and envi-
ronmental agreements to the potential role of carbon 
sinks, the policy mix in the EC, and the EC road 
transport policy. The programme of the workshop 
can also be downloaded from the EEP homepage.  
Frédéric Jaquemont (ELRC) and Janna Lehmann 
(CERDEAU), two young legal researchers, have 
further elaborated their paper for publication in this 
issue of the elni Review which you will find on 
pp.30 and 43 respectively. 
CAVA Final Workshop in Brussels 
The EU-funded network project “Concerted Action 
on Voluntary Approaches” was concluded at the 
final CAVA Workshop in Brussels on February 1 
2001. The results of the three-year project were 
presented by the researchers from CERNA, the 
coordinator of the network, and the associated re-
search institutes and then discussed with highlevel 
police makers and representatives from industry 
organisations. For this final workshop, policy briefs 
were prepared which represent a synthesis of the 
five previous workshops and research findings 
within the project. The policy paper prepared by 
Regine Barth and Birgit Dette on “The Integration 
of Voluntary Agreements into Existing Legal Sys-
tems” is included in this issue of the elni Review 
(pp.20). 
RELIEF Research Project 
In January 2001 the largest research project on 
green purchasing known in Europe was started. 
RELIEF, by full name "Environmental Relief Po-
tential of Urban Action on Avoidance and Detoxifi-
cation of Waste Streams through Green Public 
Procurement", is supported by the EC research 
programme on Environment and Sustainable De-
velopment, key action “City of Tomorrow and Cul-
tural Heritage”.  
The project is coordinated by ICLEI, the Interna-
tional Council for Local Environment Initiatives 
and carried out by a consortium of research partners 
from five countries, and is supported by the Cities 
of Kolding/ Denmark, Hamburg/Germany, 
Malmö/Sweden, Miskolc/Hungary, Stuttgart/ Ge r-
many and Zurich/ Switzerland.  
RELIEF will develop an extensive set of data on the 
environmental benefits which are potentially 
achievable through green purchasing. For this pur-
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pose methods on environmental assessment of 
products, assessment of public buying power and 
evaluation of market conditions will be developed. 
Based on local case studies and priority identifica-
tion, scenarios will be developed for the application 
of Green Purchasing at a European level and the 
environmental effects of this will be calculated. The 
results of this will be combined with a research on 
innovation fostering contractual arrangements (per-
formance criteria in tendering, contracting, ...) and a 
legal analysis. The final outcomes (policy recom-
mendations, procurement guidelines, trade code) 
will be discussed in roundtables and cumulate in a 
European Cities for Green Purchasing Campaign. 
For more information see: http://www.iclei.org/ 
europe/ecoprocura/relief/index.htm 
New Title and Layout  
You might have wondered what has happened to 
Elni when you had a first look at the front page. The 
elni “Newsletter” has been renamed in “Review”, 
since in our view the elni Newsletter is more than 
just a newsletter. We also thought it about time to 
change elni’s appearance after so many years and to 
allow our graphic designer to adapt elni’s layout to 
the corporate design of the Öko-Institut. With the 
new design we want to emphasize the Institute’s 
role in supporting the review. Without the insti-
tute’s financial contributions the elni review would 
not have existed for over 10 years now.  
Personnel changes 
Birgit Dette, coordinator of the environmental law 
division of the Öko-Institut and elni, has been dele-
gated to work with the EC Commission, DG Envi-
ronment. Her colleague Regine Barth has taken 
over her position. We wish Birgit that she will gain 
a deeper insight into the Commission’s work and 
new experience, but we very much hope that she 
will come back again to the Öko-Institut.  
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Introduction 
The concern with the settlement of a procedural 
framework regulating the administrative decision-
making is usually associated, in historical terms, 
with a precise constitutional matrix: in a democratic 
constitutional framework every public decision-
making must be submitted to a certain process.1 
Moreover, the administrative procedure served to 
reconcile broad grants of administrative discretion 
typical of the post-war administration with the 
growing distrust on bureaucratic/expertise power 
and the preservation of pluralistic values enshrining 
post-war societies.2 Simultaneous, the expansion of 
the administrative power represented a challenge 
for the conception of participation as limited to 
electoral control, therefore reinforcing the pluralist 
model.3 In the design of such a procedural frame-
work a reasonable degree of participation of indi-
viduals who are likely to be adversely affected by 
the outcome of administrative decision-making 
constitutes the basic expression of any modern legal 
order subjected to the rule of law.4. 
Given this backdrop, the view sustained in this 
work starts from the assumption that the EIA Direc-
tive must be understood in the realm of the constitu-
tional framework in which Community environ-
mental law was placed. The purpose of the this 
paper is therefore twofold: one the one hand, it 
proposes a constitutionally-principled interpretation 
of the procedural framework laid down by the Di-
                                                                 
* The present article corresponds to an abbreviated version of a paper 
presented by the author at the Workshop on European Environmental 
Politics Between Global Challenges and National Particularities, held in at 
the Robert Schuman Centre/European University Institute (Florence) on 7 
May 2001. The authors thank the participants on that workshop, and in 
particular Duncan Lifferink in his quality as discussant, for the comments 
made following the presentation of the paper. Needless to say that any 
errors or omissions remaining are those of the author only.  
 Pedro Machado, Ph.D. Researcher, Europe University Institute, Law 
Department, Florence, Italy 
1 See Mannori and Sordi (2001) 464-465. 
2 See Reich (1985) 1618-1619. 
3  See Fiorino (1989) 530. 
4  See Nehl (1999)  2. For the Community, see also the landmark judge-
ments Case 294/83 Parti Écologiste Les Verts v. European Parliament 
[1986] ECR 1339, para. 23; Opinion 1/91 (EEA) [1991] ECR I-6079, para. 
21. 
rective on Environmental Impact Assessment;5 on 
the other, it seeks to flesh out, in coherence with the 
mentioned constitutionally-principled approach, the 
participatory dimension of the EIA procedure. The 
paper is therefore structured upon two sections. The 
first will be dealing with the analysis of the nature 
of the procedure introduced by the EIA Directive. 
The remaining one will then highlight the core of 
such a procedure, trying to demonstrate that proce-
dural participation amounts to its unavoidable fea-
ture. Put differently, the absence or distortion of 
procedural participation in any EIA process 
amounts to its degeneration as an instrument to 
cope with the environmental risks associated to a 
concrete project, converting it in a diverse proce-
dural model from the one enshrined in the EIA 
Directive.  
1 The EIA Directive and the Proceduralisa-
tion of Community Environmental Law 
By having granted environmental goals a constitu-
tional status, the Community has assumed that its 
task is to preside over an environmental policy 
which revolves around the principles and constitu-
tive elements peculiar or exclusive to environmental 
concerns, rather than one which is primarily de-
signed to compensate for the externalities associ-
ated with the internal market.6 Moulding EC envi-
ronmental policy by reference to the constitutional 
principles like the ones of prevention or precaution 
implies recognising that the environmental protec-
tion demands its own resources and methods of 
law-making. And it is within this normative back-
drop that the legal instruments put forward at EC 
level must be dealt with and, in casu, the EIA Di-
rective.  
By introducing a specific procedure destined at 
assessing the effects of development projects on the 
environment in the Member States’ legal order, the 
EIA Directive does not put forward a heavily de-
                                                                 
5  See Dir. 85/337/EEC [1985] OJ L175/40, then amended by Dir. 97/11/EC 
[1997] OJ L73/5 (hereinafter EIA Directive). See, for a general overview of 
the amended text of the EIA Directive, Ladeur and Prelle (1999) . 
6  See Somsen (1998) 163. 
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tailed procedural framework, thus being permeable 
to some extent to national legal traditions related to 
administrative procedure. Yet it does not amount to 
a neutral piece of legislation derived from the 
Community and left to the Member States to com-
pound it according to the principles and values 
present in their legal orders. On the contrary, the 
EIA Directive is structured upon a core procedural 
value, notably the one of co-operative participation , 
as will be demonstrated below. The participatory 
dimension enshrined in the EIA Directive flows 
decisively from the implications that granting envi-
ronmental protection a constitutional status at EC 
level bears. 
Therefore, the common assumption of describing 
the requirement for an environmental impact as-
sessment under the EIA Directive as a procedural 
obligation, ‘under which information on the alleged 
impacts on the environment of a certain develop-
ment project is collected’,7 although being correct, 
tells us very little about the core of the EIA Direc-
tive. First, because it does not reveal the ambit of 
application of the Directive. Crucial questions like  
‘Does it submit every decision on a project to the 
procedural obligation it introduces?’ or ‘What is the 
juridical nature of such a procedural obligation?’ 
are neglected by the aforementioned assumption. 
Second, it provides a rather incomplete and unsatis-
factory explanation for the significance and the 
implications of proceduralising public decision-
making concerning private and public projects 
likely to have significant effects on the environ-
ment. In this realm, the basic question to be an-
swered would be ‘What are the core features of the 
EIA procedure?’. 
If one follows the interpretative path suggested in 
the landmark judgement rendered in Kraaijeveld,8 
beginning by stressing the Directive’s telos through 
the relevant dispositions in its preamble, and con-
fronting it then with its pertinent norms, it becomes 
clear that the EIA Directive aims at providing the 
competent authorities with relevant information to 
enable them to take a decision on a specific project 
in full knowledge of the project’s likely significant 
impact on the environment. The telos of the Direc-
tive is asserted in these precise terms by the Com-
munity legislator in the first recital of the preamble 
to the amending Directive.9 While the original text 
of the EIA Directive only referred to the concept of 
procedure under the expression ‘development con-
sent procedure’, the Community legislator now 
                                                                 
7  See Sifakis (1998). In the same vein, see also Wath ern (1988) 6. 
8  See Case C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf P. K. Kraaijeveld BV and others v 
Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid -Holland [1996] ECR I-5403, paras. 3 -13. 
9  Again, see Dir. 97/11/EC [1997] OJ L73/5. 
characterises in the first recital, in fine, of the same 
preamble the ‘… assessment procedure … [as] a 
fundamental instrument of environmental policy as 
defined in Article 130r of the Treaty and of the 
Fifth Community Programme of policy and action 
in relation to the environment and sustainable de-
velopment.’10 Furthermore, the nature of such an 
assessment procedure must be viewed in the light of 
the fifth recital of the original text of the EIA Direc-
tive, when it alludes in fine to the information gath-
ered during the EIA procedure under the following 
formula: ‘… this assessment must be conducted on 
the basis of the appropriate information supplied by 
the developer, which may be supplemented by the 
authorities and by the people who may be con-
cerned by the project in question’.11 
It flows from the cited recital that it was the inten-
tion of the Community legislator to clarify the pro-
cedural nature of the environmental impact assess-
ment. Assessing the significant effects a project can 
have on the environment shall only be done, in the 
framework of the Community environmental pol-
icy, according to a procedural model, being this 
model the one introduced by the EIA Directive. 
More concretely, such a procedure constitutes the 
adequate instrument to gather the relevant informa-
tion which will enable the decision-maker to decide 
on granting the consent requested by the developer 
on the basis of its effects on the environment. Still 
following the indications stemming from the pre-
amble, the Community legislator hints at one of the 
basic tenets of the procedure introduced by the EIA 
Directive: the procedure must allow for the partici-
pation of actors other than the developer, namely 
the authorities with competence to render a state-
ment on the content and extent of the information to 
be elaborated and supplied for the assessment, 
which is to say the authorities holding competence 
on environmental matters, and the people, in par-
ticular those eventually concerned by the project 
under assessment.  
Consistent with the objectives proclaimed in the 
preamble to the EIA Directive, its recently amended 
Article 6(1) now compels Member States to ‘take 
the measures necessary to ensure that the authorities 
likely to be concerned by the project by reason of 
their specific environmental responsibilities are 
given an opportunity to express their opinion on the 
information supplied by the developer and on the 
request for development consent. To this  end, 
Member States shall designate the authorities to be 
consulted, either in general terms or on a case-by-
case basis. The information gathered pursuant to 
                                                                 
10 Once again, see Dir. 97/11/EC [1997] OJ L73/5 (emphasis added). 
11 See Dir. 85/337/EEC [1985] OJ L175/40 (emphasis added). 
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Article 5 shall be forwarded to those authorities.’ 
The participatory dimension of the EIA Directive is 
furthermore reinforced by its also amended Article 
6(2) when obliging Member States ‘to ensure that 
any request for development consent and any in-
formation gathered pursuant to Article 5 are made 
available to the public within a reasonable time in 
order to give the public concerned the opportunity 
to express an opinion before the development con-
sent is granted.’ In a nutshell, the EIA Directive 
introduces a procedure destined to provide the 
Member States’ competent authorities with relevant 
information about the impact of certain projects on 
the environment. Yet, the Community legislator did 
not adopt a neutral stance against the structure of 
such a procedure. On the contrary, he shaped it 
according to a normative participatory view of 
administrative procedural law, in the sense that the 
information collected within the EIA procedure is 
the result of the multiple contributions of the envi-
ronmental actors concerned. Rather than the con-
cern with the rationalisation of administrative deci-
sion-making guaranteed by a set of rules guiding 
the bureaucratic action it is the prominence given to 
procedural participation that relieves in the norma-
tive framework enshrined in the EIA Directive. 
Notwithstanding the more detailed analysis that will 
be dedicated below to the issue of procedural par-
ticipation under the EIA Directive, it suffices to say, 
at this point, that the participatory element imbuing 
the EIA procedure demands access to the procedure 
for all other relevant environmental authors, namely 
the authorities likely to be concerned by a certain 
project on grounds of their specific environmental 
competencies and the public. The participatory 
strategy embodied in the EIA procedure is further-
more confirmed by the norm incorporated in its 
Article 1(5).12 Indeed, by leaving out of the EIA 
Directive’s ambit of application all projects whose 
details are approved by a specific act of national 
legislation, the Community legislator renders 
clearly participation as an underpinning value of the 
EIA procedure. In essence, democratic legislative 
procedures endeavour to maintain a reasonable 
access for all groups to those procedures whose 
democratic character consists precisely on its poten-
tial responsiveness to the claims of those groups.13 
Be it through representation or through direct par-
ticipation, the legislative procedure seeks to ac-
commodate a variety of interests by allowing them 
to be voiced, and by bestowing on them, during the 
                                                                 
12  Article 1(5) of the EIA Directive states: ‘This Directive shall not apply to 
projects the details of which are adopted by a specific act of national legis-
lation, since the objectives of this Directive, including that of supplying 
information, are achieved through the legislative process.’ 
13  See Mashaw (1990)  276. 
deliberation phase, serious consideration in the 
development of the legislative norms.14  
Within the participatory backdrop offered by the 
legislative procedure, the Community legislator 
found unnecessary to submit the projects whose 
details are adopted by a legislative act to the EIA 
requirement, ‘since the objectives of this Directive 
[EIA Directive], including that of supplying infor-
mation, are achieved through the legislative proc-
ess.’15 Thus, the EIA Directive considers procedural 
participation to be guaranteed by the features aris-
ing from the national legislative procedures in that 
they allow for the representation of the different 
interests related to projects adopted by acts of na-
tional legislation.  
This said, another conclusion can immediately be 
drawn regarding the nature of the procedure 
adopted by the EIA Directive. By excluding the 
national legislative procedures from the realm of its 
application, the competent national authorities to 
which the EIA Directive is intended to be applied 
are a fortiori national administrations. Thus, the 
procedure it introduces has an administrative na-
ture,16 which means that the EIA Directive aims at 
introducing in the Member States’ administrative 
legal orders a procedure framed according to the 
value of participation .  
It suffices to point out the ECJ’s prudence in delim-
iting the ambit of application of the exemption 
contained in that provision. According to the 
judgement held in the Bozen case, Article 1(5) is to 
be interpreted as follows:17 
‘… in order for a legislative act to display the 
same characteristics as development consent, as 
defined by Article 1 of the Directive, the act 
must lay down the project in detail, that is to say 
in a sufficiently precise and definitive manner so 
as to include, like development consent, follow-
ing their consideration by the legislature, all the 
elements of the project relevant to the environ-
mental impact assessment. 
It is only by complying with such requirements 
that the objectives referred to in the second con-
dition laid down by Article 1(5) can be achieved 
through the legislative process. If the specific 
legislative act by which a particular project is 
adopted, and therefore authorised, does not in-
clude the elements of the specific project which 
                                                                 
14  See Ely (1980)  80. 
15 See again Article 1(5) of the EIA Directive, in fine, as well as the eleventh 
recital in the preamble to the Directive. 
16  On the qualification of the EIA procedure as an administrative procedure, 
see Greco (1996) 512-514.  
17  See Case C-435/97 World Wide Fund (WWF) and others v. Autonome 
Provinz Bozen and others [not yet published], paras. 59-60. 
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may be relevant to the assessment of its impact 
on the environment, the objectives of the Direc-
tive would be undermined, because a project 
could be granted consent without prior assess-
ment of its environmental effects even though 
they might be significant.’ 
Following this reasoning, the ECJ does not integrate 
in the exemption granted by Article 1(5) of the EIA 
Directive to the projects approved by legislative 
acts those projects which, although provided by a 
legislative provision setting out a programme, re -
ceive development consent under a separate admin-
istrative procedure.18 This confirms the administra-
tive nature of the procedure set out in the EIA Di-
rective for it compels Member States to introduce in 
their legal orders a specific administrative proce-
dure destined to provide the administrative authori-
ties holding competence to decide on the develop-
ment consents with relevant environmental informa-
tion regarding the project under approval. Yet, if the 
obligation addressed to the Member States is of 
procedural nature, the Directive impregnates the 
national administrative legal orders, in the domain 
of environmental impact assessment, with a sub-
stantive value, notably the one of participation. 
From what has been said until now it has been in-
ferred that the administrative procedure incorpo-
rated in the EIA Directive protects the value of 
participation about the treatment of environmental 
actors.19 Shaped according to such a value, the pa-
rameter of procedural fairness lies then in the al-
lowance for the different positions regarding a cer-
tain project to be voiced during the EIA procedure, 
and to be given a reasonable treatment by the deci-
sion-maker, rectius by the development consent 
authorities. But the normative model enshrined in 
the EIA Directive must not only be perceived under 
the allowance of granting space for all ‘visions of 
the world’ to be voiced during the procedure. In the 
realm of the EIA procedure, its broad participatory 
dimension appears closely linked to the objective of 
the environmental impact statement, namely the one 
of providing the development consent authorities 
with information concerning the significant effects 
the project might have on the environment. 
In this vein, participation of environmental actors 
other than the developer in the EIA procedure is not 
primarily aimed at checking the information given 
by the developer and, ultimately, the decision taken 
                                                                 
18  Ibid., para. 63. 
19 On the relation between procedures and values, see Galligan (1996)  31-
48. According to this author, procedures are connected to values in two 
ways: they advance certain general social values and they protect certain 
values about the treatment of individuals. 
by the development authorities.20 Procedural par-
ticipation, as established in the EIA procedure, 
performs a constitutive function for it is aimed at 
providing the decision-maker with information 
other than the one provided by the developer. This 
becomes clear in the light of Article 8 of the EIA 
Directive. By demanding the development consent 
authorities to take into consideration the informa-
tion provided by the developer, according to Article 
5 of the EIA Directive, and the one collected after 
consultation of the environmental authorities and 
the public, pursuant to Article 6 of the said Direc-
tive,21 the Community legislator’s perspective on 
the information collected under the EIA procedure 
amounts to a complex one. More concretely, the 
information to whose gathering the EIA procedure 
aims at is viewed as the result of ‘complex constel-
lations of interests’, to use a wide-spread expression 
among the German doctrine,22 thus being the out-
come of the different visions uttered through the 
procedure in which regards the project under as-
sessment.23  
Conceptualised as such, the EIA procedure becomes 
associated with a broad concept of administrative 
procedure according to which it is viewed as a set 
of actions aimed at the attainment and processing of 
information.24 Yet, the EIA procedure shifts from a 
strict formal conception of procedure to a substan-
tive one under which the gathering of information is 
viewed as the outcome of the different contributions 
given through the procedure by the environmental 
actors involved. To be more precise, the Commu-
nity legislator has taken a stance on what kind of 
participation the EIA procedure demands in order to 
provide the decision-maker with the pertinent in-
formation to decide on the development consent 
requested by the developer. Rooted in partic ipatory 
values, the EIA procedure thus attributes an equiva-
lent importance to the information provided either 
by the developer either by the environmental au-
thorities and the public. And it is because of the 
substantive parameter according to which the EIA  
procedure is shaped that the decision-maker must  
                                                                 
20 Linking pluralism with a lay or common sense control exercised on 
technocratic administration, see Shapiro (1999) 2-3.  
21 Article 8 of the EIA Directive also compels the development consent 
authorities to take into consideration the information gathered pursuant its 
Article 7, i.e. the information provided by another Member State different 
from the one where the project is carried out but which is likely to have 
significant transboundary effects. Since the study of these cases does not 
fit in the scope of the present work, no further developments on Article 7 
of the EIA Directive will be provided.  
22  See Schmidt-Aßmann (1984) 4. 
23 For a comprehensive vision of the multi-polar nature of environmental 
decision-making procedures on grounds of the complexity of interests it 
has to deal with, see Hoffmann-Riem (1994) 593-599.  
24 See Schmidt-Aßmann (1993)  318. 
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take into consideration25 that information in the 
development consent procedure. 
But if the EIA procedure enshrines an encompass-
ing vision of the information gathered pursuant to 
the environmental impact statement presented by 
the developer and the opinions expressed by the 
environmental authorities and the public, the 
weightiness of such information is scantly treated 
by the Community legislator in the EIA Directive. It 
has already been pointed out the constitutive nature 
of procedural participation in the realm of the EIA 
procedure. Yet, Article 8 of the EIA Directive, by 
itself, does not embody decisive criteria concerning 
the due weightiness to be granted to the diverse 
information gathered during the EIA procedure. 
Which weight shall the environmental authorities 
concede to the information fostered during the pub-
lic consultation phase? And even considering the 
constitutive nature of the participatory phase of the 
EIA procedure, is such information supposed to be 
given the same weight as to the one provided by the 
developer? After all, was not the concern of the 
Community legislator primarily directed at the 
information to be provided by the developer, as 
flows from the normative densification established 
in Annex IV of the EIA Directive? And does this 
not indict at the greater weight that should be given 
to the developer’s information? It would be tedious 
insisting on this inquisitorial path. The questions 
just posed serve only to confirm the absence of 
guiding criteria established in the EIA Directive in 
order to assess the weight to be given to the infor-
mation gathered in the realm of the EIA procedure. 
Yet, it would be inappropriate to conclude in limine 
for the absence of the said criteria. And this because 
of the constitutionally valued interpretation  one 
must endeavour towards environmental protection 
at EC level.  
Environmental protection, being a Community 
constitutional goal, is a shared duty not only of the 
EC institutions and Member States bodies but also 
of citizens.26 Thus, in every Environmental Action 
Programmes the Community has stressed the role of 
                                                                 
25 See again Article 8 of the EIA Directive. For a diverse interpretation of this 
provision, see Scott (1998) 125, who argues that ‘… the language of ‘be 
taken into consideration’ exemplifies starkly the pure procedural nature of 
EIA obligations’. With due respect, such an interpretation of the provision 
at stake falls short from perceiving its meaning in the realm of the EIA 
procedure. First, because the procedural nature of the said provision is 
not incompatible with it enshrining substantive values. But to perceive 
such values, a systematic and teleological interpretation of the EIA Direc-
tive must be put forward, instead of an interpretation confined to that pro-
vision. Second, because the expression ‘be taken into consideration’ must 
be perceived, in the context of pluralism, as a legislative indirizzo given to 
the consent development authorities to engage in a reasonable balancing 
of the different visions voiced through the EIA procedure when deciding 
on the grant of the development consent. 
26 See Prieur (1996) 101. 
the citizen in the formation and implementation of 
an effective environmental policy. Most recently, 
the Fifth Environmental Action Programme, named 
‘Towards Sustainability’, identified the citizen as 
one of the actors  having shared responsibility for 
the environment, especially through making in-
formed environmental choices whether as voters or 
consumers.27 It was also the idea of an environ-
mental shared responsibility incumbent on citizens 
that led to a growing desire to co-opt citizens into 
monitoring the state of the local environment and 
assisting in the implementation of applicable envi-
ronmental policies. 
Within this constitutional backdrop, the EIA proce-
dure cannot rest on a ‘technical knowledge model’ 
under which every administrative choice tends to be 
based on technical knowledge, the monopoly of 
which excludes any effective individual participa-
tion.28 This concern in avoiding an environmental 
decision-making procedure solely based on techni-
cal knowledge becomes even more acute when one 
bears in mind that the environmental decision-
maker, in a context of uncertainty, tends to bow on 
scientific expertise, disregarding the concerns and 
opinions of lay people.29 Yet, such a reasoning 
based upon the monopoly of scientific knowledge 
would only be legitimate in a world where risks 
could be ordered according to ‘objective’ measures 
of probability and magnitude of harm, and where 
the concept of risk would constitute an objective 
property of an event or activity measured as the 
probability of well-defined adverse effects.30 Envi-
ronmental risks, however, tend to reflect social and 
cultural value judgements. This simple but core 
assumption explains, for instance, why the EC envi-
ronmental policy – at least, in its early phase – 
never evolved beyond a predominately reactive 
role, namely reacting to public pressure and the 
direct effects of large-scale environmental acci-
dents.31 It explains furthermore the limitations of 
                                                                 
27 See [1995] OJ C138/27, 72 -3 and 81.  
28 See Chiti (1996)  373. 
29 To assess how the claim for ‘external’ validity, namely through the resort 
to science -based criteria, is especially intense and relevant in the envi-
ronmental law field, see Case C-284/95 Safety Hi-Tech Srl and S.&T. Srl,  
judgement of the ECJ held on 14 July 1998, not yet reported, concerning 
the preliminary reference under Article 177 of the EC Treaty on the inte r-
pretation and valid ity of Council Regulation (EC) No. 3093/94 of 15 De-
cember 1994 on substances that deplete the ozone layer (see [1994] OJ 
L333/1). Those questions were raised in proceedings between Safety Hi-
Tech Srl and S.&T. Srl concerning the performance of a contract between 
them for the sale of product known as ‘NAF S III’, composed of hydro-
chlorofluorocarbons (generally known as HCFCs), which is used for fire-
fighting. The litigation between both parties arose after the latter refused 
to take delivery of the product, contesting the validity of the contract on the 
ground that the use, and therefore the marketing, of HCFCs for firefighting 
was prohibited by Article 5 of the mentioned Regulation. 
30 See Renn (1992)  54. 
31 See Hildebrand (1993) 25-26; Chalmers (1999)  660-661. It is worth 
quoting this latter author on this matter: ‘…, the narrow ecological focus, 
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cost-benefit approaches to risk assessment and 
management, inclined to incorporate dominantly 
objective and expert perceptions of risk based on 
the best available scientific evidence.32 
This is not surprisingly if one thinks of the envi-
ronment as an open-ended system, ‘… in which the 
vagaries of both the natural environment and human 
behaviour must be taken into account. The natural 
environment is a holistic system made up of numer-
ous complex and little understood interrelation-
ships’.33 If the Community constitutional drafters 
have chosen to grant environmental protection a 
constitutional status, premised on a high level of 
protection,34 then such a choice can only involve a 
holistic approach. As pointed out by Susan Rose-
Ackerman, the legal challenge of environmental 
policy is to make ‘democratic values operational in 
modern states where hierarchy and expertise cannot 
be avoided’.35 In this context, Community environ-
mental decision-making cannot dispense the par-
ticipation of individuals and groups in the legisla-
tive and administrative procedures for their partici-
patory input is associated with granting more in-
formation and alternatives to the decision-maker, 
enhancing the opportunity to mesh public values 
and concerns with individual interests.36 In addition, 
broader participation gives credibility to the entire 
decision-making process, since private and unso-
phisticated people speak to values rather than 
clouded issues lost in technical evidence.37 Briefly, 
the interactive communication between general and 
specific interests generated by the individual or 
associative participation in the environmental deci-
sion-making procedure renders the final decision to 
be better perceived by the people who are eventu-
ally affected and thus legitimise it. Otherwise, the 
                                                                     
both in perspective and in terms of actors, allowed a process of icon con-
struction to develop, whereby bureaucrats with limited resources acted 
reactively to a series of popular images. Popular concerns about the qual-
ity of beaches in France lead the French government to develop a regime 
based around World Health Authority (WHO) levels. It then pressed for an 
EC regime on bathing standards, which was tougher event than its own. 
The Major Accidents Directive was developed as a result of the shocking 
scenes which followed the dioxins disaster at Seveso in Italy. The Wild 
Birds Directive was pushed forward by the British government following 
television documentaries on birds migrating to Britain being shot at during 
the French and Italian hunting seasons’ (emphasis added).  
32 See Ogus (1997)  145-152; Farber (1999) Chs. 2 and 3.  
33 See Fisher (2000) 116 (emphasis added). 
34 See Article 174(2) [ex -Article 130-R(2)] EC Treaty. 
35 See Rose-Ackerman (1995) 1. 
36 See Winter (1989) 42-43; Koppen and Ladeur (1991)  38-39. 
37 See Tilleman (1995) 343; Fiorino (1996) 196-197. This latter author 
refuses the ‘technical’ model of policy making, which relies on the as-
sumption that technical and administrative elites should make decisions 
with minimal participation by the lay public. By laying down arguments 
related to the improvement of social choice, risk perception, participatory 
democracy and legitimacy, he consistently argues for democratic partici-
pation in environmental policy-making. 
heavy reliance on scientific expertise may lead 
Community environmental decision-making to the 
same deadlock that Martin Shapiro describes when 
analysing the American experience with science-
based decision-making:38  
‘American agencies have come to invest enor-
mous time and effort in erecting enormous bod-
ies of scientific and technological findings, and 
analysis of those findings, marshalled to demon-
strate that the rule that they write is not chosen 
but rather is dictated by the analysis. All of this 
leads to the paradoxical result that American 
agencies have become so skilled at camouflag-
ing policy as science that their rule making pro-
cesses have become more opaque to both citizen 
and the judge than they ever were’. 
From what has been said one infers that the EIA 
Directive introduces a procedural model founded on 
a co-operative vision of the information at whose 
collection it aims. If the EIA procedure is co-
operatively valued, procedural participation be-
comes its core for it is the means by which the in-
formation provided by the developer is comple-
mented or contradicted. In this sense, procedural 
participation follows a co-operative model of exe r-
cising the administrative powers in which the envi-
ronmental actors concerned other than the devel-
oper are asked to collaborate in the administrative 
fact-finding process concerning the project under 
assessment as well as in bringing to the procedure 
value-based statements. As such, procedural par-
ticipation under the EIA procedure does not serve 
primarily the objective of bringing the environ-
mental actors to the procedure in order to defend 
their subjective positions, thus anticipating an even-
tual litigation and defence before the courts. On the 
contrary, the choice of the Community legislator 
was to associate the environmental authorities and 
the public concerned to the task of gathering infor-
mation during the EIA procedure, independently of 
their subjective placement before the project.  
Ultimately, the EIA Directive’s detachment from a 
jurisdictional-inspired procedural model to a co-
operative one shatters the traditional reliance on the 
giving reasons requirement as the sole procedural 
guarantee to enhance democratic control on admini-
stration by making government more transparent.39 
For the giving reasons requirement has been inter-
preted by the ECJ as a right of defence, dependent 
on the right of access to a court.40 Besides, this 
                                                                 
38 See Shapiro (1997) 340. 
39 See Shapiro (1992) 180-184; Majone (1998) 20-22. 
40 See Case 222/86 UNECTEF v Heylens [1987] ECR 4097, para. 15. For a 
characterisation of the Court’s approach to reasoned decisions in a trial 
process-type, see Harlow (1996) 8-9. 
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explains why the ECJ has been more deferent to 
enforcing the giving reasons requirement than pro-
cedural participatory rights.41 Yet, the EIA proce-
dure, being moulded upon co-operation, demands 
the dialogue requirement, originally developed by 
the American courts to enforce participation in the 
regulatory process,42 to be a compelling procedural 
value43 and therefore enforced by the Community 
courts in the realm of EIA litigation.  
2 Procedural participation under the EIA 
Directive 
The integration of eventually discrepant interests 
related to environmental protection in the develop-
ment procedures marks a change in the way na-
tional authorities used to perceive actions poten-
tially dangerous to the environment. By departing 
from the concept of danger as established in police 
law, national authorities tended to evaluate envi-
ronmental dangerous activities by reference to an 
idea of normality against which danger appears as a 
deviation.44 Experience became thus the decisive 
parameter to accede to knowledge of danger.45 
However, actions affecting the environment cannot 
be referred to stable assumptions about the resil-
ience of nature following fixed standards drawn 
from past experience.46 Indeed, experience no 
longer provides a sufficient basis for the necessary 
prevention of environmental damage.47 Thus, as 
stated by Ladeur, ‘the threshold of reaction is no 
longer determined by danger …, and it is thereby 
disconnected from suppositions of probability’.48 
Political, legislative and administrative choices 
affecting the environment are thus condemned to be 
taken within scientifically controversial contexts. In 
a nutshell, uncertainty predominantly dominates 
environmental decision-making.49 
Within the backdrop of uncertainty associated with 
environmental choices and risk, the EIA Directive 
copes with it by establishing a co-operative proce-
dure. Under this procedure, environmental actors 
are called to transmit information to the develop-
ment authorities about the project under assessment. 
                                                                 
41 See Harlow (1996)  9. 
42 See Shapiro (1992) 204-205. 
43 For a characterisation of the administrative procedure as allowing dia-
logue between the parties involved, see Schmidt-Aßmann (1984) 9. 
44 See Ladeur (1994)  299-303. 
45 Ibid. 301-302. 
46 See Koppen and Ladeur (1991) 10-12; Ladeur (1998)  43-46. 
47 For instance, many effects of pollution causing disease to human indi-
viduals manifest their impact on the scale of human values and goods 
only at a moment when measures demand high expenditure. 
48 See Ladeur (1994)  303. 
49 With concrete examples of the level of ignorance and controversy associ-
ated with environmental risk, see Farber (1999) 165-168. 
Environmental authorities consulted under Article 
6(1) of the EIA Directive express their vision of the 
project pursuant to their specific environmental 
responsibilities. Likewise, the public is given the 
opportunity to intervene in the EIA procedure to 
voice their opinion about the project, which can 
amount to the grant of new information to the de-
velopment authorities. And the information brought 
in this manner to the procedure supplements and/or 
even contradicts the one previously provided by the 
developer. In a nutshell, the actors involved in the 
EIA procedure become producers and products of a 
‘common knowledge’50 shaped within that proce-
dure. The actors advance with information, but at 
the same time learn from the information provided 
by the other actors. For instance, the developer can 
learn through the public consultation in the EIA 
procedure about the deep importance a local com-
munity bestows on a particular natural good – e.g., 
because it is profoundly linked with the history of 
that particular community in that specific place –  
which will be irremediably affected by the project 
the first intends to be approved. Thus, he may opt 
for a more expensive alternative that does not dam-
age the said local good, but that avoids future social 
protests against his project. And it is by fostering 
mutual learning that the EIA procedure becomes a 
co-operative arena, where the environmental actors 
become involved in working out a mutually accept-
able solution to a project that may affect the public 
interests to whose commitment they are entrusted or 
their community and personal lives. In other words, 
the environmental actors involved in an EIA proce-
dure become engaged in a social learning process.51  
As the locus where environmental knowledge is 
exposed and simultaneously created, the EIA pro-
cedure amounts to a potentially controversial locus. 
The way in which the EIA procedure is structured 
soon reveals a predominance of the scientific and 
technical construction of issues over people’s direct 
perceptions. As stated above, the technical-
scientific discourse tends to dominate the EIA pro-
cedure for, even in those procedures preceded by a 
                                                                 
50 In this sense, see Ladeur (1995) 31. 
51 See Webler, et al. (1995) 444-445. As proposed by these authors, ‘…, 
social learning means more than merely individuals learning in a social 
situation. We envision a community of people with diverse personal inte r-
ests, but also common interests, who must come together to reach 
agreement on collective action to solve a mutual problem. Social learning 
refers to the process by which changes in the social condition occur – 
particularly changes in popular awareness and changes in how individuals 
see their private interests linked with the shared interests of their fellow 
citizens.’ (emphasis added). Applied to the EIA procedure, an expanded 
perspective of this concept is proposed, whereby not only the public con-
cerned is engaged in a social learning process through the participation in 
that procedure, but also the environmental and development authorities as 
well as the developer become active parties of such a cognitive process.  
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scoping process,52 the public is usually not given an 
opportunity to voice their concerns until the consul-
tation stage.53 Yet, as has been stressed by cognitive 
psychologists, their empirical studies reveal signifi-
cant differences between expert and lay percep-
tions.54 Ogus offers the following synthesis:55 
‘The evidence shows that individuals regard 
risks as qualitatively more serious in the follow-
ing situations (qualitative differentiation of 
risks): 
(i) the risk arises from circumstances out-
side the victims’ control; 
(ii) the risks arises from human activity, 
rather than a natural phenomenon; 
(iii) the risk arises in circumstances of se-
crecy; 
(iv) exposure to risk is involuntary; 
(v) the risk is concentrated on a particular 
location or group of people; 
(vi) the individuals exposed to the risk are 
identified or identifiable ex ante; 
(vii) the risk primarily benefits persons 
other than the victims; 
(viii) the risk, if it materializes, gives rise to 
irremediable or permanent harm’. 
This may lead to the existence of two different and 
eventually conflicting levels of perception of risks. 
As better summarised by Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, ‘two conceptual stages in theoretical 
of risk can be discerned: the first is the perception 
of risk, which refers to the definition of risk (ge-
neric and partially specific), and the second is the 
comprehension of risk, which should be understood 
as the further definitional steps that target the prag-
matic positioning [in terms of scientific, political, 
scientific and social acceptance] of a risk, and will 
normally be in the direction of preventing risk or 
remedying the materialisation of risk, after having 
confronted it with cost, political stati, other risks, 
and other relevant consideration – a truly ‘compre-
                                                                 
52 Scoping aims at the determination of the parameters of the EIA proce-
dure, the identification of the significant issues related to the project under 
assessment and the alternatives to be considered. On this issue, see 
Beanlands (1988) 33; Sheate (1997) 238-239. 
53 This exclusion of public participation in the scoping phase is problematic 
for the utility and effectiveness of scoping in EIA procedures, for that stage 
rests on the assumption that any consideration of the significance of envi-
ronmental effects must acknowledge that environmental impact assess-
ment is inherently an anthropocentric concept. It is centred on the effects 
of human activities and ultimately involves a va lue judgement by society 
concerning the significance or importance of these effects. Such judge-
ments, often based on social and economic criteria, reflect the political 
reality of impact assessment in which significance is translated into public 
acceptability and desirability. In this sense, see Beanlands (1988) 35. 
54 See Ogus (1997)  146; Sunstein (1997) 115. 
55 Ibid. 
hensive’ comprehension’.56 Given this conceptuali-
sation, even if lay people do not comprehend the 
extent of environmental risk, they may be able to 
have a perception of it. For instance, even if the 
extent of the risks posed by asbestos is not complete 
or uncontroversial, lay people may relate it immedi-
ately to carcinogen risk. And such a concern may 
constitute a relevant parameter for grounding a 
decision on a development request. Two main rea-
sons may be advanced in this respect.  
First, in the domain of uncertainty, it seems implau-
sible to pretend to justify decisions that may pose 
significant risks to the environment on the basis of 
the comprehension of those risks. This amounts to a 
science-based decision-making pattern which has 
been shattered by the uncertainty linked to envi-
ronmental risks. Put differently, the adoption of 
decisions which may affect the environment can no 
longer rest on full knowledge (deterministic or 
probabilistic) within the scientific community, sim-
ply because environmental decisions are always 
taken under conditions of scientific contro-
versy/uncertainty (causation chains, consequences 
for human activities and welfare, time profile of 
expected changes, etc.).57 
Second, following this argumentative path, it is the 
traditional claim of rationality associated with sci-
ence that is hampered. Scientific rationality was 
possible in the context of closed systems, like early 
engineering, but it is only remotely possible in the 
context of the uncertainties it is confronted with 
when dealing with health and environmental mat-
ters. The environment is, it must be stressed again, a 
system inescapably permeable to the actions of its 
components the influence of which may lead to 
unpredictable outcomes. In such conditions of sci-
entific controversy the development authority ap-
pears dressed with the garment of the arbitrator, and 
its final decision becomes thus necessarily a policy 
driven one. Given the co-operative vision enshrined 
in the EIA Directive, it is thus desirable that the 
development decision should incorporate value 
judgements according to the different perceptions of 
risks voiced during the procedure, be they science-
based or non-scientific. The decision can even be 
exclusively science-based, but it is issued following 
a reasonable balance of the diverse ‘visions of the 
world’ presented during the decision-making proce-
dure, and not because the decision-maker has a 
                                                                 
56 With pertinent bibliography on fear and risk, see Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos (1999) 176-177 (emphasis in the text). On the distinction 
between the perception and assessment of risks, see also Baldwin (1997)  
3-10. 
57 See Godard (1997)  40-42. 
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priori narrowed such balance to the alternative 
scientific ‘perceptions of reality’. 
Given the structure of the EIA procedure, one can 
consider it as tending to privilege a technical-
scientific discourse. Either in the case of EIA pro-
cedures lacking a scoping phase or in the opposite 
case, the technical-scientific information may 
dominate the procedure, at least in its early stage, 
and therefore determine its course. The posterior 
information brought to the EIA procedure, namely 
the one resulting from the consultation phase, is 
most likely to be of a reactive nature in relation to 
the information provided by the developer. How-
ever, by entrusting the development authorities with 
the duty to strike a balance between the information 
gathered pursuant to the EIA procedure’s initial and 
consultative stages,58 the Community legislator 
favoured the co-operative dimension of the decision 
to be taken by the development authorities in detri-
ment of an exclusively science-based decision.  
This said, it should also be stressed that the proce-
dure laid down by the EIA Directive is not shaped 
upon a sceptical posture related to the technical-
scientific information therein gathered. Although 
such an information is imbued with uncertainty, it 
does not follow that the development authorities 
should disregard the merit or value of it and, conse-
quently, consider it with an aprioristic scepticism. 
On the contrary, the perspective underlying the EIA 
procedure gives credit to the scientific -technical 
discourse. Yet, it gives room for other kind of in-
formation to be expressed in the EIA procedure, 
namely the one brought to the procedure by actors 
other than the developer involved or concerned by 
the project under assessment. Thus, the EIA proce-
dure lies on the acknowledgement that environ-
mental risks associated with a concrete develop-
ment project correspond also to social and cultural 
value judgements, and that those value judgements 
may supplement or even question the information 
based on scientific and technical grounds.  
Moreover, co-operative participation under the EIA 
procedure amounts to a strategy to cope with envi-
ronmental decisions taken within scientifically 
controversial contexts. In this sense, the EIA proce-
dure becomes the arena where not only several 
contradictory explanations and theories coexisting 
in any one given moment are presented, but also the 
changing equilibrium between these theories as well 
as emerging new views which alter the whole scien-
tific landscape.59 The consultation phases in the EIA 
procedure serve thus as the adequate forums where 
                                                                 
58 See again Article 8 of the EIA Directive. 
59 See Godard (1997)  41. 
different scientific and social ‘visions of the world’ 
can be exposed. Ultimately, this co-operative strat-
egy to cope with uncertainty enshrined in the EIA 
Directive implies a shift of public environmental 
action from the scientific field to the political arena, 
turning therefore the development authorities prac-
tically into arbitrators of scientific controversies 
within the background of the social perception and 
acceptability of the risks at stake. But this is the 
inevitable result of the precautionary approach upon 
which EC environmental policy is shaped, and 
under which the rational paradigm of public action, 
according to which public authorities are only al-
lowed to take action under conditions of stabilised 
scientific knowledge or precise cost-benefit analy-
ses, is shattered. After all, the precautionary princi-
ple conceals a paradoxical vision of science: on the 
one hand, public authorities depend on science to 
perceive environmental risks, but on the other, 
scientific knowledge is accepted as intrinsically  
limited to comprehend such risks, thus necessarily 
permeable to social crit icism. 60 And it is within 
these contradictory boundaries that the EIA proce-
dure deals with uncertainty. 
Since in a democracy public decisions are supposed 
to be suitable to the people who will be affected by 
them, the EIA procedure serves furthermore as a 
principal means to ensure an acceptable solution in 
environmental issues and development projects.61 
By establishing a specific procedure destined to 
assess the significant effects a project may have on 
the environment, leaving then to the Member 
States’ discretion the option of setting it up as a 
sub-procedure grafted in the development request 
procedure or, on the contrary, as an autonomous 
procedure preceding this latter one, the Community 
legislator has established a complex procedural 
paradigm, by which the environmental interests are 
confronted with private and public interests regard-
ing a certain development project. Indeed, it is not 
only the private interest of the developer that is 
confronted with the environmental concerns associ-
ated with his project. In the EIA procedure two 
public interests may stand in opposition: on one 
side, the public development interest; on the other, 
the public environmental interest. This explains the 
intervention in the EIA procedure of both develop-
ment and environmental authorities. 
The underpinning logic of the EIA procedure based 
on co-operative participation amounts thus to a 
                                                                 
60 See Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (1999) 178; Godard (1997) 65-66. For 
the original conceptualisations of the precautionary principle, see 
Cameron and Abouchar (1991) 2; O'Riordan and Cameron (1994) 17; de 
Sadeleer (1999) 137-167. 
61 See Shepherd and Bowler (1997) 728. 
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model of legitimisation of administrative decisions 
related to development projects, under which such 
decisions become legitimate by being the outcome 
of a procedure allowing for the environmental inter-
ests and concerns to be integrated in its ratio deci-
dendi. From this perspective, the legitimising ratio 
of the EIA procedure lies in the unacceptability of a 
model of spatial development under which the ad-
ministrative decisions implementing the general 
development options are taken without the envi-
ronmental interests at stake being previously pon-
dered. The EIA procedure becomes, still under this 
perspective, the suitable arena for the conflicting 
interests between development and environment to 
be voiced and a reasonable balance, if possible, to 
be struck.  
Put in this context, the EIA procedure constitutes 
the full expression of the commitment enshrined in 
Article 2 of the EC Treaty to grant the environment 
a high level of protection, for it imbues one of the 
most important facets of the Member States’ public 
administrative branch, namely the one of develop-
ment, with such an environmental deep commit-
ment. And this constitutes a vital step towards 
broadening and consolidating the legitimacy of the 
Member States’ administrations. Put differently, 
through a Community legislative act the national 
administrations see their traditional legitimacy 
pattern change, for the administrative decisions 
taken upon development requests made by private 
developers or related to public projects become not 
only the result of the exercise of the statutory de-
velopment competencies, but also the outcome of 
the information brought to the EIA procedure. Thus, 
it is the exercise of the discretionary powers granted 
to the Member States’ administrations regarding a 
certain development project that becomes restricted 
through the pertinent environmental information at 
whose unfolding the EIA procedure aims. For the 
uncertainty associated with the effects a certain 
project might have on the environment shatters the 
traditional legitimacy source of administrative deci-
sions, namely the statutory law enacted by national 
parliaments or by the Member States’ governments 
pursuant to previous parliamentary delegations. In 
the impossibility of having the development (ad-
ministrative) decisions supported by reasonably 
precise and complete legislative commands or even 
by the granting of wide discretionary powers, the 
EIA procedure becomes the legitimacy source of 
those decisions by allowing for the pertinent envi-
ronmental information to be communicated to the 
development authorities. And such legitimacy be-
comes reinforced by the association of the public in 
the gathering of the pertinent environmental infor-
mation.62 
This amounts to a new paradigm in administrative 
decision-making by which those development deci-
sions likely to have significant implications on the 
environment mu st correspond to the outcome of a 
procedure destined to generate knowledge. The 
administration, when dealing with environmental 
risks, is no longer supposed to dispose the average 
knowledge (experience) – which by itself does not 
exclude the consultation of experts who themselves 
had to interpret a common knowledge potentially 
accessible to everybody.63 In the same vein, the 
granting of discretionary powers to the administra-
tion in order to assess the significant effects a pro-
ject might have on the environment is not suitable 
to cope with the uncertainty associated with those 
effects, for administrative discretion is still oriented 
at a state of equilibrium presupposing shared and 
general public knowledge and values.64 More con-
cretely, discretion rests on the experience accumu-
lated by administrations on a case-to-case basis and 
on the privileged knowledge derived from that 
experience. On the contrary, the EIA procedure 
breaks such an administrative decision-making 
paradigm, for expertise and experience are alone 
unsuitable to cope with uncertainty. Since knowl-
edge is no longer a shared attribute between the 
actors involved in the EIA procedure, procedurali-
sation appears as the arena where the pertinent 
knowledge will be generated within a set of plural-
istic ‘vis ions of the world’. And it is from this cog-
nitive perspective, grounded on its co-operative 
participatory dimension, that the EIA procedure 
becomes a suitable instrument to render develop-
ment decisions politically legitimate. For, in con-
texts of uncertainty and complexity, the faculty of 
developing concepts which can be converted into 
common visions amounts to the possibility of exe r-
cising policy leadership.65 
3 Conclusion 
To sum up within a discursive theoretical backdrop, 
‘participation is interaction among individuals 
through the medium of language. Thus, it makes 
                                                                 
62 On this issue, but in general terms, see Galligan (1996) 282.  
63 See Ladeur (1996) 9. As stressed by this author when analysing the 
traditional paradigm of administrative decision-making, ‘… even though 
judgements are open to discussion, they have normally to relate to some 
common representation of a state of normality open to slow social evolu-
tion which are not called into question by even serious accidents. The 
attribution rules themselves are considered to e stable whereas in detail 
one could quarrel about whether cattle-grazing on the rails is ‘normal’ or 
whether thatched roofs catching fire sparks emitted by railway locomotives 
are harm to be attributed to railway companies or just bad luck to be borne 
by owners’ (underlined in the text). 
64 See again Ladeur (1996) 9. 
65 On a similar approach, see Wallace and Young (1997)  249. 
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sense to ground a normative model of [procedural] 
… participation in a theory of how language is used 
– also known as pragmatics’.66 Implicit in this claim 
stands the assumption that knowledge is socially 
constructed, thus grounding the right of individuals 
to make political arguments about how their inter-
ests and values are affected by a proposed consen-
sus.67 But the exercise of the participatory right by 
relevant actors involves the rising of a normative 
sphere in which consensus as well disagreement can 
be equally achieved as well voiced.  
Put differently, the procedure allowing for partici-
pation must be structured upon rules promoting 
equal and  competent constructions of understand-
ing.68 In this respect, the EIA procedure must be 
carried out upon the premise of the different level of 
knowledge possessed and brought by the involved 
actors when participating. This amounts then to 
inferring that procedural participation under the 
EIA procedure demands the norms upon which is 
shaped to be interpreted and applied in order to 
allow such actors to learn and to bring new knowl-
edge into the procedure. And it is under this proce-
dural parameter that the transposition of the EIA 
Directive into the EC Member States’ legal orders 
must be assessed. 
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When the permanent representatives of the Member 
States during the COREPER of March 16th 2001 
finally agreed on the last bits of it, it became clear 
that the acquis communautaire would soon be en-
riched with an important piece of environmental 
legislation: the Directive on the assessment of the 
effects of certain plans and programmes on the 
environment, the so-called SEA Directive. This 
article aims to introduce the main elements of this 
new directive. 
1 What is Strategic Environmental Assess-
ment? 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) has 
been defined as: 
"The formalised, systematic and comprehensive 
process of evaluating the environmental effects 
of a policy, plan or programme and its alterna-
tives, including the preparation of a written re-
port on the findings of that evaluation, and us-
ing the findings in publicly accountable deci-
sion-making."1. 
                                                                 
*  This paper reflects the views of its author and is not written for or on 
behalf of the European Commission or the Environment Directorate-
General.  
Jan De Mulder, European Commission, DG Environment, Unit Territorial 
Dimension 
1 THERIVEL, R., & PARTIDARIO, M.R. (1996), The practice of Strategic 
Environmental Assessment, Earthscan, London, p. 4.; Another definition 
says: "SEA is a systematic process for evaluating the environmental con-
sequences of proposed policy, plan or programme initiatives in order to 
pursue they are fully included and appropriately addressed at the earliest 
 
2 Why Strategic Environmental Assessment? 
In the literature2, one usually finds the following 
two main reasons for doing an SEA. 
(a) SEA should counteract some of the limitations 
of project EIA.  
In general these limitations concern mainly the 
following observations based on the evaluation of 
the effectiveness of the project EIA-practice: 
· project EIA is more reactive to a given project 
proposal than pro-active by having an input in 
the project-design 
· project EIA addresses a limited range of alter-
natives and mitigating measures 
· project EIA has limited opportunities regarding 
public consultation and influencing the deci-
sion making 
(b) SEA should promote sustainable development 
More in particular, SEA can play a significant role 
in enhancing the integration of environmental con-
cerns in planning processes. A more integrated 
system of planning means that environmental crite-
ria are incorporated throughout the planning proc-
                                                                     
stage of decision-making on par with economic and social considerations", 
in SADLER, B., & VERHEEM, R. (1996), Strategic Environmental As-
sessment: Status, Challenges and Future Directions, Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment/DHV, Amersfoort-The Hague. 
2 THERIVEL, R., & PARTIDARIO, M.R. (1996), o.c., p 8. 
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ess, which could help to implement the concept of 
sustainable development. 
3 The development of the SEA Directive 
Already more than a decade ago proposals were 
drafted3 and discussed but only in December 1996 
the Commission agreed on a proposal.4 After the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Commit-
tee of the Regions had given their opinions, the 
European Parliament held its 1st reading (20 Octo-
ber 1998)5. The EP's amendments reflected its con-
cerns about the scope of the proposed directive, the 
information and participation of the public, as well 
as the need for studying alternatives and establis h-
ing monitoring systems.  
The Commission accepted fully, in principle or in 
part 15 of the 29 (during the vote the 33 amend-
ments were merged to 29) amendments and modi-
fied its proposal accordingly6. 
After intensive negotiations under the Finnish 
presidency, the Council agreed on a Common Posi-
tion7 (March 30th 2000) under the German Presi-
dency. The Common Position incorporated fully or 
in part 14 of the EP's amendments. Regarding the 
scope of the future directive the Common Position 
introduced two categories of plans and programmes 
(for which an SEA is mandatory or non-
mandatory). The Commission could not support8 
the Common Position as it found that the scope of 
the future directive had been too much limited in 
comparison to the initial approach of the Commis-
sion's proposal. As a result of its 2nd reading (6 
September 2000)9 the EP formulated a number of 
amendments to the Common Position. They were 
mainly focused on widening the scope, limiting the 
number of exemptions, the possible inclusion of 
policies in the future review of the directive, im-
proving the information requirements and transpar-
ency, improving consultation with countries outside 
the Community and improving the effectiveness of 
the SEA instrument through monitoring require-
                                                                 
3 BOCKEN, H. & RYCKBOST, D. (1996), Codification of Environmental Law 
– Draft Decree on Environmental Po licy, Kluwer, London, 176. 
4 COM (96)511, OJ C 129 of 25.04.1997, p. 14. 
5 OJ C341 of 09.11.98, p. 10. 
6 COM (99)073, OJ C 83 of 25.03.1999, p. 13. 
7 OJ C 137 of 16.05.2000, p. 11. For a commentary, see: FELDMANN, L. 
(2000), Strategische Umweltprüfung (SUP) - Zwei Drittel des Weges zur 
EG-Richtlinie geschafft, UVP-report 2/2000, 109-110. 
8 SEC (2000) 0568: " (…) the scope of the Directive (…) does not live up to 
the principles and objectives on environmental integration as launched at 
the Cardiff Council (…) nor with the broad scope of application requested 
by the European Parliament at the first reading (…) there is no justification 
for legally exempting the EU Structural Funds from the scope of this Direc-
tive (…)". 
9 Not yet published in the OJ. 
ments and quality assurance for the future SEA 
reports. 
As the EP -amendments and the positions of a num-
ber of Member States in the Council were quite 
opposing and resulted in rather difficult negotia-
tions, these subsequent final rounds including some 
informal trilogues, were however successfully com-
pleted under the Swedish Presidency without the 
need of a formal conciliation. 
In the course of this process the following main 
improvements have been added:  
· insertion of the integration principle 
· transposition of the main provisions of the 
Aarhus Convention on public partic ipation 
· transposition of the main provisions of the 
Espoo Convention on transboundary consulta-
tions 
· provision to clarify the relationship to other 
Community instruments 
· provision to avoid duplication of assessments 
· clarification of the scope of application 
· introduction of monitoring requirements 
· provision to introduce the quality assurance of 
environmental reports 
4 Main Characteristics and major elements of 
the SEA Directive 
The SEA Directive10 is a horizontal directive which 
introduces procedural requirements. Its structure is 
similar to the project EIA-Directive (Directive 
85/337/EEC as amended by Directive 97/11/EC). 
Given the broad scope of the latter Directive and the 
structural link between both directives, it is hard to 
describe the SEA Directive as a stand alone instru-
ment but the SEA Directive offers undoubtedly a 
crucial policy instrument in the necessary range 
from environmental planning to voluntary agree-
ments.  
The SEA Directive contains 20 recitals, 15 articles 
and 2 annexes, dealing with: 
· objectives (Art. 1) 
· definitions (Art. 2) 
· scope (Art. 3 and Annex II)  
· general obligations (Art. 4) 
· environmental report (Art. 5 and Annex I) 
· consultations at MS-level (Art. 6) 
· transboundary consultations (Art. 7) 
· decision making (Art. 8) 
· information on the decision (Art. 9) 
                                                                 
10 For the not yet official text, see:   
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/eia/full-legal-text/ 
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· monitoring (Art. 10) 
· relationship with other EC law (Art. 11) 
· information, reporting, review (Art. 12) 
· implementation (Art. 13-15) 
5 Overview of the articles 
Article 1 concerns the Objectives of the SEA Di-
rective 
This article makes clear that the objective (singu-
lar!) of this directive is to provide for a high level of 
protection of the environment and to contribute to 
the integration of environmental considerations into 
the preparation of plans and programmes with a 
view to promoting sustainable development. How 
this ambition which reflects also Article 6 of the 
Treaty, should be tackled is made explicit in the 
second part of the article, namely “by ensuring that 
an SEA is carried out of certain plans and pro-
grammes with likely significant effects on the envi-
ronment”. 
Article 2 contains the 4 Definitions: "plans and 
programmes", "environmental assessment", "envi-
ronmental report" and "the public". 
In the Common Position the definition of plans and 
programmes concerned not only new plans and 
programmes but also their modifications and these 
plans/programmes had to fulfil 2 conditions: (1) 
being subject to preparation/adoption by an author-
ity or through a legislative procedure, and (2) being 
required by legislative, regulatory or administrative 
provisions. The EP wanted to include as a 3rd pos-
sibility: plans/programmes which are funded by the 
European Union. The final text contains now 
plans/programmes “including those CO-FINANCED 
BY THE EC” which have to fulfil both above-
mentioned conditions.  
The definition of "environmental assessment"11 
refers to procedural aspects, whilst “environmental 
report" as a kind of intermediate product of the SEA 
process, is part of the plan/programme -
documentation. 
The definition of "the public" has been brought in 
line with the definition in Article 2, par. 4 of the 
Aarhus Convention12. 
                                                                 
11 The original COM-proposal contained 5 definitions: plan/programme which 
was exclusively focused on town and country planning; competent author-
ity; development consent; project; and environmental assessment which 
included the preparation of an environmental statement. The SEA Direc-
tive no longer refers to competent authorities as the decision making con-
text regarding plans/programmes is difficult to compare with the project 
development consent or permit/authorization approaches being applied in 
Member States. 
12 Convention on access to information ,public participation in decision 
making and access to justice in environmental matters; see: 
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ctreaty.htm 
Article 3 concerns the Scope of application of the 
Directive 
This article contains several approaches. 
First of all it makes clear that for certain 
plans/programmes an SEA is mandatory, namely 
plans/programmes which fulfil certain conditions, 
and these are all plans/programmes: 
· in the areas/sectors: agriculture, forestry, fis h-
eries, energy, industry, transport, waste man-
agement, water management, telecommunica-
tions, tourism, town and country planning or 
land use AND which set the framework for 
future projects as listed in the project EIA Di-
rective (85/337 as amended by 97/11) 
or 
· with likely significant effects on Natura 2000 
sites , pursuant to Art . 6 / 7 of the Habitats Di-
rective (92/43/EC)13  
Furthermore and similar to the project EIA-
Directive, a screening-approach is introduced. 
Member States have to determine whether 
plans/programmes - other than the above-mentioned 
- are likely to have significant environmental ef-
fects. More in particular it concerns 
plans/programmes which set the framework for 
future projects, but which are not included in the 
mandatory list; plans/programmes covered by the 
mandatory list which determine the use of small 
areas at the local level and minor modifications to 
plans/programmes which are covered in the manda-
tory list. 
The screening approach is identical to the project 
EIA-screening approach: (1) case by case examina-
tion, or (2) specifying types of plans/programmes, 
or (3)combining both approaches.  
When applying one of these approaches the relevant 
selection criteria set out in Annex II have always to 
be used. Anyhow the SEA Directive still offers the 
Member States to exempt certain classes of 
plans/programmes from an assessment as the Coun-
cil did not want to take over the EP's amendment 
which intended to have only a case by case exami-
nation. 
Finally, this article lists the plans/programmes 
which are exempted. They concern the following 
areas: national defence, civil emergency, finance 
                                                                 
13 The original COM-proposal contained in its art. 10, par. 2 the following 
provision:" 2. This Directive shall not apply to management plans specifi-
cally designed for special areas of conservation and adopted pursuant to 
Article 6 (1) of Council Directive 92/43/EEC (3).". See also: European 
Commission, Managing Natura 2000 sites: The provisions of Article 6 of 
the 'Habitats' Directive 92/43/EEC, Luxembourg, 2000. Recital 13 says 
now: "Some plans and programmes are not subject to this Directive be-
cause of their particular characteristics". 
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and the budget as well as the Structural Funds regu-
lations14. Concerning the latter only 
plans/programmes under the current programming 
periods of these regulations are not subject to the 
Directive. 
A reading of the subsequent texts on the scope of a 
future SEA Directive reveals that “policies” were 
dropped (however the EP tried to pick them up 
again, and wanted to submit all the Community 
policies referred in Article 3 of the Treaty to SEA) 
and that the idea - in the original COM-proposal - to 
work only with town and country (framework) 
planning was left. The inclusion of the other sec-
tors/areas gives the impression that the scope is 
broad but the fact that the additional requirement 
for framework setting for future authorization is a 
cumulative one (and which the EP tried to alter), 
may have a rather restrictive effect to the initial 
intention. The EP was also not successful to get 
financial plans in the mandatory list. 
Article 4 concerns the General obligations. 
The SEA has to be carried out early: during the 
preparation of the plan/programme and before its 
adoption. The Member States have the choice con-
cerning the transposition of the requirements of the 
SEA Directive. They can decide to amending exist-
ing procedures for plans/programmes or they may 
prefer to establish new procedures. 
This article reflects also the clear link between SEA 
and planning approaches which should be seen as 
an iterative process. From this perspective the 3rd 
paragraph stipulates that in order to avoid duplica-
tion of assessment, Member States shall take into 
account that SEA has to be done at different plan-
ning levels if plans/programmes form part of a 
hierarchy. This paragraph refers also to the 2nd and 
3rd paragraphs of Article 5 - but according to the 
wording, not only for efficiency reasons (" for the 
purpose of, inter alia, avoiding duplication of as-
sessment ") which is however rather superfluous as 
it should be obvious to apply the relevant provisions 
of Article 5.  
The insertion of the words "avoiding duplication of 
assessment" which are included in the Articles 4 
(3), 5 (2), 10 (2) and 11 (2), shows the preoccupa-
tion not to burden planners with too stringent re-
quirements. In addition Articles 4 (2), 5 (2, 3), 11 
(2) and 12 (4) illustrate also the concern for effi-
cient legislation. 
                                                                 
14 Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/99 of 17 May on support for rural  
development from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund (EAGGF) and amending and repealing certain regulations, OJ L 
160, 26.06.1999, p. 80; and Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/99 of 21 
June 1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds, OJ L 
161, 26.06.1999, p. 1. 
Article 5 and Annex I on The Environmental Re-
port 
Strategic Environmental Assessment includes the 
preparation of an environmental report, which iden-
tifies, describes and evaluates the likely significant 
effects of implementing the plan/programme and its 
reasonable alternatives , taking into account objec-
tives and geographical scope of the 
plan/programme.  
Annex I to the Directive lists the detailed require -
ments concerning the contents of the report. 
This annex contains inter alia the requirement to 
provide information on "the relevant aspects of the 
current state of the environment and the likely evo-
lution thereof without implementation of the plan or 
programme", which leads to the conclusion that 
concerning the reasonable alternatives at least the 
so-called zero-option always has to be dealt with. 
An effort by the EP to insert as well the requirement 
that the report should indicate which of the reason-
able alternatives has to be considered as the best 
environmental option did not succeed. 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 indicate that there is a degree of 
flexibility (information that may reasonably 
required): the precise contents of a report will 
depend on the current knowledge and SEA method-
ology, the contents and level of detail of the 
plan/programme, the stage of the decision making 
process and the feasibility/usefulness of the SEA 
given the hierarchy of the plan/programme. Fur-
thermore relevant information obtained at other 
decision making levels or through other EC legisla-
tion may be used.  
In order to find out in the scoping phase what 
should be part of the report, environmental authori-
ties shall be consulted (par. 4).  
Articles 6 and 7 concern the issue of Consulta-
tions  
The SEA Directive makes a difference between 
consulting authorities  and the public. 
Member States have to designate authorities (para. 
3) to be consulted and these are the authorities 
which, by reason of their specific environmental 
authorities, are likely to be concerned by the envi-
ronmental effects of implementing the 
plans/programmes.  
The Directive stipulates that authorities are to be 
consulted in different situations: in the screening 
phase (Art . 3 (6)); in the scoping phase (Art. 5 (4)) 
and on the draft p/p and the environmental report 
(Art. 6 (2)).  
Member States have also to identify the public (par. 
4). The public is to be consulted - only - on the draft 
p/p and the environmental report. The concept of 
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the public in Art. 6 (4) is a more limited one than in 
par. 1 of Art. 6, as this paragraph 4 is linked to 
Paragraph 2 which is focused on the consultative 
aspect. So it is no surprise to find in paragraph 4 
elements of the definition of "the public concerned" 
from the Aarhus Convention (Art. 2). Furthermore 
the SEA directive transposes the public participa-
tion requirements of Article 7 of the Aarhus Con-
vention. The more precise wording in par. 4 was 
introduced further to the EP’s amendment. The EP 
could not however convince the Council to drop the 
word “relevant” (before NGOs), which was not in 
the original COM-proposal but was in the Common 
Position. 
The SEA Directive makes a difference between 
consultations at Member State level (Art. 6) and 
transboundary consultations (Art. 7). Article 7 
transposes the principles of the Espoo Convention15. 
Recital 7 deals also with the implementation of this 
Convention. The EP’s amendment to broaden the 
transboundary consultations from a Member State 
to an affected (non Member) State was not kept.  
Both articles contain provisions which require de-
tailed arrangements to be developed at the Member 
State level. 
Article 8 concerns the Decision making 
This brief but important article which remained 
essentially unchanged during the legislative drafting 
and negotiating process stipulates that the final 
version of the plan/programme has to take into 
account, BEFORE  its adoption: (1) the environmental 
report and (2) the opinions expressed pursuant to 
the consultations, including if applicable, trans-
boundary consultations. It is obvious that the im-
plementation of this provision is crucial for the 
effectiveness of the SEA instrument. 
Article 9 Information on the decision 
The SEA Directive contains in different articles a 
range of information requirements. According to 
this Directive, the following information has to be 
made available: 
· The screening decision has to be made avail-
able to the public including the reasons for not 
requiring an environmental assessment (Art. 3 
(7))16 
                                                                 
15 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context, see: http://www.unece.org/env/eia . 
 However this convention is focused on project EIA, art. 2 (7) stipulates: "7. 
Environmental impact assessments as required by this Convention shall, 
as a minimum requirement, be undertaken at the project level of the pro-
posed activity. To the extent appropriate, the Parties shall endeavour to 
apply the principles o f environmental impact assessment to policies, plans 
and programmes. " 
16 See also Art. 13 (3) on the transitory regime.  
· the environmental report and the draft 
plan/programme  have to be made available to 
the public and the authorities in order to give 
them the opportunity to express their opinions 
(Art. 6 (1)) 
· the final decision, in particular : (1) the 
adopted plan/programme; (2) an explanatory 
statement concerning the integrationof envi-
ronmental considerations as a result of the SEA 
process including the reasoning on the final 
choice in the light of the other reasonable alter-
natives; and (3) the monitoring measures have 
to be made available to the public and the au-
thorities (Art. 9 (1)). 
Member States have to determine the detailed ar-
rangements. Also this article remained largely un-
changed since the original COM-proposal with the 
exception of the insertion of the “measures decided 
concerning monitoring in accordance with Article 
10”. 
Article 10 Monitoring 
Neither the original COM-proposal, nor the Com-
mon position contained any monitoring provision. 
For this major improvement to the final text of the 
SEA Directive credit has to be given to the EP. 
During its 2nd reading the EP stuck to its opinion of 
the 1st reading. This institution justified its preoc-
cupation with monitoring as follows: “Monitoring 
of plans and programmes is essential for testing 
predictions and ensuring a consistent improvement 
in policy and prediction at subsequent cycles. The 
SEA provides the opportunity for substantially 
avoiding or mitigating environmental damage, both 
in terms of changes to policies, abandonment of 
particularly damaging elements and early modifica-
tion of projects. The effectiveness of such measures 
can only be assessed if the implementation of he 
plan or programme is monitored.” The Commission 
accepted these amendments subject to rewording.  
The article requires that Member States shall moni-
tor the significant environmental effects of the im-
plementation of plans/programmes in order to, inter 
alia : (1) the early identification of unforeseen ad-
verse effects and (2) the undertaking of the appro-
priate remedial actions. For this Member States may 
use existing monitoring arrangements17. 
Further to this provision it is obvious that Annex I 
contains also the requirement that a description of 
the monitoring measures have to be part of the 
environmental report.  
                                                                 
17 An example of an existing monitoring mechanism could be the ones 
required by Article 8 of Directive 2000/60/EC of 23 October 2000 estab-
lishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 
327, 22.12.2000, p. 1 -73. 
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Article 11 concerns the Relationship with other EC 
legislation 
Three categories of future relationships with exis t-
ing EC legislations are envisaged in this article: 
· The SEA Directive shall not lead to any preju-
dice to the requirements of the project EIA Di-
rective or any other EC legislation; 
· In case other EC legislation requires also envi-
ronmental assessments of plans/programmes 
simultaneously with the SEA Directive, Mem-
ber States may provide for coordinated/joint 
procedures; 
· In case of a plan/programme co-financed by the 
EC, the SEA has to be carried out in confor-
mity with the particular relevant EC legislation. 
The link between the project EIA-Directive and the 
future is of course very direct given article 3, and 
some delegations feared that by applying an SEA, 
subsequent EIAs could be avoided which might 
lead to an undermining of the EIA-Directive.  
Member States could introduce a coordinated/joint 
procedure with respect to the requirement of Article 
6 (3) of the Habitats Directive as this directive re-
quires an assessment for certain plans.  
The last category is the result of the concern of 
some Member States that the existing ex ante 
evaluation requirements in the Structural Funds 
regulations18 have to be considered as a kind of 
SEA…  
Article 12 concerns the issues of Information, 
reporting, review 
This article reflects a major concern: how to safe-
guard the EFFECTIVENESS of the SEA Directive? 
The 1st and 3rd paragraphs contain rather classical 
provisions, namely the information exchange be-
tween the Member States and the Commission on 
the experience gained with the SEA Directive as 
well as the 5-year review which may lead to 
amendments, e.g. on the scope of the Directive. 
More interesting is paragraph 2 which stipulates 
that Member States have to ensure the appropriate 
quality of the environmental reports, at the least to 
meet the requirements of the SEA Directive, and 
have to communicate any quality measure being 
taken. When looking for quality requirements in the 
Directive one thinks at first about the required in-
formation which should be included in the envi-
ronmental reports (article 5 / annex I). Procedural 
aspects may however not be overlooked, e.g. in  
particular how effectively the necessary consulta-
                                                                 
18 Article 43 (1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/99 and Article 41 (2, b) 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/99 of 21 June 1999. 
tion with the environmental authorities may be 
organized or more general how the environmental 
information (state of the environment reports; moni-
toring data etc…) are made available.   
The last paragraph of this article concerns - again - 
the delicate issue of the relationship with the Struc-
tural Funds regulations and requires the Commis-
sion to report on this in particular regarding the 
coherence between these EC laws. The future will 
make clear what the meaning of "ensuring a coher-
ent approach between this Directive and the subse-
quent Community Regulations" will be. 
The Articles 13, 14 and 15 concern the implemen-
tation of the SEA Directive  
The transposition date of this Directive will be 3 
years after the entry into force of this Directive. 
Article 13 (3) stipulates that an SEA is obligatory 
for: 
· plans/programmes of which the 1st formal 
preparatory act is subsequent to the transposi-
tion date 
· plans/programmes of which the 1st formal 
preparatory act is before the transposition date 
and which are adopted/submitted after more 
than 2 years after the transposition date unless 
the Member State decides this is not feasible. 
6 Some conclusions and what about the 
future?  
The SEA Directive is an important step towards the 
realization of a concrete integration approach. It 
may be considered as an effort to address the mis s-
ing link between environmental planning at the 
policy level and EIA at the project level. Also the 
NGO-world has welcomed this Directive19.  
Undoubtedly the EP has played a crucial role in 
improving the potential effectiveness of this Direc-
tive. The ongoing classical tension between eco-
nomic development priorities and environmental 
concerns was the driving force for keeping some 
rather weak provisions. 
The EP and the Council are expected to adopt the 
Directive in the course of the coming weeks. 
Regarding the implementation of this Directive it is 
obvious that a huge challenge is waiting for the 
environmental administrations in the Member 
States. Some have already done some trial exercises 
or research projects have been initiated to prepare 
the implementation20. A recent study-project21 fi-
                                                                 
19 See: http//:www.ends.co.uk/envdaily of 3 May 2001. 
20 For a few interesting publications, see: KLEINSCHMIDT, V. & WAGNER, 
D. (eds.) (1998) SEA in Europe, Kluwer, London; SHEATE, W. (ed.), Mak-
ing the Links between Tools, special issue of Journal of Environmental 
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nanced by DG Environment of the Commission 
offers valuable background information for address-
ing implementation issues at Member State level.  
                                                                     
Assessment Policy and Management, Vol 1 No 4, December 1999, Lon-
don; JACOBY, C., Strategische Umweltprüfung (SUP), UVP-report 
1/2001, 28-32. 
21 SHEATE, W. & DAGG, S. and others (2001), SEA and Integration of the 
Environment into Strategic Decision-Making, London, will be available on 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/eia 
Finally it is important that the negotiations on this 
Directive were finalized in a successful way as the 
2nd Meeting of the Parties to the Espoo-Convention 
which took place in Sofia, last February, agreed to 
start negotiations for an SEA Protocol22 to the 
Espoo-Convention. The European Community is 
now definitely in a better negotiation position. 
 
                                                                 
22 See: http://www.unece.org/env/eia/ad-hocwg.htm. 
1 Introduction 
In recent years the number of voluntary agreements 
has increased significantly, covering aspects of 
environmental policy like climate protection, the 
prevention of pollution and the management of the 
waste sector. Since mentioning the use of voluntary 
agreements in the 5th Environmental Action Pro-
gramme (1992), the EU has continuously encour-
aged the use of voluntary agreements. The EU End-
of-Life Vehicles Directive (2000) even proposes to 
use voluntary agreements as an instrument for its 
implementation on national level. While the instru-
ment at first was used without a formal institutional 
framework, several EU member states now have 
enacted regulations regarding voluntary agreements. 
In fact, today voluntary agreements must be seen as 
an established instrument for environmental policy. 
There are a number of legal constraints that limit 
the use of voluntary agreements. These constraints 
may be found in EU law with issues such as free 
trade and open competition, and in the constitu-
tional law of the member states with issues such as 
divis ion of powers, democratic legitimisation, and 
the state’s duty to protect health and safety of indi-
viduals, and third party rights. In addition to these 
constraints, the implementation of voluntary agree-
ments raises a number of other important legal 
issues , including procedural questions, monitoring 
and enforcement.  
2 Forms of Voluntary Agreements 
Shape, content and impact of voluntary agreements 
vary widely. But they all have some basic character-
istics in common. In summary one can define a 
voluntary agreement as an agreement or an action 
of self regulation which is voluntary in character, 
that involves stakeholders of which at least one is 
the state, that is either a substitute or that is a device 
for implementing or going beyond environmental 
law and policy and that is aimed at sustainable 
development (elni, 1998:27). In order to be able to 
assess the legal requirements and problems, a rough 
grouping is necessary. These groups are whether 
voluntary agreements are unilateral or multilateral, 
how they correspond to respective legal norms, 
whether they are legally binding or not and whether 
they are concluded under civil law or public law. In 
order to illustrate the different forms, first a few 
practical examples of voluntary agreements are 
given, which then will be subsumed to the different 
categories.  
2.1 Practical Examples for Different Forms of 
Voluntary Agreements 
No. 1 Voluntary Agreement of the German Aluminium 
Industry for the Protection of the Climate, 1997 
The Sectoral Association of Primary Aluminium 
committed itself to reduce the emissions of the 
greenhouse gases Tetrafluoromethane (CF4) and 
Hexafluoroethane (C2F6) by no less than 50% by 
the year 2005 on the basis of 1990. The five associ-
ated aluminium works will optimise their process 
management and use up-to-date techniques of met-
allurgical engineering to reach the goal. The pro-
gress shall be reported to the Ministry for Environ-
ment every year on the basis of independently con-
ducted surveys. 
No. 2 The Dutch Benchmarking Covenant, 1999 
The covenant was concluded by the Minister of 
Environment, the Minister of Economic Affairs and 
the provinces on the one side and the general em-
ployers’ organisation as well as organisations of 
energy-intensive industries such as electricity com-
panies and refineries on the other side. The goal is 
to reduce CO2 so that as many process-installations 
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as possible will belong to the best-of-the-world in 
the area of energy efficiency by 2012 at the latest. 
How the goal is to be reached lies within the re-
sponsibility of the companies, but intermediate 
steps and independent monitoring is foreseen. The 
state is obligated not to take any additional specific 
measures as to energy saving and the reduction of 
CO2, with the reservation though, that general en-
ergy taxes may be levied. 
2.2 No.3 The French “accord cadre” on the 
treatment of end-of-life vehicles, 1993 
The agreement was concluded by the Ministers of 
Industry and Environment on the state’s side, Peu-
geot/Citroën, Renault and the federations of the 
major industries producing material for cars. The 
joint environmental goal is to reach a recovery rate 
of 85% of the total weight of end of life vehicles by 
2002. The industry is free in the choice among 
recycling, reutilization and recovering energy. 
2.3 No.4 The Agreement of the German Federal 
Government and the Nuclear Industry on 
Phasing out Nuclear 
Energy (“Atomkonsens”), 2000 
The Agreement was initialled by the Chief of the 
Chancellor’s Office and the state secretaries of the 
Ministry for Environment and Nuclear Safety as 
well as the Ministry of Economic Affairs as repre-
sentatives of the Federal Government and by the 
four German companies producing nuclear energy. 
Its goal is to terminate the production of nuclear 
energy and it also contains provisions on storage 
and disposal of nuclear waste. The content of the 
required amendments to German nuclear law are 
described. The most important provisions are that 
the amount of electricity which may still be pro-
duced by nuclear means has been fixed. The state 
will not raise undue obstacles regarding permits etc, 
but no new nuclear plants can be permitted. Also 
special instruments of monitoring are established. 
No.5 The Municipality of Faenza’s (Italy) voluntary 
agreement on air quality,1997 
The agreement was concluded between the Munici-
pality of Faenza and some distilleries and oil mill 
companies (Ditta Neri, Tamperi, Caviro, Dister-
coop, Villa Pana). It aims at reducing air pollution. 
All participating companies are committed to im-
prove the quality of the air with specific actions in 
the places where they work. 
No. 6 The Establishment of the Dual System for 
Packaging Waste (“Green Dot”) in Germany, 1992 
An agreement was concluded in every regional state 
with the “Dual System Germany” a corporation 
founded by the packaging industry, to establish a 
general system for collection and recycling of pack-
aging waste in cooperation with the municipalities. 
The aim is to allow the implementation of the “pol-
luter pays” principle while granting the producers 
discretion on the organisation. Only some basic 
rules and quotas for the system are laid down in the 
German Directive for Packaging Waste (version of 
1998). All producers of packages who pay licence 
fees are relieved from their legal obligation accord-
ing to § 6 para. 1 German Packaging Directive, 
which would oblige them to collect and recycle 
distributed packages individually. In case the sys-
tem does not function any more, the basic require-
ments are not met or licence fees are not paid, the 
individual obligation of taking back all packages 
will come back into force automatically.  
2.4 Unilateral and Multilateral Voluntary Agree-
ments 
Unilateral agreements are one form of voluntary 
agreements. They are unilateral in the sense that 
technically they are not concluded by two parties, 
but directed at or related to the state in some way. 
Usually these are self-commitments initiated by the 
industry with preceding negotiations between busi-
ness associations and the government, resulting in 
some kind of relief by the government [Ex. 1]. 
Multilateral voluntary agreements are concluded by 
the state with business organisations or individual 
companies or with a combination of both. It is also 
possible to include more parties such as environ-
mental groups, trade unions, local authorities in 
order to enhance the efficiency, acceptance or legal 
safety of the agreement [Ex. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. 
2.5 Voluntary Agreements in Correspondence to 
Respective Legal Norms 
Voluntary agreements can also be categorised in 
regard of their relation to legal norms. Among these 
categories are those voluntary agreements prevent-
ing legal norms. They are used in a situation where 
no regulation exists at all on a specific topic and the 
state wants to use a voluntary agreement instead of 
enacting a legal norm to reach the proposed envi-
ronmental goal (Ex. No. 2, 3). Voluntary agree-
ments preceding legal norms contain certain stipu-
lations concerning the content of a new law to be 
enacted or an amendment in the near future (Ex. 
No. 4). This method enables the parties to use some 
of the benefits of a voluntary agreement even for 
those matters which must be dealt with exclusively 
by law for constitutional reasons. The impact of a 
voluntary agreement can also be that of substitut-
ing a legal norm, such as when the state decides not 
to pursue an environmental goal by enacting a legal 
norm, but with the provisions of a voluntary agree-
ment. After the voluntary agreement has been con-
cluded successfully, the legal norm will either be 
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de-enacted or not be enforced as long as the VA is 
complied with. It has to be noted that this form of 
voluntary agreement can only be used if the rele-
vant law is formally being de-enacted or if the non-
enforcement and substitution is foreseen in the law 
itself. 
2.6 Legally Binding or not Legally Binding Volun-
tary Agreements 
One of the major distinctions of voluntary agree-
ments is whether they are legally binding (Ex. No. 
2, 5, 6) or not (Ex. No. 1, 3, 4). Whereas voluntary 
agreements in the beginning mostly were legally 
unbinding, the number of legally binding agree-
ments has increased significantly. The reasoning for 
non-binding agreements usually is that they fit 
better into the concept of voluntariness, with easier 
negotiations and less formalities needed. But in case 
of non-compliance, legally unbinding voluntary 
agreements cannot be enforced. This has given way 
to much criticism towards the effectiveness and 
legality of certain voluntary agreements. Binding 
agreements, though, are enforceable, in principle, 
and allow both parties to plan future steps on a 
more reliable background. The European Commis-
sion has suggested to use legally binding agree-
ments if possible in its Communication (1996: No. 
19). 
The fact whether the voluntary agreement is binding 
or not has great influence on legal consequences, 
especially for aspects such as the dissolution of the 
agreement, sanctions and enforcement. These dif-
ferences will be addressed in sections 6 and 7 of 
this paper. 
There are different ways to determine whether a 
voluntary agreement is legally binding or not. One 
possibility is an obligatory provision in an existing 
legal framework stating that the voluntary agree-
ment has to be binding, as for example in the Fle m-
ish Decree. Therefore all voluntary agreements 
under such a rule must be concluded as legally 
binding. If no such rule exists, it is within the dis-
cretion of the parties to determine whether the vol-
untary agreement is meant to be binding or not, as 
long as specific constitutional restraints are not 
violated. The determination can for example be 
done by a respective stipulation in the voluntary 
agreement itself. 
If it is unclear whether a voluntary agreement is 
legally binding or not, the classic rules of interpret-
ing contracts must be applied, possibly in combina-
tion with aspects of administrative law. This would 
include scrutinising the exact wording, analysing 
documents of the negotiation period or methods for 
assessing the potential will of both parties, all from 
the viewpoint of good faith. 
2.7 Voluntary Agreements as a construct under 
civil law or public law 
Voluntary agreements can be concluded under the 
regime of civil law (Ex. No. 2) or of public law (Ex. 
No. 5). It depends on the country’s legal traditions. 
Both regimes entail important consequences, espe-
cially regarding the procedure and jurisdiction. In 
civil law only very few rules exist, leaving proce-
dural aspects almost completely to the discretion of 
the parties. Rules of administrative procedure are 
very formal on the exact steps the competent au-
thority and its counterpart have to take, including 
time limits, specified written forms or specified 
procedures for submitting and publishing data. 
Voluntary agreements under civil law fall within the 
jurisdiction of civil courts and their respective pro-
cedural rules, while voluntary agreements under 
administrative law can only be challenged or en-
forced before administrative courts. But one cannot 
apply all the classic distinctions between civil and 
public law to voluntary agreements. They can be 
characterised as hybrids between civil and public 
law: Procedural rules which are following certain 
elements of administrative law, such as public par-
ticipation, can also be applied in a regime of civil 
law. 
Vice versa, the flexibility when negotiating a civil 
law contract can be, at least partly, transmitted into 
the regime of administrative law. And all voluntary 
agreements which are concluded as civil law con-
tracts, such as covenants in the Netherlands, do 
comprise elements of public law (Hazewindus 
2000:6). This becomes evident when considering 
that, in comparison to the usual situation with civil 
law contracts, there is no equality between the par-
ties of voluntary agreements due to the state power. 
For example, the competent authority can, in prin-
ciple, issue a stricter permit if a company does not 
comply with the agreement and thus enforce the 
environmental goal by means of state power. To 
have this choice is unique in the context of civil law 
contracts. 
3 Voluntary Agreements and the EU 
The possibility for EU member states to use volun-
tary agreements as an instrument of environmental 
policy has been acknowledged by the EU as long as 
they do not violate community law. In its Commu-
nication (1996) the Commission has given its opin-
ion and guidelines on voluntary agreements. This 
includes the use of voluntary agreements by the 
member states as an instrument of implementing 
EU directives, subject to the reservation on two 
major aspects. According to the European Court of 
Justice the instrument can only be used if the direc-
tive does not create rights and obligations for indi-
viduals. Also the character of the voluntary agree-
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ment must be that of a legally binding agreement. 
The choice to use a voluntary agreement for imple-
menting EU law is explicitly foreseen in the End-
of-Life Vehicles Directive (1999). 
The use of voluntary agreements is not restricted to 
the EU member states. They can also be concluded 
on European level by the EU-level itself, then called 
Community Environmental Agreements (CEAs). In 
the present legal situation, though, the EU Commis-
sion can only enter into legally non-binding volun-
tary agreements e.g. in form of unilateral commit-
ments or mutual understandings (Lefèvre, 2000). 
Due to the pan-European scope of many industries 
and environmental problems, and in addition, as a 
possible option to avoid distortion of free trade and 
competition, the use of CEAs could be a valuable 
element of effective environmental policy. The 
scope of potential CEAs would be enhanced, if the 
necessary provisions for legally binding CEAs were 
introduced into EU law. The relevant legal aspects 
to be addressed are similar to those in the member 
states. For example the role of the European Par-
liament when concluding CEAs must be clarified 
and the requirements on public participation, trans-
parency, monitoring etc, which are demanded from 
the member states are no less relevant on the Euro-
pean level. 
3.1 Voluntary Agreements and the Rules of Free 
Trade, Competition and Illegal State Aid 
When concluding voluntary agreements, the EU 
member states must not violate the principles of the 
single market. According to Art. 28 of the EU 
Treaty the creation of tariffs or non tariff barriers is 
prohibited. These may occur if a technology or 
marketing symbol is used or when benefits are 
granted as incentives for the compliance of a volun-
tary agreement. Exemptions for environmental 
protection are possible, though, according to Art.30. 
As for the rules on competition voluntary agree-
ments must not prevent, restrict or distort the inter-
nal market (Art. 81 par 1). Exemptions for envi-
ronmental protection are not mentioned literally 
(Art. 81 par 3), but case law of the European Court 
of Justice has clarified that environmental protec-
tion can be perceived as an element of the stated 
exemptions. The Commission would then apply the 
proportionality principle and would weigh the re-
strictions of competition that would ensue from the 
agreement against the value of the environmental 
goals of the agreement. 
The situation is similar with state aids. They be-
come an issue for voluntary agreements if the par-
ticipating businesses are granted financial aid from 
public authorities in order to attain the goals of the 
agreement. Generally state aids are prohibited 
(Art.87 par 1) if they would result in the distortion 
of competition or free trade. But an exception is 
also possible in this field if the aid would result in 
improved environmental protection or a substantial 
reduction of pollution. State aid is normally only 
justified if adverse effects on competition are out-
weighed by the benefits for the environment. 
3.2 Voluntary Agreements and EU Directives on 
Environmental Issues 
The rules on free trade, competition and state aid 
are not the only restrictions by EU law which limit 
the use of voluntary agreements in EU member 
states. EU law often contains stipulations on the 
instruments which must be used to execute EU 
environmental law implemented into national law. 
In those cases a voluntary agreement may not be 
concluded on the issue. A prominent example is the 
IPPC Directive (1996). The purpose of this direc-
tive is to achieve integrated prevention and control 
of pollution. According to the directive, certain 
polluting activities must be permitted by the compe-
tent authority. The permit must contain provisions 
to ensure that the operation takes place according to 
the standards of the IPPC Directive. Voluntary 
agreements may not be used instead of permits here. 
Such restrictions can be found in other directives, 
too, e.g. the EU Directive on Waste (1975) where 
respective installations and undertakings must be 
permitted by the competent authorities. This direc-
tive also lays down that the authorities must draw 
up plans for waste management. European law 
would therefore be violated if the authorities would 
conclude a voluntary agreement on a subject which 
should have been addressed to by the foreseen in-
strument. In general it can be stated that EU law 
mostly subjects dangerous or potentially dangerous 
activities to strict regulations of classic command 
and control instruments. 
4 Voluntary Agreements and Constitutional 
Law 
In contrast to the classic rules of legislation and 
administration, voluntary agreements enable private 
parties to influence the setting, defining or en-
forcement of laws. It has to be examined to what 
extent constitutional law can restrain the use of 
voluntary agreements or limit their authority, espe-
cially considering the division of powers, the prin-
ciple of democracy and the state’s obligation to 
protect health and safety of individuals. 
The constitutional principle of division of powers 
requires the passing of laws by parliament. There-
fore legal uncertainties occur if voluntary agree-
ments are being concluded instead of a legal norm. 
One method to omit these uncertainties and to en-
sure democratic legitimisation, is to involve the 
parliament in this process. According to the Flemish 
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Decree on Environmental Covenants (1994) for 
example, the Parlia ment can veto an environmental 
agreement within 45 days, stopping its coming into 
force. Another possibility is legitimising the ad-
ministration to conclude a voluntary agreement by a 
respective passus in a law passed by parliament. 
Another result of the principle of democratic legiti-
misation and the division of powers is that a law 
passed by parliament and case law by courts is 
binding for the administration. This may not be 
circumvented by a mere administrative decision or 
action. Therefore the content of a voluntary agree-
ment may not contradict existing public law. Most 
European constitutions stress the state’s obligation 
to protect the health and safety of individuals, some 
include the protection of the environment. Regard-
ing the choice of instruments to carry out this pro-
tection though, there is generally no constitutional 
obligation to use classic command and control in-
struments. Hence the scope of action for public 
authorities principally includes alternative instru-
ments such as voluntary agreements. 
The above mentioned constitutional requirements of 
the division of powers, democratic legitimisation 
and the state’s duties of protecting its subjects do 
not forbid voluntary agreements, but they limit the 
area of their application. Very significant environ-
mental matters such as basic principles and citizens’ 
rights must be dealt with through legislation. For 
example it was ruled by the French Administrative 
Court (Conseil d’Etat) in 1975, that a voluntary 
agreement was illegal because it restricted the state 
authority and the required protection of third par-
ties. 
4.1 Voluntary Agreements in Federal Structures 
States with a strong federal structure must ensure 
that the competencies of their regions are respected. 
This implies that no voluntary agreements can be 
concluded on national level if its content would 
violate the legislative or administrative sovereignty 
of the regions. This can be dealt with by involving 
the second chamber representing the regions and 
thus obtaining the consent of the regions. 
In addition, voluntary agreements must take law at 
the local level into account. For example it could 
happen that a government agency has concluded a 
voluntary agreement with the respective body of a 
branch of industry and, at a later date, the individual 
companies are confronted with more stringent re-
quirements by the local authority. This must be 
prevented by adequately choosing the procedure for 
the conclusion and the voluntary agreement’s con-
tent for both legally binding and non-binding 
agreements. It has to be ensured that the local au-
thorities are successfully committed to the regula-
tions in the voluntary agreement and that this takes 
place in accordance with the country’s administra-
tive law. It should be considered that local authori-
ties can only be forced to comply with an agreement 
if the superior authority (which has concluded the 
agreement) otherwise would have been entitled to 
influence the local authority’s scope of decision by 
a directive or instruction. 
The use of voluntary agreements is not reserved to 
superior authorities. Naturally, local authorities can 
conclude voluntary agreements within their admin-
istrative competencies. Such voluntary agreements 
then must certainly be coherent to regulations on 
national or regional level.  
4.2 The Flemish Decree: An example for a Legal 
Framework for Voluntary Agreements 
With the Decree on Environmental Policy Agree-
ments (June 15th 1994) the Flemish Region in Bel-
gium has established a legal framework for volun-
tary agreements. Some of the main issues will be 
illustrated here. Per definition an “environmental 
covenant” is  
“Any agreement between the Flemish Region, 
represented by the Flemish Government, on the 
one hand and one or several umbrella organisa-
tions representing enterprises on the other, for 
the purpose of preventing environmental pollu-
tion, limiting or removing the consequences 
therefor, or of promoting effective conservation 
of the environment” (Art. 2).  
Only organisations which can prove that they have 
been delegated by their members can enter into 
such a covenant. The summary of the draft of the 
covenant must be published in the Belgian Official 
Journal and the complete draft must be available for 
inspection for a period of 30 days. Within 30 days 
after publication of the summary any person can 
submit objections in writing to the designated au-
thority, which after an assessment by the authority 
will be communicated to the other party. The draft 
covenant is also communicated to the Flemish So-
cial and Economic Council and the Flemish Council 
for the Environment and Nature, who then issue a 
will-reasoned opinion within 30 days after receipt, 
which is not binding. After that the draft including 
the above mentioned opinions will be sent to the 
President of the Flemish Parliament. If the Parlia -
ment objects to the draft within 45 days by resolu-
tion of well-reasoned motion the covenant will not 
be concluded. 
Otherwise the covenant will be concluded and pub-
lished in the Belgian Official Journal. The cove-
nants are concluded under administrative law and 
are legally binding, with the reservation of cases of 
urgency or obligations imposed by EU or interna-
tional law. The Flemish Region can convert a cove-
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nant into regulations even before the time limit is 
up, and thus include non-affiliated enterprises. 
It has to be noted that this special framework can 
only be applied to those agreements which are cov-
ered by the legal definition, therefore agreements on 
local level or with single enterprises are excluded. 
5 The Rights of Third Parties 
The rights of third parties play an important role in 
the context of voluntary agreements. Public law 
requires that with all external activities of state 
authorities, the rights of third parties must be con-
sidered, and it is a basic principle of civil law that 
contracts must not be on the expense of rights of 
third parties. 
Thus voluntary agreements may not be concluded if 
they would imply the disregard of legally protected 
interests of third parties. Examples in the context of 
voluntary agreements could be the violation of the 
individual right to health, if an agreement’s limit of 
toxic emissions is too low to protect neighbours 
effectively, or the violation of the right to fair com-
petition if cartels would be featured. A number of 
measures are necessary to prevent such violations. 
These include the hearing of possibly affected third 
parties and public participation prior to decisions. If 
the potential of voluntary agreements is being used 
properly, the addressing of third parties’ rights can 
bear advantages in comparison to classic command 
and control instruments. The relative freedom con-
cerning the procedure allows to integrate third par-
ties in multiple states and forms. 
In case of a dispute, the legal situation depends on 
whether the voluntary agreement is legally binding 
or not. If a binding agreement violates the rights of 
a third party, the law must provide the aggrieved 
parties with access to means of legal redress, which 
could mean nullification of the agreement, amend-
ment, or compensation for harm. 
For non-binding voluntary agreements the situation 
is different. They do not bind anyone in a legal 
sense, therefore they cannot violate the rights of 
third parties directly. Therefore it is not possible for 
the third party to fight the unfavourable voluntary 
agreement itself, even if it affects legally protected 
interests. In some situations, though, legal redress 
against a non-binding voluntary agreement can be 
possible indirectly. For instance, if the meeting of 
requirements of public law can only be ensured by a 
classic command and control decision, and if the 
lack of such a decision violates the right of a third 
party (e.g. the right to health), the harmed party 
may seek legal redress. In this constellation the 
third party can have the right to legally force the 
authority to refrain from the voluntary agreement 
and use classic, legally binding instruments. 
Otherwise there is only the possibility of fighting 
the agreement by political means. Securing the 
principle of equality and preventing informal, but 
potentially powerful structures, can be achieved by 
concluding legally binding voluntary agreements 
whenever it is possible. One other very important 
aspect of third party rights must be addressed here - 
the right of acknowledged environmental groups to 
legal redress on behalf of the environment. By using 
voluntary agreements, the form of actions of public 
authorities is shifted toward steering processes. The 
individual decisions then are taken outside the 
sphere of the state, e.g. within the companies par-
ticipating in the agreement. This reduces the possi-
bilities of judicial control of the administration, 
especially in those countries which restrict the ac-
cess to legal redress against an illegal action of a 
public authority to those individuals who can prove 
the violation of their own individual rights. This can 
be addressed by providing for the possibility of 
acknowledged environmental groups to legal re-
dress against actions related to the environment by a 
public authority which are not compatible with 
existing public law. Then the conclusion of such an 
illegal voluntary agreement could be revised judi-
cially.  
6 Procedure and Design of Voluntary Agree-
ments Procedure 
In recent years several procedural rules have been 
established. Some states now have codified basic 
rules (Denmark, Flanders), some have elaborated 
official recommendations (Portugal, The Nether-
lands). Among the main aspects to be considered is 
the determination of who the parties are and if they 
are entitled to conclude voluntary agreements. Also 
it must be ensured that possibly affected third par-
ties are being heard properly and whether public 
participation is realised according to the rules. If 
necessary for constitutional reasons or because it is 
foreseen by law, the parliament must be engaged. 
Finally, the requirements for due publication must 
be met. 
6.1 Public Participation, Transparency and Pub-
licity 
Especially in the initial period, with no legal 
framework established, voluntary agreements 
mostly were concluded without any kind of public 
participation. This has always been perceived as 
one of the weak spots of voluntary agreements, 
because no interests besides those of the industry 
and the government have been considered. The 
concept of a modern and democratic administration, 
which includes public participation and transpar-
ency, is being backed by the Arhus Convention 
(1998). Also the Communication of the Commis-
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sion (1996: No. 18) emphasises the necessity for 
participation and transparency. Even though today 
regulations exist which make forms of public par-
ticipation for voluntary agreements obligatory in 
some EU member states, there are still examples 
where the procedure takes place behind closed 
doors. Public participation is relevant not only from 
a democratic point of view, but also would enable 
the parties to take suggestions by interest groups 
like environmental NGOs or trade unions into con-
sideration. It would also consolidate the acceptance 
of an agreement in the public. Public participation, 
though, also entails some disadvantages for the 
instrument of voluntary agreements. It affects the 
attractiveness of the instrument especially for the 
industry. Business strategies may have to be re-
vealed, more interests have to be considered and the 
process of negotiation may take longer. But one 
should bear in mind that both classic legislation and 
command and control systems are no less subject to 
forms of public participation. It must be seen as an 
advantage of voluntary agreements, that both parties 
can influence how well public participation is in-
cluded into the process of negotiation, while retain-
ing the instrument’s benefits such as promptness 
and flexibility. In addition, more transparency could 
be reached by explaining in the agreement, why the 
parties chose this instrument. 
Another requirement to increase transparency of 
voluntary agreements is the obligation to publish 
them in the acknowledged way, which means to use 
the same form foreseen for respective legal norms.  
Monitoring is an important factor for the effective-
ness of voluntary agreements. In order to inform the 
public, the results of monitoring should also be 
published. 
6.2 Criteria for the Content of Voluntary Agree-
ments 
Voluntary agreements grant the parties more flexi-
bility than classic command and control instru-
ments. This does not mean though, that the discre-
tion of public authorities concerning their content is 
unlimited. Due to the above mentioned constitu-
tional obligations, the final responsibility for secur-
ing public interest lies with the state. If public au-
thorities choose to use a voluntary agreement, they 
partly shift the execution of their obligation to pri-
vate parties. It must therefore be a precondition that 
some minimum standards within the entangling of 
public and private interests are being guaranteed. 
These standards include the duty of properly fulfill-
ing the given tasks, the equal consideration of inter-
ests and the sufficient institutional securing of neu-
trality. In respect of future democratic changes, 
voluntary agreements also should be limited in 
time. 
6.3 Voluntary agreements should include provi-
sions on the following issues: 
· Who are the parties of the voluntary agree-
ment? 
· Can new participants join later or leave earlier? 
· What is the environmental goal of the volun-
tary agreement? 
· How shall it be reached? 
· In what period? 
· What are the intermediate steps? 
· To what extent may authorities demand access 
to information? 
· How is the agreement being monitored and 
who does it? 
· Who will be affected by the agreement? 
· What are the liabilities of business organis a-
tions, its members and the state? 
· Are there incentives by the state to fulfil or 
exceed the goal? 
· What are the sanctions for non compliance? 
· If in discretion of parties: should it be legally 
binding? 
If it is binding 
· How can the agreement be altered? 
· Under which circumstances can the voluntary 
agreement be terminated? 
· How can the voluntary agreement be enforced? 
· Is a form of arbitration provided? 
7 Monitoring and Enforcement 
Monitoring and enforcement of voluntary agree-
ments are important for the successful implementa-
tion of the pursued environmental policy. From a 
legal point of view a number of questions have to 
be addressed concerning incentives and sanctions, 
liability, arbitration and litigability. The possibilities 
and legal conditions for these aspects vary accord-
ing to the form of voluntary agreement, especially 
according to whether they are legally binding or not 
and whether they are concluded under civil or ad-
ministrative law. 
7.1 Monitoring 
Monitoring is essential to secure the effectiveness 
of voluntary agreements, to gain knowledge for 
future planning and to portray progress publicly. 
Monitoring is also required as an instrument of 
counter-control. As far as the state relinquishes part 
of its competencies of surveillance inherent to clas-
sic instruments of command and control, this must 
be compensated in regard to the state’s obligation to 
guarantee public safety. Thus, monitoring is not 
only crucial for the proper functioning of the 
agreement, it is also demanded by principles of 
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public law even for those agreements concluded 
under the regime of civil law. Monitoring can either 
be regulated by law or official recommendation on 
the procedural rules of voluntary agreements or it 
can be foreseen through provisions in the agreement 
itself. Intermediate goals should be included. The 
monitoring by independent institutions has proven 
to be quite effective, especially in controversial 
situations. The concrete methods which should be 
used and the extent of monitoring cannot be gener-
alised for all voluntary agreements. Basic rules are 
that the results of monitoring must give the state 
authority and the public an overview of the status 
quo, and the progress made toward reaching the 
environmental goal. Information provided by moni-
toring, in addition to the information gained by the 
remaining means of surveillance from public au-
thorities, must als o enable the public authority to 
secure general environmental standards and to 
guide further steps. Finally, the results must provide 
information that will facilitate officials in bringing 
possible enforcement actions. 
The monitoring process can bear the danger of 
business secrets being disclosed to corporate bodies 
and thus be transmitted to competitors. This might 
unfortunately also be used as a pretext. In order to 
ensure the required intensity and accuracy, it is 
essential to take great care when designing the con-
crete monitoring systems, especially with respect to 
aspects of confidentiality and independence.`  
7.2 Incentives and Sanctions 
Beside the pending threat that public authorities 
might resort to command and control instruments, 
the effectivity of voluntary agreements can be en-
hanced tremendously if tools to ensure a better 
enforcement are included. 
One of them is compliance incentives such as the 
access to subsidies, tax exemptions, certification, 
public advertisement or other benefits. When pro-
posing such positive incentives, one must always 
bear in mind the restrictions by EU law concerning 
the distortion of the single market. 
Sanctions are another method in case of non-
compliance that can make voluntary agreements a 
more credible instrument of environmental policy. 
Forms of sanctions are fines, subsidies witheld, 
exclusion from the agreement of the violating party, 
or less co-operation on the part of the environ-
mental agency. Sanctions can either be imposed by 
law or be included in the agreement itself. 
7.3 Liability in Relation to Third Parties 
With all activities, one has to ask for the liability if 
damage to persons or goods occurs. Actually, this 
question is especially important for voluntary 
agreements. The enlarged scope of self-regulation 
and self-administration often inherent to voluntary 
agreements must have its counter-balance in a con-
sequent rule of liability. On the side of the comp a-
nies it is evident that they are liable for deliberate or 
reckless damages. A different situation exists if the 
damage occurs even though the company has acted 
completely in accordance with the voluntary 
agreement and the fault lies within the voluntary 
agreement itself. As an example this could be the 
case if an agreement is concluded with the aim to 
reduce the emission of a specific material step by 
step. The company fulfils its obligations by the 
agreement, but later it is shown, that the reduction 
was not sufficient to prevent health damages to 
neighbours. It then depends on the laws of liability 
in the member states to determine whether this 
company would still be liable or not. Apart from the 
liability of the company, one also has to take the 
liability of the state into account. The Flemish De-
cree on Voluntary Covenants (1994), for example, 
provides for the possibility of suing the state for 
damages or specific performances if the rights of 
third parties are violated due to a voluntary agree-
ment. But liability of the state in the context of a 
faulty voluntary agreement is also possible without 
a specific regulation. It can derive from the general 
rules of state liability in case of negligence by the 
authority or a single civil servant, which are quite 
different among the member states. Generally, li-
ability law should be designed in a way that neither 
the company nor the state should be able to rid itself 
from liability for damages by using a voluntary 
agreement instead of another instrument. 
7.4 Liability between the parties 
Apart from the moral responsibility for both parties 
and the usual bona fide rules, several aspects of 
legal liability must be considered. Depending on the 
content of the agreement, collective and individual 
liability have to be discerned. Collective liability 
comprises those provisions which are in the respon-
sibility of the business associations, whereas indi-
vidual liability is related to the individual comp a-
nies either as members of the association or as an 
individual party. In this context, members of an 
association which has concluded a voluntary 
agreement must not be allowed to circumvent their 
obligations by leaving the association. Liability 
naturally is not limited to the industry. The state is 
liable to its partners in the agreement. Exemptions 
may be applicable in case of international obliga-
tions or a state of emergency. 
7.5 Dealing with “Freeriders” 
Problems may occur if a voluntary agreement has 
been concluded between public authorities and an 
association representing a field of industry. If the 
membership of the association does not include all 
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active companies and thus not all are bound to par-
ticipate, unwanted results could be the consequence. 
Among these unintended consequences are the 
possibility that all the potential benefits to the envi-
ronment may not be met, or that imbalances may 
occur in the allocation of burden between firms in 
a n  association. This problem can be avoided by 
enabling the state by law to lay down similar re -
quirements for enterprises not covered by the 
agreement or to declare a voluntary agreement as 
generally binding. Another way to deal with the 
problem is to deny freeriders usually granted bene-
fits or to use mechanisms of publicity to expose the 
company as a freerider. In some cases the identity 
of freeriders is unknown. Here it would be the re-
sponsibility of both the state and business organis a-
tions to use all adequate means to identify and con-
front any freeriders. 
7.6 Arbitration 
The functioning of voluntary agreements also de-
pends on the capability to settle disputes. As a very 
useful instrument for resolving conflicts, arbitration 
fits perfectly into the concept of cooperativity rather 
than supremacy of the state. It must be settled in 
advance which circumstances allow a call for arbi-
tration, as well as the line-up of the arbitration 
panel, which ideally should include independent 
persons. Arbitration can either be installed as the 
final instance. Disputes on legally binding agree-
ments, though, usually cannot be resolved by arbi-
tration once and for all. The banning of courts, 
depending on the actual case, could conflict with 
constitutional law. It is very useful and fits well in 
the concept of co-operation, to make the arbitration 
process a precondition for the litigability of volun-
tary agreements. 
7.7 Litigability 
The hybrid character of voluntary agreements 
brings up several questions concerning their coming 
to court. Naturally this only concerns legally bind-
ing agreements. First of all, there is the question of 
jurisdiction, whether the civil court or the adminis-
trative court is relevant. If not provided otherwise 
by law, the voluntary agreements concluded under 
the regime of civil law are in the jurisdiction of civil 
courts, and, respectively, those concluded under the 
regime of public law are in the jurisdiction of ad-
ministrative courts. One of the major consequences 
of jurisdiction are the applied rules on procedure. 
For example in some member states civil courts 
may only base their decision on those aspects which 
have been brought forward and proved by one of 
the parties, while the procedural rules for adminis-
trative courts demand the court exploring all rele -
vant aspects, even if they were not brought up by 
either of the party.  
Exemplary constellations for the litigation of a 
voluntary agreements are, that the state is suing the 
association of a single business for not complying 
the agreement. Usually the aim would be to enforce 
sanctions or even have the agreement or parts of it 
nullified. On the other hand a respective member or 
an association can sue the state for breaking the 
agreement in order to get protection from the state 
enacting a legal norm or commanding a measure 
which is contrary to the agreement. Also benefits 
which should have been granted might be claimed 
that way. Finally there could be a third party trying 
to pursue its rights. The hybrid and mainly uncodi-
fied character of voluntary agreements arises many 
important questions of detail, such as legal methods 
to nullify a voluntary agreement (ex tunc or ex 
nunc) or the amount in dispute. It has to be noted 
that these details differ extremely between the legal 
systems of the member states. Hardly any cases of 
litigation of voluntary agreements have occurred so 
far. Apart from legal uncertainties, which might 
lead to the abstention from bringing voluntary 
agreements to court, the infrequency of this kind of 
enforcement can also be attributed to the benefits of 
the instrument. In the process of negotiating the 
agreement, many potentially disputable aspects are 
likely to turn up and thus can be settled in advance.  
8 Policy Conclusions and Recommendations 
· Voluntary agreements can be performed legally 
if certain rules are applied. 
· Currently legally binding voluntary agreements 
may not be concluded on EU level. To change 
this, the EU would have to establish the respec-
tive legal conditions. 
· Legal safety of voluntary agreements can be 
improved if states develop a legal framework 
for voluntary agreements, either by law or rec-
ommendation. 
· With such a framework possible breach of 
constitutional law could be prevented by in-
cluding major aspects such as the role of par-
liaments and restraints in respect of the division 
of powers and the basic rights of individuals. 
· Limiting the framework to basic rules would 
prevent suffocating the flexibility of the in-
strument. Such basic rules can include the need 
for hearing third parties, public participation, 
publication, monitoring, sanctions and jurisdic-
tion. 
· States using legally binding agreements wher-
ever useful and legally possible would have the 
advantage to be able to enforce the voluntary 
agreements and to enhance the acceptance. 
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9 Summary 
This policy paper gives an overview of the aspects 
which have to be considered when integrating vol-
untary agreements into existing legal systems. 
Various forms of voluntary agreements exist. Their 
legal conditions and consequences depend on 
whether they are unilateral or multilateral, on their 
proportion to legal norms, whether they are legally 
binding or not and whether they belong to civil or 
public law. 
EU law still lacks provisions on voluntary agree-
ments on EU level. Voluntary agreements in me m-
ber states are encouraged by the EU, but the rules of 
free trade, competition and illegal state aid as well 
as EU directives on environmental issues must be 
observed and limit the use and restrict the content of 
voluntary agreements.  
Special attention must be given to questions of 
constitutional law. The principles of division of 
powers, democratic legitimisation and effective 
protection of individuals from harm require the 
respect of certain limitations and procedural rules. 
One way to prevent constitutional violations is to 
implement or recommend rules on the conclusion 
and content of voluntary agreements.  
Voluntary agreements can be concluded on na-
tional, regional or local level. The competencies of 
the different levels in federal structured states must 
be respected. 
Voluntary agreements may not contradict existing 
public law. Rights of third parties must not be ig-
nored. This includes involving possibly affected 
third parties or environmental interest groups in the 
process of negotiating and concluding a voluntary 
agreement. 
Public participation, transparency and publicity are 
important factors for effective voluntary agree-
ments. Much of the past criticism on voluntary 
agreements was due to the lack of public participa-
tion and transparency. 
Concerning the content of a voluntary agreement, it 
is very useful to set an environmental goal and a 
date by which the goal has to be achieved, to fore-
see. intermediate steps and to determine the obliga-
tions of both parties as exactly as possible. 
The success of voluntary agreements also depends 
on monitoring, incentives and sanctions for non-
compliance. These features enhance the impact of 
voluntary agreements and can lead to a better ac-
ceptance. 
An effective voluntary agreement also depends on 
whether the state can force the opposite party to 
comply with its stipulations. In this context ques-
tions of liability, arbitration and litigability play an 
important role, although, few practical cases can be 
cited and the legal conditions are very different in 
the member states concerning those questions. 
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Climate Change: A Controversial Political 
Issue 
In this article, a brief overview of the relevant legal 
questions concerning the EU competences in the 
international regime on climate change will be 
given. 
The collapse of the negotiations for the implementa-
tion of the Kyoto Climate Change Protocol in the 
Hague, November 2000, together with the statement 
by President Bush that the US will not ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol (KP), raises the question of the 
international community’s ability to respond to 
global warming. The talks are to be resumed in 
Bonn in July 2001. Since the Hague, the European 
Union as a party to the Climate Change Conven-
tion1 and signatory to the KP has undertaken intense 
diplomatic activ ity to develop alliances in order to 
bring the KP into force. However, one may question 
the capacity of the EU, as a group of fifteen States 
and an entity of legal mixed competence, to con-
tribute to the complex issue of a successful revival 
of the negotiations2. At the Hague, while the Euro-
pean countries dedicated a considerable amount of 
time reaching consensus amongst themselves, cli-
mate negotiations were proceeding among the other 
participants. 
The complexity of the issue lies in the Protocol 
itself. Indeed, the KP to the Climate Change Con-
vention requires industrialised countries3 to ensure 
their emission of greenhouse gases does not exceed 
their Assigned Amounts (AAs) as listed in Annex B 
of the Protocol4. This should lead to an overall re -
duction of greenhouse gases emissions to 5% below 
1990 levels, which should be achieved by the end of 
the first commitment period (2008-2012). In order 
to help these countries fulfil their emission reduc-
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1  The European Community (94/69EC: Council Decision of 15 December 
1993 concerning the conclusion of the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change) doc 394D0069) and all Member States have 
signed and ratified the Climate Change Convention. 
2  For an analysis of The Hague negotiations see Michael GRUPP and 
Farhana YAMIN: “Climatic collapse at The Hague: what happened, why, 
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Climate Negotiations: An Analysis of COP6”, CEPS Policy Brief No.1, 23 
March 2001. 
3  Countries listed in Annex I of the Climate Change Convention. 
4 Article 3.1 of the KP. 
tion commitments at a lower compliance cost by 
means other than domestic abatement, the KP pro-
vides a series of tools. These instruments are 
‘sinks’5, and economic based mechanisms (known 
as the flexible mechanisms) such as Joint Imple-
mentation (JI)6, Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM)7, and International Emission Trading (IET)8. 
In accordance with the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility, the Protocol requires 
from industrialised countries to reach their binding 
targets, whereas from developing countries no 
quantitative commitments to limit or reduce their 
Greenhouse gases emissions are demanded9. 
The American argument is that in the face of the 
uncertainty of scientific evidence base concerning 
climate change, Kyoto targets are too ambitious and 
measures to achieve them too costly for the Ameri-
can economy. Therefore, these targets should be 
renegotiated and extended to developing countries. 
The EU will have to keep a strong unity in order to 
maintain the integrity of the Protocol in Bonn. In-
deed, by taking this position, the US challenges two 
major principles upon which the Climate Change 
Convention and the KP are based – the precaution-
ary principle 10 and the principle of common but 
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differentiated responsibility. It is hardly imaginable 
that developing countries will renounce the second 
principle. This creates an opportunity for the EU to 
be in line with the Group 77/China. Further, in 
order to attract the members of the Umbrella 
Group11, American allies, to ratify the KP, the EU 
would have to give in to some of their demands, 
such as caps and sinks12. Finally, to make the KP a 
success, the EU would need to show leadership by 
implementing serious domestic policies and ratify-
ing the Protocol. 
Before the Bonn talks, an examination of the EU 
competences and responsibilities on climate change, 
especially in regard to the KP, is of significance. 
The EU: A misleading entity 
As a group of fifteen nation-states, the EU is a con-
fusing entity for international partners. It has neither 
a legal personality internally to take legally binding 
measures, nor internationally to conclude interna-
tional agreements13. Part of the EU is the European 
Community (EC), comprising the same Member 
States, which in contrast has legal personality14. 
However, the question of the international capacity 
of the EC was unclear until the European Court of 
Justice stated that the EC has the international legal 
personality as well as internally 15. Therefore, the 
most appropriate terminology is the EC to designate 
the proper legal entity of competence. 
In contrast to a sovereign state, the EC has not a 
general competence on all matters. Indeed, the 
Community has only the power given to it by its 
constituting treaty. The other power remain with its 
                                                                     
contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reser-
voirs of greenhouse and adaptation and comprise all economic sectors.“  
11 Negotiating group of Annex I Parties aiming for flexibility. The group 
consists of Japan, the US, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Russia, and 
Ukraine. 
12 The EU had the position to restrict/or to put caps on the use of the Kyoto 
flexible mechanisms, as they should be supplemental to domestic actions. 
It proposed quantitative limitations, in such a way that only 50% of the 
reductions could be achieved through the use of flexible mechanisms to 
accomplish the national targets. They were also cautious to credit sinks 
before real scientific evidence on the capacity of absorption of land and 
forest and how permanent are the sequestration of CO2 by the forests. 
The in troduction of caps was opposed by the countries of the Umbrella 
Group.  
 In order to enter into force, the KP shall be ratified by Parties included in 
Annex I, which accounted in total for at least 55% of CO2 emissions of all 
the Parties included in this Annex I. Article 25.1 KP. 
13 For further information see, Philippe MANIN: « Les Communautés Eu-
ropéennes », PEDONE (1997) ; Damian CHALMERS : « European Union 
Law », V.1, DARTMOUTH (1998). 
14 The EC became the EU by the Treaty on European Union, which was 
signed in Maastricht on 10 December 1991. The EU also includes the 
European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy 
Community created in 1957, which form the first pillar of the EU, the se c-
ond pillar is formed by the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the 
third by the Justice and Home Affairs. See supra note 13. The legal ca-
pacity of the EC lies in Art. 210 and 211 of EC Treaty. 
15 ECJ Case 22/70, (AETR 31 March 1971). 
Member States. This principle of specific attribution 
of competence is reflected in Article 5 EC Treaty, 
which states that: “the Community shall act within 
the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty and of objectives assigned to it.”16 Follow-
ing this principle, the Community has competence 
when expressly given to it through the provisions of 
the Treaty and implied competence in order to carry 
out the tasks assigned to it by the objectives of the 
EC Treaty17. Thus, in order for the EC to act, it 
needs to make reference to the specific legal basis 
to justify its actions18.  
As regards external competence, the same rule 
applies: the Community has the capacity to con-
clude international agreements in areas where the 
EC Treaty has explicitly given authority to it. 
Where the Treaty is silent, the Community has 
implied external competence in areas in which it 
has acted internally19. Furthermore, this competence 
extends to the case where no internal legislation 
was enacted20. This was the case when the Council 
declared that the Community as a whole would 
limit emissions of carbon dioxide as stated under 
the Convention on Climate Change21. At that time, 
there was no internal legislation on which the 
Community competence to implement such interna-
tional commitment could have been based22. How-
ever, external competence under the Community 
law is not sufficient for the EC to conclude interna-
tional agreements. Such instruments must provide a 
clause of accession which allows ‘regional eco-
nomic integration organizations’ to become a party. 
The Climate Change Convention and KP contain 
such a clause23. 
On environmental policy, the EC has the task “to 
promote throughout the Community … a high level 
of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment…”24. In addition to this general task, 
                                                                 
16 “As the Community can only act through its institutions, this provision  must 
be placed alongside Article 7.1 EC, which requires that each institution 
must act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the Treaty”, D 
CHALMERS, see supra note 13. 
17 See Case 22/70 (AETR 1971), Joined Cases 281, 283-5, 287/85 (Ger-
many, France, the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom v 
Commission 1988). 
18 See Case 300/89 (Titanium dioxide), Case C-155/91 (Commission v 
Council). 
19 See Case 22/70 (AETR 1971), Case 3,4 and 6/76 (Kramer 1976), Advi-
sory Opinions 1-76 and 1 -94 in which the Court has developed the doc-
trine “ in foro interno, in foro externo”, providing that the Community is 
externally competent in a reas in which it has internal competence. 
20 ECJ Opinion 1/76 (Laying-up fund) 1977. 
21 Article 4(2) Climate Change Convention. Council decision of 15 December 
1993, OJ 1994 L 33/13. 
22 See Jan H. JANS: “European External Environmental Policy”, in European 
Environmental Law, European Law Publishing (2000), p.81. 
23 Article 22.3 Climate Change Convention and article 24.3 KP. 
24 Article 2 EC Treaty. 
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the Community environmental policy shall promote 
measures at an international level to deal with re -
gional or worldwide environmental problems 25. In 
order to implement these objectives into legal bind-
ing instruments, Article 175 allows the Council to 
take environmental decisions. Thus, the Community 
through the EC Treaty has explicit powers at its 
disposal to take actions in environmental matters26. 
In regard to global warming, a worldwide environ-
mental problem, the Council took the decision to 
adhere to the Convention on Climate Change by 
virtue of Articles 175 and 300 of the EC Treaty27, a 
procedure that should be used for the KP.  
Article 174(4) EC Treaty underlines that environ-
mental policy is a shared competence. Member 
States share the capacity to act with the EC in this 
field, both externally and internally28. This addi-
tional difficulty muddles other states in respect of 
the EC’s capacity to undertake actions under the 
Climate Change Convention. Additionally, it may 
prevent the Community from using some of the 
possibilities laid down in the KP. 
Climate Change: A shared competence  
Climate Change is a typical area of shared comp e-
tence. As a result, negotiations are conducted by 
both, the EC and the Member States. By the same 
token, the Climate Change Convention was ratified 
by both the Community and its Member States29. 
                                                                 
25 Article 174.1 EC Treaty: “The Community environmental policy shall 
contribute to -preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the envi-
ronment- protecting human health - prudent and rational utilization of natu-
ral resources- promoting measures at international level to deal with re-
gional or worldwide environmental problems.”  
26 As broadly formulated, the environmental objectives seem to allow any 
initiative at an EC level which the political institutions of the Community 
consider appropriate. Furthermore, Article 6 of the EC Treaty, provides 
that environmental protection requirements be integrated into the defini-
tion and implementation of all Community policies. See Ludwig KRÄMER: 
“Environmental Law in the European Union”, in International, Regional 
and National Environmental Law, Fred L. MORISSON and Rüdiger 
WOLFRUM, Kluwer Law International (2000), p.459. 
27 Council decision 94/69, OJ (L 33). 
28 On the external competence Article 174(4) EC Treaty provides: “Within 
their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the member-
States shall cooperate with third countries and with the competent interna-
tional organizations. 
 The arrangements for Community co -operation may be subject of agree-
ment between the Community and the third parties concerned, which shall 
be negotiated and concluded in accordance with Article 300. 
 The previous subparagraph shall without prejudice to Member States’ 
competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude interna-
tional agreements.” . Internally, shared competence implies that as long as 
the Community has not enacted legislation, Member States are free to 
adopt measures for the protection of the environment, provided that these 
measures are neither discriminating nor disproportionate. Where the 
Community has enacted legislation, based on Article 175, competence is 
shared between Member States and the Community, since Member 
States have maintained the possibilities to legislate more stringent envi-
ronmental protective measures under Article 176. See L.KRÄMER supra 
note 26. 
29 When a Convention falls partly within the competence of the Member 
States and partly within the competence of the Member States, it can be 
implemented by means of “close association between the institutions of 
 
However, international partners often raised con-
cerns over the lack of clarity in the definition of 
legal competence between the EC and its Member 
States30. Indeed, to what extent does this internal 
division of powers affect the legal position of other 
parties since neither the Community nor the Mem-
ber States has exclusive competence31? In order to 
clarify this cumbersome situation, choices have to 
be made on whether specific areas of the Conven-
tion fall within the competence of the EC or its 
Member States. These choices will determine who 
is allowed to negotiate or to vote under the Conven-
tion when decisions have to be taken on specific 
issues32. 
The Climate Change Convention and the KP in-
clude provisions that in case the Community be-
comes a party without its Member States, it shall be 
bound by all the obligations under these instru-
ments. When one or more of the Member States 
together with the Community are parties, the EC 
and its Member States must decide on their respec-
tive responsibilities for the performance of their 
commitments under the Convention and the Proto-
col33. In ratifying the Climate Change Convention, 
the EC added to its instruments of ratification a 
Declaration of Competence, which should demo n-
strate to the other parties to the convention the ex-
tent of its responsibilities under the Convention34. 
However, such a declaration does not define a pre-
cise division of competences under the Convention 
between the Community and its Member Sates. In 
this document, the EC recalls its competence to 
protect the environment and it lists the most rele-
vant legal instruments that the Community has 
taken in relation to the matters covered by the Con-
vention. Thus, the document reflects the outlines of 
the internal delineation of competence35. Therefore, 
the Community competences under the Convention 
cover the areas where it has already enacted inter-
nally. However, for other parties to the Convention, 
                                                                     
the Community and the Member States both in the process of negotiation 
and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the obligations entered into”, ECJ 
Opinion 2/91 ILO-convention no.170 (1993). See also H. JANS supra note 
22. 
30 See Joanna DEPLEDGE: “Tracing the Origins of the Kyoto Protocol: an 
article-by-article textual history”, August 99/August 2000, DHG.00-187. 
31 H. JANS supra note 22. 
32 Articles 18.2 Climate Change Convention and 22.2 KP provide that: 
“ Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their com-
petence, shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to 
the number of their Member States that are parties to the Conven-
tion/Protocol. Such an organization shall not exercise its right to vote if 
any of its Member States exercises its right, and vice versa.”  
33 Articles 22.2 Climate Change Convention and 24.2 KP. 
34 This declaration of competence is required by Article 22.3 Climate Change 
Convention and Article 24.3 KP.  
35 See Jan H. JANS supra note 22. 
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it is still vague who they can call on for fulfilling 
the obligations under the Treaty. 
Responsibility of the Community under the 
Climate Change and the KP 
As a Party to the Convention, the EC has adopted 
an important instrument listed in its Declaration, 
Directive 93/389. This Directive, as amended in 
1999 to encompass the new requirements under the 
KP, establishes a Community monitoring mecha-
nism for greenhouse gas emissions. It is a frame-
work directive which requires Member States to 
implement national programmes for limiting or 
reducing their greenhouse gas emissions and to 
report to the Commission. It will allow the Com-
mission to assess the progress of its individual 
Member States towards the fulfilment of their 
commitments under the Climate Change Conven-
tion and the KP. It will also allow the Commission 
to fulfil its obligation to present an inventory of 
Community greenhouse gases to the Secretariat of 
the Climate Change Convention36. This directive 
reproduces the requirements and guidelines as 
stated in the Convention and the KP. 
This instrument is significant for two reasons. First, 
under Article 4.6 of the KP, the Community is 
jointly committed with its Member States to achieve 
its target of an 8% reduction of its greenhouse gases 
emissions (the European bubble concept)37. If the 
overall target is not met, the EC will still remain 
responsible for its 8% reduction target, while each 
Member State individually will be liable for its own 
target, as set out in the Burden Sharing Agreement. 
Should a Member State fail to reach its target, 
meaning that the EC falls into a status of non-
compliance, both, that Member State and the Com-
munity will be held liable. Therefore, the Commis-
sion needs to track the progress of the Member 
States in order to assess how well the EC as a whole 
is implementing its commitments. 
Finally, under the KP the annual inventories will be 
used by the Compliance Committee to assess com-
pliance with emission reduction commitments at the 
end of the first commitment period. Furthermore, 
compliance with guidelines for producing and re-
porting greenhouse gases inventories will be an 
eligibility criteria for the participation in the Kyoto 
mechanisms, and will fall under the authority of the 
                                                                 
36 Article 4.1(a) Climate Change Convention and Articles 4,5 and 7 KP. 
37 The European Bubble concept leaves open the possibility for the EC and 
its Member States to re-allocate their Assigned Amounts amongst them-
selves, under the condition that they comply overall with the KP. In Coun-
cil Environment meeting of 16-17 June 1998, the Member States agreed 
on their respective targets, this agreement is known as the Burden Shar-
ing Agreement. 
enforcement branch of the Compliance Commit-
tee38. 
Two important conclusions can be drawn. First, the 
EC as a whole is exclusively responsible for report-
ing its greenhouse gases emissions and to demon-
strate progress towards reducing its emissions under 
the Climate Change Convention. Such a Commu-
nity’s responsibility is a result of two facts, because 
it has acted internally and because the Community 
will be jointly committed with its Member States 
under the KP. 
Finally, when the EC and its Member States are 
parties to the KP and the Protocol enters into force, 
the Burden Sharing Agreement will be legally bind-
ing. In this context, it will place a particular demand 
on the EC, because the Community will be held 
responsible under the KP for its Member States. In 
the situation of non-compliance, the EC would face 
heavy penalties under Article 18 of the Protocol. 
Lately, the Commission realized that it should take 
further measures ensuring that Member States will 
fulfil their commitments. Although a reliable moni-
toring system is necessary to assess Member States’ 
compliance with their targets, it may not be suffi-
cient. An enforcement system may be desirable. 
One step could be to make the Burden Sharing 
Agreement legally binding within the Community 
law system. Thus, Member States would be liable 
under two systems of law for meeting their targets, 
the international regime under the KP and the 
Community law. 
As stated earlier, the KP provides flexible mecha-
nisms which allow parties to comply with their 
emission reduction commitments at lower economic 
costs. This raises the question of the eligibility of 
the EC to participate in the Kyoto Mechanisms. 
Although the EC will be a Party to the Protocol, it 
remains unclear whether the Community will have 
the competence to use such mechanisms in relation 
to the shared competence problem. 
The EC in relation to the Kyoto Mechanisms: a 
series of ambiguities 
The Commission is willing to implement a domestic 
Emissions Trading System (ETS) within the Co m-
munity39 and is currently working on designing a 
directive. It should be a limited emission trading 
scheme to start by 2005 to enable a learning-by-
doing approach prior to the Kyoto Protocol’s emis-
sions trading (2008)40. In doing so, the Community 
                                                                 
38 Articles 5, 7 and 8 KP. 
39 See Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading within the 
European Union. COM (200)87. 
40 Article 17 KP. 
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will demonstrate progress in achieving its commit-
ments under the Protocol41.  
Meanwhile the United Kingdom and Denmark are 
implementing their own national schemes. As long 
as the Community has not enacted legislation, there 
is nothing that will prevent Member States to take 
such measures, provided that these measures are 
neither discriminating nor disproportionate42. With 
respect to the Kyoto Protocol, the implementation 
of a Community ETS can be questioned. It will 
depend the status of the EC and its Member States 
within the KP. 
Since the EC is authorised under Article 4 of KP to 
jointly achieve together with its Member States its 
overall target, the EC and its Member States can be 
seen as a single party to the KP. Thus, any trading 
system established by the EC can be considered to 
be a ‘domestic action’ under the KP43, as long as the 
EC has the competence to implement such measure. 
The Environmental Council (1998) interprets ‘do-
mestic action’ along the line of the shared comp e-
tence that exists between the EC and the Member 
States in climate change44.  
Regarding the EC Treaty, the Commission has 
serious legal grounds and arguments to take action 
in this field. Such action can be justified by calling 
upon the need to protect the environment and by the 
requirement to create equal conditions of competi-
tion, which are necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market45.  
The second argument falls within the exclusive 
competence of the EC and imposes on the Commu-
nity a duty to act. For example, the adoption of 
different criteria by the Member States for the par-
ticipation of companies or the coverage of different 
sectors by their national ETS may entail distortion 
of competition within the European internal market. 
These considerations do not imply that the EC has 
an exclusive competence in implementing an ETS, 
the example of Denmark and the United Kingdom 
show the opposite, but they give consequent argu-
ments to support a Community action. 
As climate change is a mixed competence, the de-
gree of intervention by the Community will depend 
on whether its proposal meet the criteria of the 
subsidiarity principle as laid down in Article 5 EC 
Treaty and its guidelines. Such criteria will assess 
                                                                 
41 Article 3.2 KP 
42 The Commission has assessed these national emissions trading schemes 
and gave green light for their implementation. 
43 Article 17 requires that IES “ shall be supplemental to domestic actions” . 
44 2106 th Council meeting Environment Luxembourg, 16-17 June 1998, 
PRES/98/205. 
45 Articles 2 and 3 EC Treaty.  
transboundary aspects of a Community ETS that 
cannot be satisfactory regulated by Member States 
actions and the conflicting possibilities with the EC 
Treaty requirements that a Member State ETS alone 
or the lack of Community ETS would have and, 
finally, compare the clear benefits by reason of its 
scale or effects of a Community ETS in respect with 
ETS at the Member States level. 
In practice, the application of the subsidiary princi-
ple is done by finding a politically acceptable level 
of intervention. The degree of Community interven-
tion is more or less a political compromise between 
the Commission and the Member States. A Com-
munity regulation for an ETS will have to take into 
account the existing national ETS. Therefore, it will 
presumably take the form of a framework directive 
based on Article 175, with the aim of a minimum 
harmonisation on issues such as: the sector cover-
age, criteria for participation, the distribution of 
emission allowance, and the adoption of common 
unit of trade. The Member States would still have 
the possibility to legislate within this framework.  
With the Member States, the EC shares the comp e-
tence to implement a domestic ETS in respect with 
the KP and the Community law, it should therefore 
enjoy the possibility to trade under Article 17 KP. 
However, two limits must moderate this affirma-
tion. Firstly, the contemplated Community ETS is 
limited in time and in scope46. It is seen by the 
Commission as an experiment, a ‘learning-by-
doing’ approach in order to be ready when the KP 
enters in force. The question of whether a new ETS 
legislation will be listed in the EC Declaration of 
Competence under the KP is still open. However, it 
can be presumed that the Commission will claim 
such possibility for the EC. 
Finally, Article 24.2 KP, which allows regional 
organisations to become a party to the protocol, 
states that “the organisation and the Member States 
shall not be entitled to exercise rights under this 
Protocol concurrently.” Therefore, in case the EC 
declares its competence to exercise rights under 
Article 17, it will exclude Member States from 
trading and vice versa. Will Member States re-
nounce such a possibility of complying at a low 
cost? Such a possibility is hardly conceivable.  
In the situation where the EC is banned from using 
such a tool, success for the EC in meeting its target 
would be more difficult. Thus, the EC would be 
bound to achieve its obligation under the KP, but 
powerless to achieve them through the flexible 
mechanisms.  
                                                                 
46 Only limited actors are concerned and it will just encompass CO2 emis-
sions, when the KP has listed 6 gases, and should operate in a period of 
time between 2005-2008. See Green Paper, COM(2000)84. 
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The phrasing of Article 24.2 could be interpreted 
less strictly, meaning that rights between the EC 
and the Member States could not be exercised con-
currently in case of possible conflicts between 
them. Thus, it would leave the possibility for the EC 
of exchanging parts of Assigned Amounts along 
with the Member States, in order to jointly secure 
compliance with their commitments. However, this 
ambiguity should be addressed to avoid any dispute 
on the EC’s participation in the flexible mecha-
nisms as set up by the KP. 
Another ambiguity exists in relation to ‘the Euro-
pean Bubble’ and the provisions under Article 3.13 
KP. This article provides for a party that has over-
complied to bank its allowances for the next com-
mitment periods. 
In case a Member State over-complies with respect 
to its national target under the Burden Sharing 
Agreement, when another Member State under-
complies, the over-complying State would have an 
obligation to transfer its excess parts of Assigned 
Amounts to the under-complying state, or to the EC 
in order for the EC to comply as a whole. In doing 
so, Member States would renounce the right of 
banking under the KP. This raises the question to 
whom the Assigned Amount Units reallocated be-
longs. Do they belong to the EC as a whole, be-
cause Member States are jointly committed with the 
EC or do they belong to Member States individu-
ally? The Burden Sharing Agreement that reallo-
cated the targets between European States gives 
neither an answer, nor sets rules for such a case. 
By reading Article 4.6 KP, it could be interpreted 
that Assigned Amount Units reallocated under the 
Burden Sharing Agreement belong to the EC, until 
the Community as a whole has failed to comply 
with its overall target. From this moment, they will 
fall into the Member States’ responsibility, since 
Member States will become individually responsi-
ble for meeting their agreed targets under the Bur-
den Sharing Agreement. The same argument can be 
extended to excess Assigned Amount Units. 
However, such a situation may create an incentive 
for a Member State not to comply with their agreed 
target to a certain extent, when they think that other 
Member States will over-comply. Therefore, an 
enforcement regime within the Community is 
highly desirable. 
Finally, the Commission is rather silent in its politi-
cal documents on reduction emissions projects 
under JI and CDM 47. This silence is rather disap-
pointing with respect to developing countries and 
Annex I countries such as Russia and the Ukraine. 
A strong willingness from the EC to invest in such 
projects could be a good incentive for these coun-
tries to join the EC in ratifying the KP. 
Should this silence from the Commission be inter-
preted as leaving the exclusive competence to the 
Member States to purchase Certified Emission 
Reduction and Emission Reduction Units: in this 
case, it would impede the Commission from having 
a control on the environmental quality of such Cer-
tificates introduced within the Community, since 
the EC failed to impose its positive list of projects 
for CDM at The Hague. Furthermore, by renounc-
ing such instruments for complying with its com-
mitments, the EC would put a spoke in its own 
wheel. 
Conclusion 
The division of competence within the EU between 
the EC and Member States seems to reach a limit 
where more clarification is needed. Flexible mecha-
nisms introduced in the KP are a real novelty com-
pared to other international environmental agree-
ments. However, ambiguities remain as regards the 
role of the EC in relation to such flexible instru-
ments. In strictly reading the KP, shared comp e-
tence on climate change between the EC and Mem-
ber States may impede the first from using the op-
portunities given by the KP to reduce greenhouse 
gases emissions at lower costs. The European Bub-
ble, which was seen by European countries as a 
flexible means to achieve their commitments under 
the KP, entails a heavy burden on the EC: the re-
sponsibility of ensuring that all Member States will 
comply with their Burden Sharing targets. In this 
field, it would be wise for the Commission to de-
sign an enforcement system within the Community. 
In addition, the issue on banking excess parts of 
Assigned Amounts should be addressed. Finally, 
the ambiguous silence from the Commission on its 
role with respect to CDM and JI should be removed 
in order to address a clear signal to the developing 
and Eastern European countries in Bonn. 
                                                                 
47 Commission political documents on climate change actions, such as the 
European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), the 6th Environmental 
Action Programme, do not mention any intention from the Commission to 
participate in such projects. Meanwhile, countries such as Denmark, Swe-
den, and the Netherlands are willing to undertake JI and CDM as part of 
their national policy to comply under the KP. 
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Introduction 
In the field of state aid, the weight of national state 
aid for environmental protection has been reflected 
in the new guidelines on State Aid for Protecting 
the Environment issued in December 2000 by the 
European Commission1. Despite other categories of 
state aid have traditionally held the attention of the 
Commission, state aid addressed to environmental 
protection is becoming a fairly widespread matter 
with which the DG IV has to deal2. Not only has it 
increased in number but simultaneously states have 
launched extremely innovative types of environ-
mental subsidies, which differ largely from the 
categories used in the past.  
In addition, the fact that state aids for environmental 
protection are deemed to be one of the future con-
cerns in the state aid area is largely owed to the 
recent impact of national policies on climate change 
protection and the incentive mechanisms for renew-
able energy which are the consequences of the for-
mer. Even if it is a relatively recent phenomena, the 
General Direction on Competition (DG IV) is per-
ceiving the future tensions that climate policies are 
likely to cause regarding European state aid policy. 
In this line it is quite illustrative that the Commis-
sion has not only the occasion of deciding upon a 
national scheme implementing a market permit 
system of CO2 quotas in Denmark,3 but also its 
conception on “state aid” has been rebutted in a 
case concerning the German system of guaranteed 
prices for renewable energy4. 
                                                                 
 Mercedes Fernández Armenteros, Research Associate, EEP Network, 
Öko-Institut, Darmstadt Office, Germany 
1 Community guidelines on state aid for protecting the environment, JO C 
37/03, 03.02. 2001. 
2 Environmental aid falls within the category of horizontal aid. The Commis-
sion understands horizontal aid as aid which lacks regional or sectoral 
specificity and which is granted regardless of the location of the benefici-
ary undertakings or their sectoral orientation. Other examples of horizontal 
aid are R&D aid, investment aid, export aid, aid for the benefit of SMEs, 
employment aid and rescu e and restructuring aid for companies in trouble. 
Other general categories of state aid under the terminology used by the 
Commission are sectoral aid - comprising measures aiming at supporting 
specific crisis-ridden spheres of commercial activity - and regional aid 
which covers aid granted to regions which are disadvantaged in compari-
son with other regions of the same Member State. For an overview of the 
categories of state aid see, Carl Baudenbacher, A Brief Guide to Euro-
pean State Aid Law, 1997, Kluwer Law International. 
3  The decision on the Danish CO2 quota system corresponds to State Aid 
N. 653/99. 
4  The German case on renewable energy is under Case C-379/98 ECJ, 13 
March 2001, Preussen Elektra. The case is considered to be relevant 
 
Stemming from the previous observations, the arti-
cle mainly intends to offer an overview of the ju-
ridical framework elaborated by the Commission 
upon the guidelines on state aid for environmental 
protection through the comparison with the prece-
dent European framework. In view of its relevance, 
we will primarily focus on those state aid questions 
derived from the national climate protection re-
gimes, with the aim of assessing the suitability of 
the new guidelines vis -à-vis the new environmental 
economic instruments. 
The compatibility between competition and 
environmental policies 
The European legal framework on state aid, estab-
lished under Chapter I of Title VI of the EC Treaty 
(Art. 87-89) is characterised not only by the absence 
of formal legislation, but in particular by its politi-
cal sensibility, which differentiates the rules on 
state aid from the competition rules applied to firms 
(Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty) where the Treaty 
sets up a rather broad prohibition. Thus, in the con-
text of state aid, the Commission enjoys a discre-
tionary power to guarantee that the objectives re-
lated to the completion of a competitive and single 
market will not be jeopardised by any state aid 
regime. Yet, the regime on state aid allows the 
Commission to recognise that state aid might be 
addressed towards the achievement of objectives 
other than the ones required by a full competitive 
policy. In this context, environmental protection 
appears recognised as one of those social objec-
tives.  
In spite of the growing weight of environmental 
protection issues linked with the domain of state 
aid, the relationship between competition and envi-
ronmental polices has traditionally been confused. 
Although the polluter-pays principle has been 
largely recognised at the European level as being 
part of the environmental policies of the European 
Community, it is far from clear that such a recogni-
tion was indispensable.5 Indeed, the polluter pays 
                                                                     
because of the cla rification on the concept of state aid, and the refusal of 
the ECJ to admit the “extensive definition” of state aid such as proposed 
by the Commission. However, the reasoning of the Court is also quite 
interesting – although not fortunate – due to the second part of the ruling, 
which rises questions regarding the inte rnal market. 
5  The polluter-pays principle is currently included in Article 174(2 ) of the 
Treaty and it was introduced for the first time in a legal text through the 
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principle by requiring the internalisation of envi-
ronmental costs is before all a principle of effi-
ciency, and considering that efficiency is at the root 
of a free market economy, the European Commu-
nity would have applied it anyhow, even if it was 
not expressly recognised as an environmental prin-
ciple. Thereby, the fact that the polluter-pays prin-
ciple makes part of the logic both of the competition 
– and free market in general – and environmental 
policies is in principle a guarantee of the compati-
bility between the aims pursued by both policies. 
Furthermore, it should be also a question of noting 
that at the European level the evolution of the envi-
ronmental polices as well as the competition polices 
tend to converge. On the one hand, both the Mem-
ber States and the European Commission make 
more and more use of market instruments for envi-
ronmental protection at the expenses of the tradi-
tional ‘command-and-control’ approach. On the 
other hand, the public sector starts accepting the 
active role of the private initiative regarding envi-
ronmental protection. In this respect, the recent 
“CEDED 6 decision” is illustrative, since the Com-
mission has approved for the first time an agree-
ment among several firms, which intended to re-
duce the production of technically unefficient wash-
ing machines so as to reduce energy consumption.7 
This kind of responses from the part of the Co m-
mission confirms not only its openness towards the 
environmental protection initiatives of the private 
sector, but equally they imply a direct application of 
the integration of environmental considerations into 
the competition area as required by Article 6 of the 
Treaty.  
Does the integration principle influence the 
new guidelines on state aid for environmental 
protection? 
The new European framework on state aids for 
environmental protection reflects the legislative 
development both at the European and national 
level that came about in this area during the last 
years.8 Especially, it is the reference to the integra-
tion of environmental considerations imposed by 
Article 6 of the Treaty that marks the development 
                                                                     
Recommendation of the Council on the inclusion of environmental costs 
by the public authorities in 1974, Council Recommendation, 3 March 1975 
OJ (L 194, 1). 
6  European Council of Domestic Appliance Manufactureres 
7  OJ L 187, 26.7.2000. See also XXX Report on Competition Policy 2000, 
SEC (2001) 694 final, 7.5.2001. In the named decision, the Commission 
considers that the agreement, even if restrictive of competition according 
to Article 81(1), can be exempted following Article 81(3) since it dimin-
ishes energy consumption (environmental positive effect) and benefits 
consumers by saving energy. 
8  JO C37, 3-2-2001. 
of the new regulatory framework. From this per-
spective, the Commission will emphasise in para-
graph 3 of the new guidelines this duty of integra-
tion so as to promote a sustainable development. 
Undoubtedly, the new guidelines show the willing-
ness of incorporating the environment as a factor to 
be considered in assessing national state aid meas-
ures. Nevertheless, this intention does not imply a 
total integration. Beyond doubt the Commission has 
enlarged the number of exemptions in the state aid 
regime due to environmental reasons so as to foster 
Member States to adopt environmental protective 
measures. Nonetheless, the Commission continues 
to hold the principle that state aids - despite having 
a role to play within the environmental protection 
policies - cannot ensure the development of activi-
ties whose economic viability is not possible. 
Yet, the fact that the environmental integration 
principle under Article 6 of the EC Treaty makes 
part of the chapter on principles on which European 
policies must be based could in the future favour the 
consideration of environmental issues when assess-
ing state aid measures. As suggested by some au-
thors, it could be thought of the Commission ex-
empting environmental aid or some categories of 
environmental aid according to what prescribed by 
Article 89.9 As a matter of fact, Regulation 994/9810 
authorised the Commission to exempt by group 
certain categories of state aid, among which also 
was the environment. In case the Commission 
would decide to issue a decision exempting envi-
ronmental state aid, this would mean to consider 
automatically state aid with environmental purposes 
compatible with the single market and competition 
rules, being furthermore Member States excused 
from the obligation to notify the Commission as 
required by Article 88.3. Still, it is interesting to 
observe that in a previous version of the current 
approved guidelines on state aid for environmental 
protection, the Commission admitted quite openly 
that for new forms of operating aid it would proba-
bly be necessary in the future to adopt a regulation 
exempting state environmental aid from the general 
current regime.11 It is true though, that even if in the 
future an exemption by category in favour of state 
aids for environmental protection would be positive, 
such an exception is probably not advisable at the 
present moment. Taking into account that many 
                                                                 
9  This observation had already been launched by Jans regarding the 
framework of 1994: ‘The integration principle provided for in Art. 130 R 
does not go so far as to exempt environmental aids from the scope of art. 
92’. See Jan H. Jans, ‘State aid and Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty: 
Does the polluter really pay?’, European Environmental Law Review, 
April, 1995, p. 108. 
10 Regulation 994/98, OJ 1998 L 142. 
11 See paragraph 2 of this version, which can be found in www.wind-
energie.de/englisch/eu_guidelines_environment.htm.  
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state policy areas - especially those combating cli-
mate change - still in phase of experimentation, it 
would be precipitated to elaborate in an early time a 
precise and clear category which would have the 
negative effect of excluding the development of 
some of the innovative - and likely environmentally 
friendly - approaches which are being tested by 
Member States. 
Regarding the integration principle, the declaration 
introduced by the new guidelines in paragraph 83 
by which the Commission is required to consider 
the environmental aspects when adopting or review-
ing other dispositions on state aid should be deemed 
positive. Likewise, the integration principle reach a 
more concrete sense with the statement included 
into 83 paragraph, according to which the Commis-
sion will have the possibility of requesting Member 
States to elaborate environmental impact studies 
whenever they will notify state aids on different 
sectors. In case this possibility will be put in prac-
tice, it will undoubtedly become one of the most 
effective completion of the integration principle. 
The novelties provided by the new regime on 
state aid for environmental protection. 
The acknowledgement of the necessity to provide 
exceptions to the polluter-pays principle and as a 
result accepting state aid for environmental pur-
poses gave origin in 1974 to the adoption by the 
Commission of a memorandum on state aids for 
environmental purposes, which suffered several 
modifications through the eighties.12 The most re-
markable feature of this first framework rested on 
the transitory admission of state aid for environ-
mental protection, in such a way that the Commis-
sion previewed that for the future the full applica-
tion of the polluter-pays principle would be the rule. 
In 1994, after the experience acquired during almost 
two decades the Commission elaborated a more far-
reaching juridical framework on state aid for envi-
ronmental protection.13 The 1994 framework had 
been in force until 2000 and was substituted by the 
new guidelines. From a comparative perspective 
between the three phases, it can be drawn that the 
first and second phases were characterised both by 
                                                                 
12 Memorandum, 6 November 1974, Letter to the Member States SEC(74) 
4264; IV Report on Competition Policy, paragraphs 175-182; Letter to 
Member States SG (80) D/8287 of 7 July 1987 and Letter SG (87) D/3795, 
23 March 1987. 
13 For general view of the evolution of the rules on state aid for environ-
mental protection until 1995 see, Jan H. Jans, ‘State aid and Articles 92 
and 93 of the EC Treaty: Does the polluter really pay?’ European Envi-
ronmental Law Review, 1995, p.108 and ss. For a deep analysis of the 
state aid rules in the context of environmental policy, see Eberhard Gra-
bitz and Christian Zacker, Scope for action by the EC Member States for 
the improvement o f environmental protection under EEC law: the example 
of environmental taxes and subsidies, Vol. 26, Common Market Law Re-
view, 1989, (423-447). 
an attempt to clarify the cases accepted as exemp-
tions to the state aid rules and by the Commission’s 
reluctance towards the new incentives modalities 
proposed by the Member States under the form of 
environmental subsidies. This vision was to a large 
extent in accordance with the harmonisation of 
environmental policies practised during this period 
at Community level. During the last years, espe-
cially during the late 90s, the efforts on total har-
monisation have decreased, and simultaneously the 
Commission through its practice has provided 
broader room for states to adopt new modalities of 
environmental state aid. This change of philosophy 
is reflected in the principles presiding the new 
guidelines, in such a way that the Commission 
declares in point 18 of the guidelines that state aid 
could just be justified in two cases: firstly, as a 
temporary second-best solution, when it  is not yet 
possible to internalise all costs, and secondly when 
the aid acts as an incentive to firms to improve their 
standards or to undertake further investment de-
signed to reduce pollution from their plants. 
Investment aid rules 
The first changes observed in the guidelines of 
December 2000 are represented by environmental 
investment aid. This kind of aid under the 1994 
framework adopted three modalities: 
· environmental aid that aimed at facilitating 
firms the adaptation towards new environ-
mental standards or at encouraging them to-
ward a more rapid adoption; 
· aid which intended to achieve standards supe-
rior to the standards imposed legally; 
· aid aimed to the attainment of environmental 
standards derived from environmental agree-
ments and unilateral programs which are not 
legally mandatory. 
Within the new framework, investment aid under 
the first case has disappeared. That means that 
whereas in the past firms that were able to adapt to 
the new legal obligations derived from Community 
legislation could benefit from 15% of eligible costs 
and for a limited period (point 3.2.3.A), under the 
new system firms required to accomplish environ-
mental standards established by law cannot benefit 
from any kind of aid to achieve their obligations. 
Still, the small and medium enterprises are granted 
an exception to this rule, and according to point of 
the guidelines they might benefit from aid so as to 
adapt themselves to Community standards during a 
period of 3 years – from the moment these stan-
dards become compulsory and up to a 15% of eligi-
ble costs. Logically, paragraph 3 of point 3.2.2 A of 
the old guidelines dedicated to the relocation of 
firms has also disappeared, under which firms exist-
ing during 10 years and deciding to build a new 
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plant instead of adapting the new compulsory stan-
dards to their plants, were considered not as new 
firms but as old ones. On this basis, these firms 
were allowed to receive an aid that should not ex-
ceed the costs of adaptation to the new plant. In 
contrast, the new framework has established that the 
relocation of firms does not constitute environ-
mental protection and is consequently excluded. 
There is an exception to this rule: the granting of 
aid is justified when the relocation is undertaken by 
a firm established in an urban area or in a Natura 
2000-designated area. In this case, aid to relocation 
might be granted when the firm lawfully carries on 
an activity that creates major pollution and, on 
account of this location, must move from its place 
of establishment to a more suitable area, having the 
change of location been imposed by an administra-
tive or judicial decision. 
Akin to the past, the new guidelines consider essen-
tial a positive treatment for those cases in which 
national standards are more stringent than those at 
the European level. Hence, the possibility of award-
ing investment aid is admitted (point 20-29) when-
ever Community environmental standards are ex-
ceeded either as a consequence of more strict na-
tional legal standards or as derived from voluntary 
commitments of the firms. 
Consequently, the Commission has considerably 
extended the concept of internalisation of costs by 
denying state aid when its purpose is to provide 
help for accomplishing mandatory standards, and by 
limiting the cases of investment aid to those repre-
sented by small and medium enterprises. From this 
perspective, it is quite meaningful the declaration 
that the declaration of the Commission stated in 
point 19 of the new guidelines asserting that after 
the adoption of the Fifth Action Programme on the 
Environment, which was already based on the ‘pol-
luter-pays’ principle and cost internalisation, “firms 
had disposed of seven years for adapting gradually 
to the application of the principle”. By the same 
token, under point 21 the Commission insists on the 
evidence that compulsory environmental standards 
constitute the ordinary law with which firms must 
comply, therefore implying that it is not necessary 
to provide with aid in order to encourage them to 
obey the law. 
Another innovation, this time related with the defi-
nition of investment state aid is provided by the new 
rules. It should be noticed that the new framework 
already stems from a broad definition of environ-
mental protection in which not only remedies and 
prevention of physical damages but also energy-
saving measures and use of renewable sources of 
energy are included.14 Although the 1994 guidelines 
already considered aid for energy conservation and 
renewable energy (point 2.3), the Commission am-
plifies the granting of investment aid to the renew-
able energy sector (point 32), accepting even to 
overcome the general 40% of normal authorised 
costs up to 100% under certain conditions. Again, 
another novelty is represented by the inclusion of a 
category within the state aid guidelines, namely, 
investment aid in the field of combined production 
of electric power and heat. In assessing the invest-
ment aid for combined production of electric power 
and heat, the Commission will take into account the 
particular kind of primary energy used. 
Aid for advisory/consultancy services in the 
environment field 
A second category of aid that undergoes modifica-
tions under the guidelines 2000 is the advisory and 
consultancy services in the field of environment. 
These are public aid aiming at disseminating 
knowledge, subsidising audits and consultancy 
services as well as at the dissemination of informa-
tion. Under the new scheme and in contrast to the 
past, only small and medium-sized enterprises can 
benefit from these kinds of aid. 
Operating aid 
By far, operating aid – which is in fact the aid hav-
ing a direct effect on the costs of production and in 
turn on prices – are the schemes which have under-
gone most of the amendments under the new guide-
lines for environmental state aid. It is in the domain 
of operating aid that the Commission will finally  
accept many of the legal solutions introduced in 
recent times at national level, providing at the same 
time with a set of clear and structured rules. This 
blatantly contrasts with the previous legal scenario 
dominantly embedded with scarce and vaguely 
defined cases of acceptable operating aid. To be 
sure, the 1994 guidelines only pointed out as cases 
of investment aid potentially accepted those in the 
field of waste management as well as exemptions to 
environmental taxes. The reluctance of the old 
guidelines towards environmental operating aid is 
easily perceived all over the text. In this sense, for 
instance, whereas the point 2.3 of the old guidelines 
admitted that state aid to renewable energy could 
fall under the category of investment aid, operating 
aid for production of renewable energies should 
rather be judged on its merits. Under the new rules 
of December 2000, not only specific rules for the 
general category of operation aid are provided, but 
equally the guidelines contain concrete and differ-
                                                                 
14 See point 6 of the guidelines. 
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entiated clauses in the domain of operating aid in 
the case of combined production and sale of electric 
power and heat (points 66-67), in the case of re-
newable energies (points 54-65) and operating aid 
in the form of reductions or exemption from taxes 
(points 47-53).  
Briefly, two features can be derived from the new 
guidelines on state aid for environmental protection. 
Firstly, it is the energy sector and in particular re -
newable energies which acquire a large favourable 
treatment both under the categories of investment 
and operating aid. The second conclusion is that the 
new framework rests on the increase of acceptable 
modalities of operating aid, what is to a large extent 
surprising given the traditional reluctance of the 
Commission towards the admission of new types of 
operating aid.15  
In view of the relevance of renewable energies and 
exemption of taxes regarding climate change poli-
cies, the rules applicable to operating aid relating to 
both categories will be briefly described in the fol-
lowing. 
Rules applicable to operating aid for renew-
able energies 
During the last decade, a large number of Member 
States have set up different legislative frameworks 
so as to promote the development of renewable 
energies through the provision of mechanisms that 
correct the failures which prevent renewable ener-
gies from competing with other traditional energies. 
The main reasons for the lack of non-
competitiveness of renewable vis -à-vis traditional 
energies are derived from the fact that “the techni-
cal processes available do not allow energy (from 
renewable) to be produced at unit costs comparable 
to those of conventional sources” (point 55 of the 
guidelines). Thus, by scrutinizing national legisla-
tion on renewable energies, the Commission will 
consider whether the objective is basically to cover 
the difference between production costs of renew-
able energies and the market price of that energy, 
which indirectly implies that the Commission will 
meticulously examine on the competitive position 
of the renewable energy at stake.  
By echoing the experiences undertaken to promote 
renewable energies at the member state level, the 
Commission has finally embraced - apart from the 
general rules on operating aid (points 45-46) - three 
different modalities of operating aid for renewable 
sources of energy. The first option chosen by Mem-
ber States to promote alternative energies -regulated 
                                                                 
15 On this issue see, Rose M.D´Sa, European Community Law on State Aid, 
1998. p. 58 
under points 58-60- is to grant aid aimed at cover-
ing the difference between production costs and 
market costs. Under the second option, the Com-
mission includes the numerous market instruments 
which Member States have been using to encourage 
renewable energy, proposing as examples the case 
of green certificates and tenders. The receptivity of 
the Commission towards this kind of operating aid 
to renewable energy is  perceptible by comparing the 
time duration for general operating aid with the 
time duration of operating aid for renewable energy: 
whereas the Commission authorises operating aid 
for renewable energies during 10 years (point 62), 
the normal period for operating aid in the case of 
waste management for instance, is 5 years. Finally, 
the third option for Member States to introduce 
state aid for renewable energies is to a certain extent 
the most coherent with the polluter pays principle, 
since according to paragraphs 63-64, Member 
States can grant aid based on the external avoided 
costs. External costs are understood as those envi-
ronmental costs that society would have to bear if 
the same quantity of energy were produced by a 
production plant operating with conventional forms 
of energy. This option is by large the most precise 
one from a cost internalisation viewpoint in view of 
the fact that it comprises not only negative external-
ities –environmental damages- but also positive 
externalities –environmental benefits-, which are 
rarely accounted for during the design of environ-
mental policy instruments. 
· Rules applicable to all operating aid in the 
form of tax reductions or exemptions 
The chapter dedicated to operating aid in the form 
of tax reductions or exemptions is not utterly a 
novelty since the last paragraph of 3.5 point of the 
old framework permitted the temporal reduction or 
exception of environmental taxes. The current 
framework improves the previous rules by offering 
a detailed regime upon the way Member States can 
carry on policies based on reduction or exemption 
of taxes in favour of their enterprises in order not to 
damage their international competitive position. 
Certainly, rules under this chapter are applicable to 
any type of environmental taxes, but they gain a 
particular significance in the context of climate 
change policies given on the one hand that most of 
the Member States are currently undertaking or are 
about to establish fiscal environmental reforms. On 
the other hand, it should be considered that exemp-
tions and reductions of CO2 taxes are nowadays a 
normal practice in many Member States, since the 
Commission already had the occasion to accept 
national measures exempting CO2 taxes. 
As stated above, the current rules on the reduction 
or exemption of taxes are quite detailed. Basically, 
rules are different depending on whether there ex-
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ists an harmonisation at the Community level or 
not. In the context of climate change policies and 
considering the absence of harmonisation, the most 
relevant rules are those included under paragraph 
51, which refers to the case when Member States 
introduce new taxes - or when the national tax is 
higher than the tax fixed at Community level. In 
this case, the rules on the reduction or exemption of 
taxes will depend on whether firms -or groups of 
firms - have concluded agreements in order to reach 
environmental objectives. 
In the case of an existing voluntary agreement 
aimed at achieving environmental protection goals - 
reduction in energy consumption, reduction in 
emissions and any other environmental measures- 
the Commission will accept the state aid for a pe-
riod of ten years. Here, it is remarkable that in an 
indirect way the Commission is going to define 
what it understands by a “voluntary agreement” and 
the conditions it imposes for consenting to the 
agreement. First of all, the Commission requires 
that the environmental agreement must be negoti-
ated by the member state, which implicitly excludes 
some categories of environmental agreements 
known as “gentle agreement”. In other words, in-
formal agreements drawn on a voluntary basis by 
firms and submitted to the state without the possi-
bility for public authorities of negotiating the 
clauses of the agreement remain excluded.  
Furthermore, Member States have a duty to control 
the implementation of the agreements since they are 
obliged to ensure a strict monitoring of the com-
mitments taken on by the firms or associations of 
firms. As a last condition for the acceptance of 
agreements, the Commission requires the inclusion 
within the terms of the agreement of juridical sanc-
tions in case of non-accomplishment of the envi-
ronmental engagements assumed by firms. With 
this requisite the Commission intends to avoid a 
common practice in many countries where envi-
ronmental agreements cannot be enforced legally 
since the stipulations of the agreement do not pro-
vide with legal sanctions in case of infringement of 
the provisions of the covenant. Interestingly, the 
requisites named by the Commission to accept 
environmental agreements as the basis for reduction 
or exemption of taxes are in fact the suggestions 
included by the Environmental Directorate of the 
Commission in its Recommendation on Voluntary 
Agreements in 1994. In other words, the guidelines 
on state aid for environmental protection give a new 
legal force to the concept of environmental agree-
ments. In this sense and according to the new 
framework the Commission will be able to assess 
not only the opportunity but also the environmental 
effectiveness of the agreement. This entails an ex-
ante scrutinising power upon the content of the 
agreement for the reason that the agreement to-
gether with the legal framework which exempts or 
reduces the tax must be notified by the member 
state to the Commission. From this point of view, it 
could be argued that to a certain extent the Comp e-
tition Directorate within the Commission might 
eventually become a new actor in the field of the 
implementation of environmental policies. For 
instance, the Commission could refuse an exemp-
tion or a reduction of taxes claiming that the envi-
ronmental goals included in the agreement are not 
ambitious enough. Put it differently, the Commis-
sion would reject the agreement because the envi-
ronmental benefits derived from the covenant are 
inferior to the economic aid in the form of a tax 
reduction or exemption.  
Member States can also grant tax reductions or tax 
exemptions for 10 years even if voluntary agree-
ments between the Member States and the recipient 
firms do not exist, provided that the recipient firm 
after the tax reduction will still pay an amount 
higher than the Community minimum –in case that 
the reduction or exemption is based on a Commu-
nity tax. When the reduction concerns a domestic 
tax in the absence of a Community tax, the firm 
should still pay a significant proportion of the na-
tional tax. 
It should be pointed out that in the previous ver-
sions of the 2000 guidelines as proposed by the 
Commission, the conception of operating aid in the 
form of exemption or reduction of taxes was much 
more restrictive than the notion finally endorsed16. 
This narrow approach was actually coherent with 
the traditional reluctance of the Commission to-
wards operating aid. Nevertheless, the guidelines 
were largely criticised by Member States, especially 
those aspects concerning the degressivity of aid, the 
limitation of the granting period and the appropri-
ateness regarding climate change policies. From this 
last perspective, the criticisms on behalf of the 
states rested on the idea that taking into considera-
tion the lack of CO2 tax harmonisation and the di-
verse initiatives at the member state level, the legal 
framework provided by the guidelines would ob-
struct the ongoing environmental fiscal reforms at 
the member state level17 as well as the different 
national CO2 taxes and charges. As a matter of fact, 
the strict conditions advanced by the Commission 
regarding both the degressivity and the limits on the 
granting period were not suitable for environmental 
fiscal reforms, which hinge on the necessity of 
continuity and the protection of the international 
                                                                 
16 This old version can be found in www.wind-energie.de/englisch/ 
eu_guidelines_environment.html  
17 For an overview of the different energy taxation systems and environ-
mental fiscal reforms in different Member States see, Kai Schlegelmich, 
Energy Taxation in the EU and some Member States: Looking for Oppor-
tunities Ahead, Wuppertal Institute, 1998, Germany. 
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competitiveness of national firms 18. At length, the 
Commission accepted some of the objections of 
Member States in the last version of the guidelines. 
Accordingly, it can be observed that as stipulated by 
point 23 of the guidelines, Member States are en-
abled to continue with their fiscal reforms. More-
over, they are allowed to prolong the duration of the 
aid after the period of ten years since they “... will 
remain free to re-notify the measures in question to 
the Commission, which could adopt the same ap-
proach in its analysis while taking into considera-
tion the positive results obtained in environmental 
terms”.  
National instruments for the reduction of 
greenhouse gases 
One of the salient chapters under the new guidelines 
is represented by the title on policies and measures 
introduced or to be introduced by Member States to 
conform themselves with climate protection objec-
tives derived from national, European and interna-
tional obligations. As a proof of the relevance 
achieved by state aid derived from national policies 
on climate change, for the first time the VIII Report 
of on State Aid included a title addressed to the 
fiscal regime in favour of emission reductions of 
CO2 by determining that “The category of state aid 
for environmental protection includes a sub-
category, constituted by the regimes implemented 
by certain Member States so as to encourage the 
emission reductions of CO2 … and sustain the use 
of renewable energies” being the main reason for 
justifying these regimes “… the necessity for the 
European Union and every member state of respect-
ing the engagements accepted in the framework of 
the Kyoto Agreement…” 19.  
If anything, this chapter is relevant because of what 
it does not contain, rather than because of what it 
does contain. Basically, the Commission being 
aware that measures adopted by Member States in 
this field might fall into the category of state aid, 
opted for not prejudging the content of such meas-
ures, at least for the time being. Rather, the Co m-
mission will confer a large margin of manoeuvring 
to Member States by promoting the adoption and 
implementation of climate change policies20. A 
                                                                 
18 For a view of the position of the German government regarding state aid 
for environmental purposes,    
see, www.wind-energie.de/englisch/c_guideline_env.htm. 
19  COM (2000) 205 final, 11 -4-2000. 
20 Also, one should observe that climate policies are intimately linked to 
energy policies and these late ones remains as Member States compe-
tence to a large extent. In this respect it should be observed that as stated 
in the first Declaration of the Governmental Conference in 1985 on art. 
130R –currently art. 174. energy policies of Member States will have a 
priority on environmental policies of the Commission. Declaration 9. “The 
Conference confirm that the action of the Community related to the envi-
ronment will not interfere with national policies of exploitation of energetic 
resources”. 
closer look at the wording of the chapter illustrates 
the flexibility with which the Commission intends 
to deal with national climate policies. Primarily, 
despite its awareness of the future concerns derived 
from the use of new instruments in the context of 
climate change, the Commission does not seem to 
have the intention of interfering with the fostering 
process initiated by the Environmental Directorate 
in order to encourage Member States to adopt new 
market instruments for climate change protection. 
By the same token, while admitting that certain of 
the modalities adopted by Member States to comply 
with the objectives of the Protocol might constitute 
state aid the Commission will consider prematurely 
to lay down conditions for delimiting the features of 
such an aid. These statements lead to two main 
consequences. Firstly, even if the Commission 
already had the occasion to analyse some national 
programmes - the Danish CO2 quota system, for 
instance- and considering further its remark about 
the future tensions between the regime of state aid 
and the new economic instruments for climate pro-
tection, the Commission opts for allowing Member 
States to behave as laboratories of policies, given 
both the lack of legislation at the EU level, as well 
as the requirement of innovation concerning poli-
cies on climate change21. Moreover, the adopted 
framework remains silent - in contrast with the 
previous versions of the guidelines - regarding the 
modalities and steps according to which Member 
States should design their market instruments to 
face climate change22. Undoubtedly, the amendment 
incorporated into the definitive guidelines text was 
the result of the reticences on behalf of Member 
States toward the Commission´s proposal imposing 
a single European model of market instruments. 
In conclusion, the new guidelines on state aid for 
environmental protection acknowledge the rele -
vance of policies aimed at combating climate 
change. For such a purpose, many of the novelties 
introduced by the new framework rest on the neces-
sity of providing Member States with the legal 
legitimacy for the experimentation of new eco-
nomic and market instruments. Additionally, the 
guidelines represent an improvement regarding the 
internalisation of costs - especially in the category 
of investment aid - and contribute to the strength of 
the principle of environmental integration within 
state aid and competition policies in general. 
                                                                 
21 Despite the leader role assumed by the EU as an actor in the context of 
climate change policies, all documents issued by the  DGXVI stress the 
importance of the subsidiarity principle and the need to encourage Mem-
ber States to adopt innovative tools in the framework of climate change 
policies. See, for instance, COM (1999) 230, 19 May 1999. 
22 In the old guidelines the Commission was quite explicit, for instance, upon 
the way in which Member States should distribute market permits within a 
system of tradable permits. 
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Several legal approaches can be taken in order to 
protect the earth against air pollution. Among these 
are international, regional and bilateral agreements 
and declarations. These measures, that transcend the 
national sphere, should undoubtedly be considered 
the most appropriate ones since air pollution itself is 
a problem that, in general, transcends national bor-
ders. Although not necessarily a global problem, air 
pollution most often concerns several countries in 
the same region. This is particularly true in Western 
Europe, as it consists of many relatively small coun-
tries that are densely populated and highly industri-
alised. In spite of all this, the approach of fighting 
cross-border pollution through international agree-
ments has so far not proved to be very successful. 
Few agreements actually entered into force, others 
have not been fully applied as such. Also the "new 
instruments and mechanisms", proposed in the 
Kyoto Protocol on climate change, and which are 
measures of economic rather than a legal nature, 
such as e.g. emission trade and clean development 
mechanisms (transfer of technology), are for the 
moment only in the very early stages of their devel-
opment.  
In general, most countries therefore continue to use 
"classical measures" – i.e. general regulatory meas-
ures – in order to protect the atmosphere. This 
means that national legislation for industrial plants 
is applied on a local level, leaving the local authori-
ties the final say on questions of interpretation and 
intervention. These forms of national legislation are 
normally implemented through a licensing system 
with matching administrative regulations and local 
jurisdictions verifying the validity of these “pollut-
ing permits”. Thus, these classical licences play a 
crucial role in the current system of protecting the 
atmosphere. In spite of the considerable effects the 
granting of these licences can have on the neigh-
bouring countries, these states do not play a large 
role in their enforcement.  
The purpose of this article is to raise awareness of 
the problems and possible merits connected to in-
junction proceeding brought against cross-border 
polluting plants by foreign adjoining owners in 
                                                                 
 Janna Lehmann, Research Associate at the Centre d'Etude et de Recher-
che sur le Droit de l'Environnement, de l'Aménagement et de l'Urbanisme 
(CERDEAU), Paris I-Sorbonne, currently a Ph.D. candidate at the Univer-
sity of Aix-Marseille III. 
order to protect the atmosphere. The article does 
not, however, deal with the legal difficulties of 
cross-border private injunctions sought by cross 
border neighbours in an exhaustive way, but will 
focus instead on analysing the possibilities available 
to a foreign judge in reviewing the validity of a 
foreign operating licence . 
Firstly, I will analyse the main problems connected 
to injunction proceedings brought by individuals 
from neighbouring countries in their national courts. 
(I) Two main questions have to be addressed in the 
proceedings: which law will be applied to decide 
the case and how will the judge handle the operat-
ing licence? Secondly, I will discuss the possible 
merits of recognising the foreign licence for the 
purposes of environmental protection. (II) 
I. The Problems related to injunction pro-
ceedings initiated by individuals of the neigh-
bouring state in their national courts 
A. The existing possibilities to act and their diffi-
culties 
1. When to act and through which procedures? 
a) Different options are available: 
A private individual can act against a licence in 
different ways and at different stages. Firstly, there 
is the possibility of trying to intervene in the licens-
ing procedure. Here the question arises of whether 
the foreign national can intervene on the same basis 
as the adjoining owners in the country granting the 
licence. If so this would mean that the intervening 
party enjoys at least the right to receive informa-
tion1 or even the right to participate in a "public 
investigation", as it is customary in e.g. France, 
where the general public is consulted in the course 
of the licensing procedure2. These rights should thus 
be the same for the foreign neighbours, above all 
the EU, but all too often they are not, or, at least 
remain entirely theoretical. The problems related to 
such an intervention will not be elaborated further 
upon in this context, even though the exact rights of 
                                                                 
1 For EC countries, these conditions have been created by the 1985 
Directive on environmental impact assessment. 
2 Enquête public, décret n°77-1141 du 12 octobre 1977, JO 13 october, 
M.Prieur; Droit de l'environnement, n°97. 
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foreign adjoining owners intervening in licence 
procedures are not fully clear in every country.3 
Another possibility for the foreign national is to act 
against a licence that has already been approved. 
Several options exist: judicial proceedings can be 
brought in one’s national courts, in the courts of the 
country granting the licence or in the courts of a 
third state. The latter possibility is of a more theo-
retical nature and has little relevance in practice. 
The second possibility does not differ from the 
situation where an adjoining owner in the licensing 
state brings proceedings, in the sense that there will 
be no review by a foreign judge of the licence.4 
Therefore, this option will not be addressed in any 
detail. Instead, I will concentrate on proceedings 
brought before one’s national courts. This is indeed 
the option most often used by the parties con-
cerned5. 
b)  Basic Procedural Rules  
Within the EU, a private person is authorised to sue 
in his national court on the basis of Art. 5 of the 
Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the en-
forcement of judgements in civil and commercial 
matters6. According to widespread opinion, Art. 5, 
sub 3, includes also injunction proceedings brought 
by owners and holders of properties.7 This possibil-
ity has, however, so far not been confirmed by the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities.8 In 
respect of the EFTA countries, the question has 
been resolved by the Lugano Convention9. Some 
bilateral conventions addressing this question also 
exist10. For third states, the relevant international 
civil procedure rules regulate such a possibility. 
According to the Brussels Convention and some 
national legislation, this implies that injunction 
proceedings are based on a tort claim. 11 The possi-
bility for a foreign national of bringing proceedings 
before his own court against a plant in the neigh-
bouring country will thus necessarily constitute a 
                                                                 
3 See for this subject among others: Nassr-Esfahani, pp.84f; M. Prieur, Droit 
de l'environnement, Dalloz, 2001, 4è Ed., pp.67-129. 
4 This case is also of interest as there is the possibility for the cross- border 
adjoining owner to refuse the validity of the licence as a justifying objec-
tion for the plant owner. M.Prieur, “La reconnaisssance des autorisations 
étrangères”; p.215. Nassr-Esfahani, p.22. However, this case is pratical 
for damages, but it will not be applicable in injunction proceedings. 
5 Nassr-Esfahani, pp.23f. 
6 27. September 1969, O.J. 1990, C, 189/2. 
7 C.Kohler, Zivilrechtliche Schadensersatz- und Unterlassungsklagen – 
Gerichtliche Zuständigkeit und Verfahrensfragen, p.160. 
8 M. Wandt, VerR, 1998, p.529. 
9 Lugano Convention of 16 September on jurisdiction and the enforcement 
of judgements, O.J., L, 319/9. 
10 E.g.the bilateral convention between France and Switzerland, 15. Juin 
1869; see Bischoff, Zivilrechtliche Schadens- und Unterlassungsansprü-
che - Gerichtliche Zuständigkeit, p.173 (in french). 
11 Nassr-Esfahani, p.30. 
civil action12 against the owner of the plant, based 
on a claim for damages and on an injunction decree. 
In terms of environmental protection, only the pro-
hibitory action is of any interest in this context. In 
Germany e.g. , the question is resolved by the new 
law of "Gesetz für außerverträgliche Schuldverhält-
nisse und für Sachen" of 1 June 1999 (Law on ex-
tra-contractual liability and liability for commodi-
ties). Article 44 EGBGB provides that claims for 
injunctions and damages are expressly linked to 
liability on tort.13 In other countries this qualifica-
tion raises some problems, as will discussed below.  
2. Qualification and applied law  
The answer to this question of qualification and of 
the applicable law differs from country to country 
and can even differ from judge to judge. It depends 
on a state’s private international law, or "conflict of 
laws" system. Two questions need to be distin-
guished: the problem of qualification and the prob-
lem of deciding the applicable law on the basis of 
the given qualification.  
a) How is the claim to be qualified14? Are the in-
junction proceedings based on a tort claim or do 
they depend on another concept? In most European 
countries - e.g., in Germany15, in Switzerland16, 
Liechtenstein17, Italy 18 and France19 - the claim will 
be qualified as a tort claim. In Austria, the qualifica-
tion is not as straightforward, as the claim can be 
based on the law of tort or the law of property.20 
Below we will discuss to which solution this quali-
fication will lead.  
b) The qualification determines which law will be 
applicable . If one supposes that the adequate quali-
fication is that of tort law, the lex delicti commissi 
will be applicable in most countries. Both the place 
of the tortious activity21 and the place of effect 22 are 
considered to be the location of the tort.23 In our 
case, the place of the damages does not coincide 
                                                                 
12 Proceedings before admintrative courts are excluded, as adminstrative 
juridictions have no competence to judge facts occurings outside  their 
territorial jurisdiction. 
13 T. Pfeiffer, p.265. 
14 Concerning the discussion of which law should be applied in order to 
determine the qualification, see inter alia Loussouarn/Bourel, Droit Inte r-
national Privé, 5è éd. p.195ff 
15 see above. 
16 Switzerland is the only country with a special conflict regulation on 
environmental liability, Art. 138 IPRG; M. Wandt, VerR, 1998, p.530. 
17 Art. 52 I IPL (1997); M. Wandt, VerR,1998, p.531. 
18 Italy codified its private international law in 1995. Art. 62 provides fo r a 
general conflict regulation in respect of tortuous acts. 
19 Loussouarn/Bourel, Droit International Privé, 5è éd. p.455ff.  
20 M. Wandt, VerR, 1998, p.531. 
21 The so -called Handlungsort 
22 Erfolgsort (place of the damaging impact)  
23 R.Lummert, NuR, 1982, p.241; G.Betlem, Civil liability for transfrontier 
pollution, p.93. 
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with the place where the tortfeasor acted24, but the 
places are situated in two different countries. Which 
law should be applicable, the lex loci executionis25 
or the lex loci actus26? Once more, this question is 
answered in different ways in different countries 
depending on the national conflict of laws system.  
In France, the law of tort has not been codified. The 
judiciary is in principle in favour of applying the lex 
loci delicti27, the judge thus applying the law of the 
country in which the plant is situated.28 French 
doctrinal opinion, however, defends the principle of 
optionality29. Some defend the theory of choice30. In 
Germany, the new "Gesetz für außervertägliche 
Schuldverhältnisse und für Sachen" 31 is no longer 
based on the principle of ubiquity and instead 
leaves the choice of the applicable law to the plain-
tiff.32 Italian33 and Swiss34 law equally leave this 
choice to the plaintiff, whereas Austria, in the case 
of a tortious qualification, opts for the lex loci de-
licti and in the case of law of property qualification 
for the lex rei sitae35. Liechtenstein36 generally 
chooses the lex loci actus, with a possible exception 
for the case of a plaintiff who has a closer connec-
tion to the lex loci executionis. 
As can be seen from this small overview of solu-
tions, the choice of the applicable law is most often 
left to the plaintiff, which is quite advantageous. A 
further question needs to be addressed in this con-
text. Indeed, the most crucial question is the one 
concerning the actual existence of the licence of the 
plant. In fact, in several respects the case of a for-
eign adjoining owner has to be clearly distinguished 
from the case of an adjoining owner within the 
same state. Firstly, the foreign owner probably did 
                                                                 
24 Case of offence committed over a distance ("Distanzdelikt). 
25 Law of the place where the prejudice occurred. 
26 Law of the place, where the tortious activity has occurred. 
27 The law of the place where the tort has been committed. 
28 Loussouarn/Bourel, Droit International Privé, 5è éd. p.187; Tribunal Civil 
de Sarraguemines, 30.10.1957. 
29 The tort should exclusively be localised in function of the elements, which 
are most characteristic of the act. For the majority of cases, this will be the 
place where the pollution is produced. A. Huet, Zivilrechliche Schadenser-
satz- und Unterlassungsklagen (in french), p.193f. 
30 Système „cumul“: Two options exist: firstly, the plaintiff has the choice or, 
secondly, the licity will be judged on the law of the place where the pollu-
tion was realized and only for the remainder, can the plaintiff choose the 
law (the last one is the majority opinion). 
31 See supra, IA1b. 
32 § 40 EGBGB. 
33 The Italian IPRG law of 31 May 1995 does not specially regulate for the 
liability in environmental law. Therefore Art. 62, on general conflict law 
concerning torts, provides the possibility of choosing between the lex loci 
delicti and the lex fori. A renvoi is excluded (Art. 13 II c IPRG). 
34 Switzerland has a distinct system of conflict of laws for environmental 
liability law. A renvoi is excluded; See Wandt, VerR, pp.530ff. 
35 Theory according to which the law of the place where the property is 
situated is competent.  
36 See M. Wandt, VerR, 1998, p.531. 
not enjoy the same possibilities of intervening in the 
licensing procedure. This clearly hampers the pos-
sibility of balancing the contradictory rights in an 
equitable way. Secondly, the licence does not have 
the same status in the neighbouring country as in 
the country where the installation is situated. This 
brings us to the essential issue: how will a foreign 
judge consider the licence? 
B. Problems related to the recognition of foreign 
licences 
The granting of a licence is an act of a local author-
ity based on a process governed by public law, and 
thus constitutes a sovereign act within the national 
territory. What status will it therefore have in an-
other state and in what way will it be considered by 
the foreign judge? Should a foreign judge respect or 
recognise37 it, or not? 
1. Characterisation of the licence: 
To start with, the character of operating licences is 
not the same in every country, not even within the 
EU. The cases of Germany and France illustrate the 
difference: 
a) In France 
In France, a licence is granted while reserving the 
rights of third persons38. This means, that the li-
cence does not provide a preclusion objection for 
the owner of the plant, as a French judge can award 
damages in spite of the existing licence. The licence 
has no effect on third private persons as it merely 
regulates the relation between the plant owner and 
the authorities. This is one of the consequences of 
the clear-cut distinction between the public and civil 
juris dictions. Another consequence of this, how-
ever, is that the French civil judge does not accept 
injunction proceedings. Therefore injunction pro-
ceedings constitute a real preclusion objection.39  
b) In Germany 
Once a licence has been granted and an installation 
has been approved, the plant owner enjoys the pro-
tection add to the validity of his licence40. The right 
of the adjoining owner to intervene in the licensing 
                                                                 
37 The use of the term "recognition", does not imply any jurisdictional 
appreciation in this context, as the applicable law should be designated 
without prejudice. 
38 Art. 8 de la Loi de 1976 sur les installations classées, Art. 6 de la Loi de 
1964 sur la pollution des eaux, Art. 11 du décret du 20 septembre 1977 
sur les carrière. 
39 Tribunal des conflits, Décision du 23 mai 1927; Cass Civ., 5 nov 1964; M. 
Prieur, „La reconnaisssance des autorisations étrangères”, p.214. 
40 The licence is often also protected by the doctrine of rights of individuals: 
in Germany, e.g. this is assured through public law, in the Netherlands 
and in Austria by regulations of private law in a large sense. In France, the 
clear-cut separation between the competence of public and civil jurisdic-
tions blocks civil injunction proceedings in the case of a licence no longer 
being subject appeal proceedings. We will discuss this question below. 
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procedure entails the corresponding obligation to 
tolerate the pollution once the licence has been 
approved. Only in exceptional circumstances can a 
licence be revoked by the authorities. In Germany, 
therefore, the licence has an effect on third private 
parties and constitutes a preclusion objection. All 
injunction proceedings against the plant owner will 
be met by the objection of the existence of the oper-
ating licence as a preclusion objection. In this situa-
tion the rights of the owner of the plant – who 
should be able to rely on the licence – and the rights 
of the adjoining owner – i.e. his property rights – 
are in clear contradiction with each other.41 The 
civil judge, however, can order the installation of an 
additional protection device. In somma, the German 
system is more favourable than the French with 
regard to injunction proceedings. 
2) Handling the licence. 
Theoretically, the judge has several options in how 
to consider the foreign operating licence. We will 
briefly analyse some of these. 
a) The judge can totally ignore the licence 
This first option, the most radical one, is that of 
total rejection of every form of recognition of the 
licence. As the licence is a sovereign act based on 
national public law, its legal value stops at the na-
tional border. This conclusion can be drawn from 
the territoriality principle as recognised in public 
international law. It has already on several occa-
sions served as an argument for national judges to 
refuse the recognition of foreign licences42. The 
application of the territoriality principle in this 
context is crucial and has indeed been heavily crit i-
cised.  
b) The judge can consider the licence as a "fac-
tum"43. 
According to this theory, the judge considers the 
licence not as a “point of law” but as a simple fact, 
comparable to every other factual circumstance of 
the case. Two conditions have to be fulfilled. 
Firstly, the provision of substantive law44 concerned 
has to be applicable to the foreign state of facts45. 
Secondly, the statutory definition of the offence46 
has to be comparable to the one in the country of 
the forum. This implies that the foreign licence 
                                                                 
41 Nassr-Esfahani, pp.18f. 
42 For the theory of the principle of territorality see among others: Nassr-
Esfahani, pp.26f and pp.52f; K.Siehr, p.387; M.Wandt, VerR, 1998, p.533. 
43 Theory described by Ehrenzweig as the "Datumtheorie", see T.Pfeiffer, 
pp.274f. 
44 Sachnorm.  
45 Auslandssachverhalt. 
46 Tatbestand. 
should be comparable to the licences in the forum 
state. 
c) Substitution 
Some authors support another thesis, close to that of 
the factum – the theory of substitution47. Here the 
judge applies a norm of his own legal system. This 
norm contains a statutory definition that is related to 
the system of the forum. However, the elements of 
the statutory definition have been developed under a 
foreign norm system. The question is therefore 
whether the judge can substitute the elements of a 
statutory definition given in the norm of the forum 
by the corresponding legal definition of the foreign 
country. In our specific case, this means substituting 
the statutory elements of the licence in the corre-
sponding domestic norm by those of the licence in 
the foreign country.48 
d) Special connecting factor49 
According to another theory, the evaluation of the 
licence has to be considered as a special connecting 
factor. The unlawfulness - solely this question can 
be addressed – is to be determined following the 
place of the act, therefore the country granting the 
licence.  
e)  Application of the law of the neighbouring coun-
try 
Another option is that of applying foreign law to all 
questions concerning the material process. This is, 
as we have seen, possible in the countries whose 
conflict of laws system provides for this option. 
The application of foreign law can, however, differ 
from one country to the other. In France a judge 
applies foreign law as an "element of fact"50, which 
entails the refusal by the Cour de cassation to re-
view the interpretation of the foreign law given by 
the lower court51. Neither can the judge apply the 
foreign law automatically 52. The Italian system 
applies the foreign law based on the theories of the 
reception of the foreign law53, formally 54 or materi-
ally 55. The foreign law can also be applied in its 
                                                                 
47 See among others: T. Pfeiffer, pp.276. 
48 T. Pfeiffer, p.276. 
49 See among others: G. Hager, RabelsZ, 1989, pp.330, "Sonderanknüp-
fung". 
50 Théorie de l'application de la loi étrangère comme élément de fait: Lous-
souarn/Bourel, Droit International Privé, n° 239. 
51 The Cour de Cassation only decides the interpretation of the "law" not the 
facts. 
52 See supra footnote 39. 
53 Teoria della recezione della legge straniera. 
54 The foreign law is formally received in the Italian law system. This means 
that the foreign law is interpreted o the basis of the Italian legal system.  
55 The foreign law is integrated in the Italian law system materially. This 
means that the foreign law is interpreted on the basis of the foreign law 
system. According to the new codification, Art. 55 della legge 218/95 pro-
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character of vested rights. This Anglo-American 
theory of vested rights considers that the foreigner 
who is sued in court has received vested rights on 
the basis of the foreign law which should be pro-
tected by applying them56. The judge can also apply 
the foreign law as the foreign judge would do, in 
considering the whole law system of the foreign law 
(system) concerning the applied foreign law in 
question.57 
II. Possible merits of recognising foreign 
licences in injunction proceedings for the 
purpose of environmental protection 
As we saw above, the moment, the judge is faced 
with a claim brought against a private person in a 
foreign country – here the owner of the plant - the 
problem of deciding the applicable law presents 
itself. This question can only be decided after hav-
ing decided on the qualification of the claim. In 
general, the plaintiff is seeking the award of an 
injunction decree or at least the indication of an 
additional protection device. A claim for damages 
will moreover be presented in parallel to the pri-
mary claim. The qualification of these claims - 
either as tort law or as property law – will decide 
the applicable law.58 
We will briefly consider the results of some of the 
theoretical possibilities and their respective merits 
(A) and will then defend some propositions (B). 
                                                                     
vides that the foreign law should be interpreted in the light of its proper law 
system; Novelli, Diritto Internazionale Privato e Processuale, pp.35f. 
56 Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht, p.141; Loussouarn/Bourel, Droit 
International Privé, n°239. 
57 Krophooler, Internationales Privatrecht, pp.207f. 
58 It must be specified, that in some countries, among which France, the 
judge does not automatically search for the qualification. French jurisdic-
tions e.g. still refuse a compulsory application of foreign law (see the 
judgement "Bisbal“ of the Cour de Cassation, 12 mai 1959, Pas d'applica-
tion d'office de la loi étrangère.) This is the logical result of the French 
theory of considering the foreign law as a factum. Consequently, the fact, 
that a foreign law may be competent, must be invoked by one of the par-
ties and the burden of proof of the existence of the foreign law falls to the 
parties invoking the fact during the proceedings. If none of the parties 
invoke the possible competence of a foreign law, the French judge will 
apply French law ex officio without considering the question of qualifica-
tion. The result will be negative for the plaintiff, since a civil action on in-
junction proceedings or on a claim for the indication of additional meas-
ures in respect of a plant that already enjoys the protection of the right of a 
licence, is not admissible in France because of the strict distinction be-
tween private and public jurisdictions. However, a recent evolution in case 
law can be observed in that a judge does have the option of applying 
foreign law, even without a party invoking it; Cass, 26.5.99; (for the evolu-
tion of case law: Loussouarn/Bourel, DIP, n°241). Totally different in Italy, 
where the judge must apply ex officio the foreign law; Novelli, Diritto Inter-
nazionale  Privato e Processuale, p.36. 
A.  Theoretical outcomes of the different handling 
of the licences by the judge 
1. Application of the lex fori combined with a non-
recognition of the licence: 
If the judge applies his national law and totally 
ignores the existence of the operating licence59, he 
will normally grant the claim. The question, 
whether the licence can function as a real preclusion 
in the proceedings, is not even raised as the licence 
does not even exist, as for him there is no licence 
anyway. This solution seems quite favourable to the 
environment, but has no relevance in practice. Since 
such a judgement will undoubtedly be contrary to 
the "ordre public" of the licensing country - at least 
as far as injunction proceedings are concerned – it 
will not be enforceable in that country.60 Unfortu-
nately, this is frequently the solution adopted by 
countries applying the principle of territoriality in a 
strict way in respect of foreign licences61. This out-
come may be interesting for claims for damages, 
but not for injunction proceedings. 
2. Application of the lex fori combined with a partial 
recognition of the licence 
This solution can be of interest if the judge does not 
consider the licence as a simple fact, but as a point 
of law. If, according to his domestic law, a licence 
is a preclusion objection and if he considers the 
licence as a factual element, the judge will not ver-
ify its legality but will only note its existence as a 
given fact and reject the claim. If, on the contrary, 
the judge considers the licence as a point of law, 
and even if the licence is a preclusion objection in 
his domestic law, he will proceed to an examination 
of the legality of the licence.  
The judge has two ways of reviewing the validity of 
the licence: either based on the law of the licensing 
country62 or based on his domestic law concerning 
licences similar to those of the neighbouring coun-
try63. He will opt for the first solution in cases 
where the licensing systems of the two countries are 
so divergent that he cannot find a corresponding 
domestic norm. The second solution can be consid-
ered if the two licensing systems are similar . Both 
solutions have practical relevance, as in both cases 
the legality of the licence will be reviewed. Obvi-
ously, in cases where the licensing procedures are 
similar , but stricter in the country of the forum, the 
application of domestic law is beneficial to the legal 
                                                                 
59 See infra, IA3a. 
60 See among others: Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht, p.622. 
61 See Nassr-Esfahani, pp.52f. 
62 See infra, IA3c. 
63 See infra IA3b. 
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means of environmental protection. The same holds 
true for cases where the licensing country, contrary 
to the country of the forum, allows for injunction 
proceedings. Even if there may be a certain risk of 
unenforceability, this is less problematic than in 
respect of the first option, where the judge totally 
ignores the licence. 
3.) Application of the foreign law 
The result will depend on the way in which the 
judge applies the applicable foreign law. For there 
to be any merit in judicial control of environmental 
protection, the foreign law should not be considered 
as a mere "fact", as in France, but should at least be 
received in a formal or material way, or even ap-
plied in its entirety. The judicial scrutiny by the 
foreign judge is not likely to extend beyond what 
the judge of the licensing country would have done, 
but it is nonetheless a supplementary control by a 
judge with a different background. The judge 
should ask which jurisdiction in the foreign country 
would be competent and adhere to this practice64. In 
some ways, the foreign judge can even contribute to 
the progressive development of the applicable for-
eign law, e.g. in cases where it has a deficiency or is 
clearly out of date.65  
A judgement of this kind will moreover have the 
biggest chances of being enforced. 
B.) Propositions concerning the recognising (and 
enforcement) of operating l icences 
1. Recognition and enforcement of the injunction 
decree 
The question to be considered firstly, is whether the 
foreign judgement against the industrial plant 
holder / owner will have any legal effect outside the 
court granting the judgement and whether it can be 
enforced abroad. 
In principle, all substantive judicial decisions can be 
enforced66. Several conventions provide for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements. 
The most important of these for the West-European 
region is the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction 
and the enforcement in civil and commercial mat-
ters, already mentioned. The principles underlying 
this convention have been extended to the relation-
ship between the EU Member States and the EFTA 
                                                                 
64 In the case of French law, e.g., the judge of neighbouring country should 
consider the fact that the judge in civil cases refuses injunction proceed-
ings. But he can nevertheless consider applying the same rules as the 
administrative French judge would do in the case of "recours en excess de 
pouvoir". 
65 Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht, p.208. 
66 Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht, p.617. 
Member States by the Lugano Convention, also 
already mentioned.  
a) Recognition 
Recognition is a necessary step towards enforce-
ment. There may be recognition without enforce-
ment, but no enforcement without recognition. Art. 
26 of the Brussels Convention provides for auto-
matic recognition of judgements, which means that 
special, additional procedures are not required for 
the enforcement of a foreign judgement. Indeed, 
there is a sort of "reputable presumption in favour 
of recognition67". 
b) Enforcement 
According to various national systems of civil pro-
cedure law, a special enforcement procedure is 
required68. The Brussels Convention provides for 
simplified ex parte enforcement procedures that are 
largely identical in all Contracting States. The em-
phasis with regard to litigation is on the country 
where the initial proceedings take place, instead of 
the recognition and enforcement stage.69 The court 
enforcing the judgement is prohibited from review-
ing the jurisdiction of the court that passed the ini-
tial judgement70. 
c) Ordre public 
In principle, the refusal of the recognition of the 
foreign judgement is only admitted on limited, 
special grounds. In addition to the question of 
whether the rights of the defence have been re-
spected and two other additional ones in the Lugano 
Convention, the refusal can only be based on public 
policy71. This "ordre public" escape clause, as fore-
seen in Art. 27 and in several national systems of 
civil procedure law72, is the only real obstacle in our 
situation. According to this escape clause, recogni-
tion can be refused "if such recognition is contrary 
to the public policy in the state in which recognition 
is sought (...)" 
2. Enforceability of injunction decrees and court or-
ders for the installation of additional protective devices 
against cross-bordered air polluting plants  
In principle, in respect of recognition and enforce-
ment, judgements granting an injunction to refrain 
from the emission of air polluting substances do not 
differ from judgements on damages.73 However, 
                                                                 
67 G.Betlem, Civil liability for transfrontier pollution, p.263. 
68 E.g. in Germany § 722 ZPO ("Vollstreckungsurteil") or in France, Art. 509 
N.C.p.c.). 
69 G.Betlem, Civil liability for transfrontier pollution, p.264. 
70 Prohibition of the révision au fond, Art. 28f Brussels Convention.  
71 Art. 27f Brussels Convention, Art. 34 GVO. 
72 E.g.: In Germany, § 328 I Nr 4 ZPO; In Italy, Art. 16 della Legge 218/95 – 
"ordine publico internazionale". 
73 G.Betlem, Civil liability for transfrontier pollution, p.261and p.282.  
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one can argue that injunction proceedings may have 
a wider scope than damages74. In fact, recognition 
can be refused, if the judgement forbids to the de-
fendant an act which has been permitted by the 
authority of the enforcement country75.  
a) Thus, if the judgement of the neighbouring State 
totally ignores the existence of the licence granted 
by the enforcement State, it is out of question that 
the neighbouring State will refuse the recognition 
by invoking the clause of ordre public in a justified 
manner. In my view, in injunction proceedings at 
least a partial recognition of the licence will be 
necessary if enforcement is to have any practical 
effect. Indeed, only if the neighbouring country 
takes into account the foreign licence, may it be 
obliged to enforce the injunction or the judgement 
ordering the installation of an additional protective 
device.  
If, therefore, the judge has taken into account the 
review of the legality of the foreign licence in his 
judgement, applying either the lex fori or the for-
eign law, will the licensing country hence be 
obliged to enforce the judgement? No general an-
swer can be given to this question, as it will depend 
on the circumstances of each individual case, with 
relevant factors such as the countries involved and 
the applicable law to take into account. However, 
some arguments in favour of the enforceability can 
be put forward.  
b) Recognition can only be refused if enforcing the 
judgement would constitute a violation of an essen-
tial principle of the national legal system.76 As long 
as the licence has been reviewed, there seems to be 
no ground to justify such violation. If, however, the 
licence has been reviewed through application of 
the lex fori (which is in our case also the lex execu-
tionis), the recognition would be justified by two 
main reasons: firstly, the licence has been granted 
on the basis of the licensing procedure of the coun-
try in which the plant is situated, but the polluting 
effects of this plant (and therefore of the licence) 
transcend the border and affect the judgement-
granting-country. The individuals living abroad 
may not have enjoyed the possibilities of interven-
ing in the licensing procedure in the same way as 
the domestic adjoining owners have.77 Therefore, 
their obligation to put up with the pollution is less 
                                                                 
74 Which justify the French civil jurisdiction position to accord damages, but 
to refuse injunction proceedings; for the facility of damage claims in com-
parison to injunction proceedings, K.Siehr, RabelsZ, 1981, p.386. 
75 M. Wandt, VerR, 1998, p.530. 
76 Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht, p.622. 
77 See, e.g. the case of "Airport Salzburg", where German individuals sue in 
court on injunction proceedings. The German adjoining owners didn't 
enjoyed the same rights to participate in the licensing procedure. See 
K.Siehr, RabelZ, 1981, pp.36f, Nassr-Esfahani, pp.36f.  
significant. Secondly, the individuals abroad cannot 
be expected to tolerate industrial pollution, which 
would be forbidden in their own country. Therefore, 
if a country granted a licence, which affects the 
State on the other side of the border, it cannot refuse 
the (indirect) review of the licence by this neigh-
bouring state in injunction proceedings. The licence 
should also take into account the legitimate interests 
of the neighbouring country, if this country is af-
fected by the pollution.  
c) Also in the light of the existing and planned har-
monisation of the licensing procedures and the 
common demands for effective environmental pro-
tection, above all within the EU, a judgement of one 
of the EU Member States in respect of a licence of 
another EU Member State cannot be rejected on 
grounds of ordre public. Moreover, national rules 
must be interpreted in the light of the general prin-
ciples of the Community law.  
d) Therefore, the statement can be made, that there 
is no justification to refuse the enforcement of an 
injunction decree on grounds of public policy, at 
least in cases where the judgement has reviewed the 
existence of the licence. One may even argue that 
the application of the escape clause of ordre public 
in the case of environmental liability should be 
refused categorically. In fact, one author78 put for-
ward, that a (in this case Dutch) judgement in the 
field of environmental liability will be recognised 
and enforced in all Member States of the Commu-
nity under the Brussels Convention. The author 
argues that: "The view is taken that there is no place 
for application of this escape clause in the cases of 
international tort, such as liability for transfrontier 
pollution: Recourse to public policy by the en-
forcement-court would, in my view, amount to 
abuse of this safety-valve in the types of cases un-
der consideration; thus, victims of pollution do not 
have to grant any concessions as to jurisdiction in 
order to prevent non-enforcement. (...) In principle, 
the free movement of judgements within the Com-
munity is guaranteed by the Brussels Convention."79 
Unfortunately, the EC Commission's White Paper 
on environmental liability80 does not consider any 
question of private international law such as the 
determination of the competent jurisdiction or the 
applicable law.81  
                                                                 
78 G.Betlem, Civil liability for transfrontier pollution, pp.282f. 
79 G.Betlem, Civil liability for transfrontier pollution, p.284. 
80 COM (2000) 66 final, 9 February 2000; http://www. Eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/environment/liability/index.htm.  
81  G. Betlem, "The EC Commission's White Paper on Environmental Liabil-
ity: Towards an EU-Wide Regime ", Elni 2/2000, p.30. 
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1 Introduction 
The process applied in building the European 
Community, namely the merger of European coun-
tries and the increased free movement of persons 
and goods, goes hand-in-hand with an extended use 
of existing transport infrastructure. Roads and rail-
ways as with air routes have higher (and increasing) 
traffic levels than ever before. The world-wide 
increase in air traffic comes with demands for air-
port expansions. As a result of this more and more 
people are suffering from the side effects of in-
creased traffic, especially those problems related to 
environmental noise. According to the Commission 
the EU population that is disturbed by environ-
mental noise is about 100 million. At least 20 mil-
lion of these are seriously disturbed in their sleep 
and may suffer from various noise-induced ill-
nesses. 
Recognising a deficit within EU legislation in this 
field, the Commission presented a proposal for a 
Directive relating to the assessment and manage-
ment of environmental noise1. Present EU Direc-
tives only deal with the limitation of noise emis-
sions at the source and cover for example road 
                                                                 
Dirk Teßmer, lawyer, Frankfurt a.M., Germany. 
1  COM(2000) 468 final, 2000/0194(COD). 
vehicles, aircraft and various types of equipment2. 
With this further proposal the Commission is aim-
ing to control not only the noise produced by certain 
groups of noise-sources (the emissions) but also the 
situation of existing immissions. The objective of 
the proposal is, however, not to prohibit or penalise 
the exceeding of certain noise limits. In fact the 
proposal does not even seek to set common noise 
limits. The objective of the proposed Directive is 
instead to provide European-wide standardised 
noise indicators and assessment methods. These 
will then be utilised by the Member-States to meas-
ure and document the noise exposure from various 
sources and furthermore to inform the EU -
administration and the public about the current level 
of noise exposure. The Commission believes that, 
once Member-States have published the gathered 
information, necessary national limits for pollutants 
and other action to reduce noise immission will be 
established. The knowledge and awareness of exist-
ing noise exposure and its comparison within the 
EU will therefore be the catalyst for further im-
provements.  
                                                                 
2 For example: Motor vehicles and their exhaust systems (70/157/EEC, 
73/350/EEC, 77/212/EEC, 81/334/EEC, 84/372/EEC, 84/424/EEC, 
89/491/EEC, 92/97/EEC, 96/20/EC, 1999/101/EC), Aircraft (80/51/EEC, 
89/629/EEC, 92/14/EEC), Compressors, Generators a.s.o. (84/533-
538/EEC). 
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Although the proposal has not as yet been passed by 
parliament, it should be examined and discussed in 
public to provide useful feedback on whether the 
proposed provisions will ensure an effective ap-
proach to the problem.  
2 The health impact of noise 
Noise has several effects on humans3. Sleep distur-
bance and interference with communication are 
some of the less serious implications, but can be 
highly irritating (and thus stressful). Continued 
interruption of sleep can lead to further physical and 
psychological problems. But even if people do not 
wake up because of the environmental noise, their 
sleep might be disturbed and doesn’t provide the 
necessary grade of relaxation needed for the follow-
ing working-day. Noise can also directly cause 
more severe medical problems such as high blood 
pressure, mental stress, heart attacks and hearing 
damage. Between 5 to 15 % of the EU population at 
least suffers from serious noise-induced sleep dis-
turbance and at least 25 % is reporting noise-
induced annoyance or experience a reduced quality 
of life 4. A study by the German Federal Environ-
mental Agency relating the environmental noise 
caused by airplanes comes to the conclusion, that 
noise exposure of 55 decibel(A) during daytime and 
45 decibel(A) at night shall be regarded as serious 
annoyance. With a noise exposure of 60 decibel(A) 
during the day and 50 decibel(A) at night health-
damages have to be taken into account under a 
prophylactic medical view. Health-damages in form 
of cardiovascular diseases are to be expected if a 
limit of 65 decibel(A) during daytime and 55 deci-
bel at night is permanently exceeded.5 Taking to-
gether the medical costs and the reduction of hous-
ing prices, reduced possibilities of land use and the 
cost of lost labour days the annual damage in the 
EU due to environmental noise estimated range is 
from EUR 13 billion to 36 billion6.  
3 The proposal presented by the Commis-
sion 
As public concern about exposure to noise pollution 
remains high within the European Community, the 
Commission presented this proposal as one (and 
first) step to try and improve the situation. However 
the Commission refrained to set commo n European-
wide noise limits. The main objective of the pro-
                                                                 
3 „Guidelines for Community Noise“; WHO 2000. 
4 „Noise Exposure and Public Helath“, W. Passchier-Vermeer and W.F. 
Vermeer, Environmental Health Perspectives Volume 108, Supplement 1, 
March 2000. 
5 „Fluglärmwirkungen“, Umweltbundesamt, J. Ortscheid and H. Wende, 
Berlin 2000. 
6 “Green Paper on Future Noise Policy”. 
posal is rather to establish a common EC-
framework for the harmonisation of assessment 
methods and management of exposure to environ-
mental noise. As noise from different sources has 
different levels and effects it needs to be defined as 
different pollutants. The circumstances under which 
sound is perceived as noise differ between individu-
als. The proposal covers sound generated by human 
activity in the domestic and public environment of 
people, for example by road traffic, railways, aero-
planes, industry, construction and, recreational 
activities. Noise produced by animals, by nature or 
by one’s neighbours is excluded as is sound in an 
individuals work place.  
One major problem in assessing noise and its im-
pacts on humans is that the sense of sound and level 
at which it becomes a nuisance is subjective - at 
least in view of threshold values – as it varies from 
person to person. Furthermore, the level of annoy-
ance not only depends on the sound volume, but is 
also highly dependable on its pitch (frequency), 
impulse, its content (speech, information, rhythm), 
it’s consistency (whether it maintains a constant 
level or fluctuates), the existence or mixture of 
(very) loud single noise eruptions and continuous 
“background” noise level, the time of day/night and 
the location of the emission (relative to the individ-
ual). Therefore knowledge of the method used to 
measure the noise level and the impact of a concrete 
sound event is essential to the accurate assessment 
of the results. 
With the use of standardised indicators and assess-
ment methods the Commission wants to make it 
possible to compare the noise level and degree of 
noise exposure within the EC, especially in the most 
affected regions.  
The core of the directive is the definition of the 
noise indicators and their application (Article 5 and 
Annex I). The Directive establishes two values, the 
Lden and the Lnight. The primary noise indicator is the 
day-evening-night level Lden in decibels. In order to 
refine the approach for the protection of the domi-
nant sleeping period, i.e. the night, the Commission 
also proposes to establish an overall night-time 
noise indicator called Lnight.  
The Lden indicator is used to prove the long-term 
noise exposure and its relation to community noise 
annoyance in particular to the percentage of highly 
annoyed respondents. In combination with special 
dose-effect relation indicators it is also possible to 
record annoyance due to noise with strong tonal 
components, annoyance due to noise with an impul-
sive character and the adverse effects on children’s 
learning. Lden stands for a day-evening-night aver-
age sound level that is determined throughout one 
year. On the 24 hour day Lday covers 12, Levening  4 
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and Lnight 8 hours. In the evening and more-so the 
night time hours people are at their most sensitive to 
noise therefore the values of + 5 and + 10 respec-
tively are to be added to the recorded decibels (dB). 
The start of the day (and consequently the start of 
the evening and the night) may be chosen by the 
Member States. Otherwise the default values of 
07.00 - 19.00 hours being day, 19.00 - 23.00 hours 
being evening and 23.00 - 07.00 hours being night 
are applicable.  
With the Lnight  indicator the average night-time 
sound level throughout the whole year will be 
documented. In its methods of assessment it equals 
the Lnight calculated as part of the Lden. The applica-
tion of the Lnight indicator will be useful to illustrate 
the relationship between long-term noise exposure 
and sleep disturbance when compared to the per-
centage of people that report a high level of sleep 
disturbance. Lnight could also be a suitable indicator 
for specific medial or social effects related to noise 
exposure during the night (quality of sleep, awaken-
ings and problems with falling asleep, etc.). A re -
duced value of Lnight should therefore reduce ad-
verse health effects from night-time noise exp osure. 
While the Lden and the Lnight values are suitable to 
document long-term noise exposure on an average 
24-hour day and an 8-hour night respectively, cer-
tain instances of noise exposure will not be recog-
nised. Problems do occur for instance in cases 
where: 
· The relevant noise source is intermittent or a 
once-off and therefore does not operate regu-
larly throughout the day or year, 
· There are, as an average, only a very low num-
ber of loud noise events (for example passing 
trains or aircraft)  
· The low-frequency content of sound is strong, 
· The noise contains strong tonal components, 
· The noise has an impulsive character, 
· There is a high noise exposure only at the 
weekend or in the evening / night-time periods, 
· The combination of noise from different 
sources is an integral factor and needs to be 
taken into consideration  
· Noise occurs in otherwise relatively quiet areas 
in the open country. 
The knowledge of only the average sound level 
therefore does not provide a sufficient basis to as-
sess the specific noise exposure in all cases. Hence, 
assessment methods and dose-effect-relations are 
required that take into account the specific circum-
stances and characteristics of sound events. The 
Commission was aware of this fact, but relied on 
the Member-States to find an appropriate way to 
add other noise indicators or use dose-effect-
relations, in these specific cases, to adjust the Lden if 
appropriate. This adaptation by each member state 
is perhaps debatable as it defies the aim of the di-
rective, namely to standardise on methods of indica-
tion and assessment. It would seem appropriate to 
also provide European-wide assessment of ‘special’ 
cases as defined above. 
Once defined the noise values Lden and Lnight will 
then be registered in regional "noise maps" (Article 
7 and Annex IV).  
These noise maps will be a representation of data 
detailing: 
· Previous, existing or predicted noise situations 
in terms of a noise indicator, 
· Instances where the limit value as been ex-
ceeded  
· The number of dwellings in a certain area that 
are exposed to specific values of a noise indica-
tor, 
· The number of people that are affected by the 
noise in a certain area, 
· Cost-benefit ratios or other applicable eco-
nomic data on mitigation measures or scenar-
ios.  
For each agglomeration separate strategic noise 
maps shall be made for road traffic noise, rail traffic 
noise, aircraft noise and industrial noise. 
The gathered and documented information on noise 
exposure must be sent to the Commission (Article 
10) and be made accessible to the public (Article 9). 
On the basis of the information action-plans have to 
be established on a local level and provide the EC 
with the opportunity to formulate further strategies 
and standards of measurement (Article 8 and Annex 
V). The action plans shall contain a description of 
the agglomeration (size, location, number of inhabi-
tants, land use, main noise source, type of buildings 
and their use) and the major roads, railways and 
airports (location, size, data on traffic, surround-
ings). Furthermore, information on the responsible 
authority, the legal context, the noise level values 
(Lden and Lnight) and a summary of the result of the 
noise mapping shall be given. Based on the noise 
maps and the dose-effect relations, an analysis of 
the health situation and identification of problems 
and suggestions on actions to improve the situations 
within the next 5 years shall be made. A long-term 
strategy has to developed containing, for instance, 
land use planning, traffic planning, introduction and 
enforcing of speed limits, promotion of public 
transport, possibilities on technical measures at 
sources and a reduction of sound transmission by 
noise barriers. Other possible actions are to intro-
duce special licences and financial measures such as 
direct charges and penalties. 
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Before approving any “action-plan”, the relevant 
authorities within the member states will be asked 
to organise a public consultation from which any 
feedback or results will be taken into account (Arti-
cle 9 No. 2). Action-plans are to be published on the 
Internet or other on-line facility within two months 
of their initial approval (Article 9 No. 3). The avail-
ability, to the public, of the collected data, and 
summaries of the action plans, is to be ensured by 
the me mber states.  
After receiving the information on noise exposure, 
the Commission will compile a database of noise 
maps and related information. On a five yearly 
basis, a report will be drawn from this database 
summarising the data being held (Article 10). By 
31st December 2007, the Commission must submit 
a report to the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil, based on experience/data collected, of the appli-
cation of the Directive. In this report a review of the 
need for Community quality objectives related to 
the control of environmental noise must be in-
cluded. The Commission will then propose further 
actions and strategies to ensure achievement of 
these objectives.  
Long-term and medium-term goals for the reduction 
of the number of persons that are affected by the 
noise from specific sources (especially road traffic, 
rail traffic, civil air traffic and industry) and the 
measures necessary to reach these goals shall be 
considered (Article 11).  
4 Conclusion 
The proposed Directive could initiate an important 
first step for an approach to get in control of the 
problem of environmental noise by providing a 
general overview of the present and future situation 
of environmental noise and its the grade of exp o-
sure within the Member-States. For the establis h-
ment of European-wide standardised assessment 
methods and noise-mapping routine it is essential to 
get comparable data. On this basis priority lists for 
further actions will be possible. Furthermore, as the 
asses sment of discovered noise level depends on the 
knowledge of the used methods of measurement, 
the setting of common noise limits will not be pos-
sible before standardised noise indicators and as-
sessment methods are established. But, since a high 
percentage of people already suffer from high a 
level of environmental noise, it is doubtful that the 
transformation of this proposed Directive will im-
prove the situation of the affected people in the near 
future. A first EU summary report on received local 
noise maps and action plans is due in 2007, the 
deadline for the publication of finished noise maps 
is in 2010 and action-plans have to be ready not 
before 2011. Regarding that projects in the near 
future - like the extensions of airports, building or 
expansion of roads and railways - will by then be 
done or at least have the necessary national permis-
sions, the situation on environmental noise is likely 
to have become even worse then; at least if the 
Member-States do not find appropriate means to 
control the problem on their own. As the objective 
of the proposal for a Directive is an European-wide 
approach to the problem, it is doubtful that the pro-
posed provisions will provide the intended en-
forcements. Therefore it rather seems to be neces-
sary to establish common noise limits within the EU 
much sooner than it is intended by the Commission.  
The proposed Directive nevertheless should be 
regarded as an important first step towards a “qui-
eter” domestic environment and a better life stan-
dard for an increasing amount of noise-affected 
people. At least Member-States are enforced to 
assess and document the situation on environmental 
noise, their inhabitants live in. But a tightening of 
the time-plan to transform and apply the Directive 
and the development of noise limits that secure a 
minimum-standard of protection against noise 
seems to be critical. Though it is unlikely, there is 
to hope that the European Parliament or Council 
will find those improvements of the proposal neces-
sary and pass a more effective approach to the prob-
lem through their legismation. 
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On 24 January the European Commission made 
public its proposal for a sixth environmental action 
programme 1. The last programme, officially 
adopted by the Council in 1993 and entitled “To-
wards Sustainability”2, expired at the end of 2000, 
following an extensive review3 and a ‘global’ as-
sessment4. This article will provide a brief overview 
of the Commission proposal for a sixth environ-
mental action programme. In doing so, it will out-
line the draft programme’s structure (1) before 
engaging in a discussion of some of its salient fea-
tures (2). The article will continue by arguing that 
the draft programme raises the issue of a more pre-
cise division of powers with respect to the environ-
ment (3). The final part will conclude by summing 
up some of the criticisms that will be raised in the 
course of this article (4). 
1 Outlining European environmental policy 
for the coming decade 
The Commission proposal (to which is appended a 
proposal for a formal decision of the European 
Parliament and the Council adopting and proclaim-
ing the new programme in force) is divided into 
eight parts. Following an introductory chapter 
which outlines the legislative background and ob-
jectives of the new programme, the Commission 
sets out the core substantive and procedural issues 
that it intends to pursue over the coming decade. 
                                                                 
 Sven Deimann, LL.M., research associate, Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe 
University, Frankfurt a.M., Germany 
1 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions on the sixth environment action programme of the European 
Community ‘Environment 2010: Our Future, Our Choice’. Proposal for a 
Decision of the European Parliament and the Council Laying Down the 
Community Enironment Action Programme 2001-2010, COM (2001) 31 
final, Brussels 24.1.2001. 
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The proposal identifies and elaborates on four prior-
ity areas (climate change, nature and bio-diversity, 
environment and health, and, lastly, the sustainable 
use of natural resources and waste management), 
which are preceded by what the authors of the pro-
posal have termed a “Strategic Approach” to meet-
ing the programme’s environmental objectives. Part 
seven discusses issues pertaining to the European 
Union’s growing role as an active participant in 
international environmental policy while the last 
part examines some of the prerequisites to sound 
environmental policy-making, namely broad stake-
holder participation, well-informed policy- and 
decision-makers, and compliance with the funda-
mental principles of EU environmental policy, as 
set out in Art. 174 of the EC Treaty. 
Against the backdrop of the rather mixed results of 
the fifth environmental action programme 5, the 
Commission apparently is of the opinion that prior-
ity should be accorded to the implementation and 
improvement of existing legislation rather than the 
development and conceptualization of new policy 
fields. It comes as no surprise, then, that the pro-
posal should dwell at some length on the “Strategic 
Approach” to meeting the programme’s objectives, 
before addressing the substance of future policy 
initiatives. The “Strategic Approach” essentially 
comprises five elements: improving the implemen-
tation of existing Community legislative provisions, 
integrating environmental policy concerns into 
other policy sectors, reinforcing market incentives 
for environmentally sound economic growth and 
development, enhancing citizen participation as 
well as influencing consumption patterns, and inte-
grating environmental concerns into spatial plan-
ning and zoning as well as strategic management 
decisions. 
Apart from spelling out a “Strategic Approach” for 
pursuing environmental policy objectives at the 
Community level, the programme also seeks to 
identify the overall political parameters for develop-
ing Community environmental policy over the com-
ing decade. In its explanatory memorandum to the 
appended draft decision, the Commission thus 
points to sustainable development, the “inter-
                                                                 
5 Ibid. at 7. 
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reliance between economic progress and a sound 
environment”, globalization, and enlargement of the 
EU as the wider policy context within which EU 
environmental policy must evolve and that it has to 
take into account.6 
2 The integration principle and evolving 
European environmental policy 
It is the focus on improved implementation and 
compliance with Community environmental legisla-
tion as well as finally achieving the integration 
principle, as laid down in Art. 6 of the EC Treaty, 
that constitutes the real novelty of the Commission 
proposal. While the fifth environmental action pro-
gramme sought to lend credence to the concept of 
sustainable development by spelling out a legisla-
tive blueprint for its implementation, the current 
proposal concentrates on the principle of integrating 
environmental concerns into other policy sectors as 
an important, if not in fact the most important, pre-
requisite for successfully pursuing environmental 
policy objectives at the European level. The Co m-
mission thus recognizes the vital role that policy 
integration can play in remedying significant policy 
pathologies that prevented full attainment of the 
objectives set out in the fifth environmental action 
programme.7 Indeed, while most of the substantive 
policy initiatives in the four priority areas (with a 
few notable exceptions8) appear to be geared to-
wards consolidating existing policies, in particular 
those regarding the protection of individual media 
such as water or air quality, realizing the integration 
principle, as required by Art. 6 of the EC Treaty, 
constitutes a recurrent theme throughout the Com-
mission proposal that effectively sets it apart from 
its predecessor. 
a) Realizing the integration p rinciple: achieving 
environmental policy goals under conditions of 
economic inter-connectedness 
Stressing the importance of integrating environ-
mental concerns into other policy sectors lies, of 
course, in the consequence of what the explanatory 
memorandum terms the “inter-reliance between 
economic progress and a sound environment”. 
Given this inter-reliance and the pervasive influence 
of EU policies such as the Common Agricultural 
Policy or the Common Fisheries Policy on impor-
tant segments of the economy in all of the current 
(and future) EU member states, moves to realize the 
full potential of the integration principle have long 
                                                                 
6 See Communication, supra note 1 at 67. 
7 Ibid. (explanatory memorandum, pt. 7). 
8 See below at note 30 and accompanying text. 
been overdue and, hence, deserve unreserved praise 
from an environmental policy point of view.  
Particularly welcome must be the Commission’s 
declared intention9 to screen the EU’s external poli-
cies, especially as regards the negotiation and con-
clusion of trade agreements, with a view to ensuring 
that environmental concerns are given wider con-
sideration. As globalization has intensified over the 
last decade with the establishment of the World 
Trade Organization, the provisions in multi- and 
bilateral trade agreements concerning foreign direct 
investment, national treatment, and most favoured 
nation status set the stage for regional and global 
economic development. Given the inter-relatedness 
between economic development and sound envi-
ronmental protection that the Commission rightly 
emphasizes10, it is imperative that possible strate-
gies for economic development which would re -
spect strictures imposed by the ecology of man’s 
natural environment not be foreclosed by interna-
tional trade agreements. 
The Commission’s draft decision for adopting the 
new programme accordingly calls for more interna-
tional cooperation on risk assessment and evalua-
tion that would respect the precautionary princi-
ple.11 This will allow policy-makers to err on the 
side of caution if short-term economic benefit aris-
ing from the untrammelled play of market forces - a 
play which has been given an additional boost in 
recent years by ‘liberalising’ free trade agreements - 
threatens to undermine long-term sustainability. 
The freedom to forego short-term economic gain for 
the benefit of long-term sustainability would appear 
to be a crucial prerequisite to any strategy for 
achieving a more sustainable economic develop-
ment - development that would be respectful of the 
requirements for an ecologically healthy environ-
ment and the entitlements of future generations12. 
Equally welcome from the vantage point of sustain-
ability, and consistent with the Commission’s stated 
goal of finally lending teeth to the integration prin-
ciple, is the idea of greening the financial sector, 
and here in particular, the Community’s own insti-
tutions active in the field. As part of the Commis-
sion’s “Strategic Approach” to achieving environ-
                                                                 
9 Ibid.; see also Art. 8 (4) and (5) of the draft decision appended to the 
programme. 
10 See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also European Commis-
sion, Bringing our needs and responsibilities together - Integrating envi-
ronmental issues with economic policy, COM (2000) 576 final of 
20.9.2000. 
11 Communication, supra note 1, Art. 8 (4) and (5). 
12 See E. Brown-Weiss, In Fairness To Future Generations (Tokyo: U.N., 
1989); see als R. L. Revesz, “Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives” (1999) 99 Col. L. Rev. 941 
at 1009 for the idea of intergenerational allocation as a “central function” 
of sustainable development. 
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mental policy objectives13, requiring banks and 
other lenders to consider the environmental conse-
quences of the development projects they finance 
reflects the central role played by financial institu-
tions in shaping economic development. 
While moves to effectuate the integration principle 
would certainly appear to be apt in light of the nu-
merous and pervasive policy failures that emerged 
from the global assessment of the fifth environ-
mental action programme14, the Commission’s 
current proposal, unfortunately, sheds disappoint-
ingly little light on how it intends to bring about a 
‘greening’ of other policy sectors such as transport, 
fisheries, or agriculture - policy sectors that have a 
very real and large potential for impinging on 
strategies to reach a more sustainable form of eco-
nomic development. 
This, of course, is a question that concerns not only 
the Commission but also the other Community 
institutions, notably the Council, and the Commis-
sion is certainly right in referring to the relevant 
work that has been undertaken by the Council in the 
wake of the 1998 Cardiff European Summit.15 
That, however, still leaves wide open the question 
of how the Commission intends to screen its policy 
initiatives in environmentally -sensitive policy sec-
tors with a view to realizing the full integration of 
environmental concerns - a question of considerable 
importance given the crucial role played by the 
Commission (who alone enjoys the right of initia -
tive) in the EU/EC legislative process. And on this 
point, no less important than appropriate measures 
within the Council, the proposal for a sixth envi-
ronmental action programme remains vague. The 
“Strategic Approach” merely holds out the prospect 
of the Commission reinforcing internal mechanisms 
to ensure compliance with the integration require-
ment as set forth in Art. 6.16 What these mecha-
nisms might be - e.g. the creation of ‘sustainability 
cabinets’ in Directorate-Generals other than DG 
XI17 or the introduction of self-assessment and re-
porting requirements to ensure compatibility of 
policy initiatives with sustainability goals set by 
each Directorate-General18 - remains obscure.19 
                                                                 
13 Communication, supra note 1 at 21. 
14 See supra note 4. 
15 Communication, supra note 1 at 15 ff. 
16 Ibid. 
17 For a similar and thoughtfu l suggestion to provide institutional and proce-
dural safeguards that would help implementing strategies to achieve su s-
tainability within the context of the German federal bureaucracy see G. 
Füllgraff, “Institutionelle Herausforderungen für eine Politik der  Nach-
haltigkeit”, in: H. v. Köller (ed.), Umweltpolitik mit Augenmaß (Berlin: Erich 
Schmidt, 2000) 149-163.  
18 A system which has been in use for a number of years in Canada, albeit 
with mixed results, see Canada (Auditor -General/Commissioner of the 
Environment and Sustainable Development), Report of the Commissioner 
 
The same applies with respect to individual in-
stances of realizing the integration principle. Thus 
the proposal remains silent on how environmental 
concerns could be integrated into the EU’s external 
policies. In a like manner, while the proposal fre -
quently pays at least lip-service to the idea of inte-
grating environmental concerns into the Common 
Agricultural and Fisheries Policies, no concrete 
quantitative policy goals in terms of modifying 
industrial agriculture or, and perhaps more impor-
tantly given recent scientific reports indicating 
considerable and ultimately unsustainable overfish-
ing, reduced catch quotas emerge from the proposal. 
Quite to the contrary, with respect to fisheries con-
crete proposals and goals are expressly deferred to 
2002 when the Common Fisheries Policy is to be 
revised.20 
Concrete policy goals as well as suggestions for 
institutional safeguards would have greatly en-
hanced the credibility of the Commission’s “Strate-
gic Approach”. The lack of any precise proposal in 
this regard can only help to raise doubts as to the 
political will to bring about the institutional changes 
that would be necessary to facilitate a greater 
awareness and consideration of environmental con-
cerns in other policy sectors. 
Such doubts also arise when the Commission envis-
ages recourse to voluntary agreements, as it does 
with respect to financial institutions and their lend-
ing practices. Bearing the Community’s jurisdiction 
with respect to the Internal Market and its function-
ing in mind, the draft programme lacks a convinc-
ing reason why banks or other lending institutions 
should not be required - as a matter of binding 
community law rather than non-binding  voluntary 
guidelines - to furnish their shareholders or inves-
tors with information as to the environmental im-
pact of their lending policies. 
Finally, the Commission’s reticence in this regard 
may reflect its overall belief that more progress 
towards sustainable economic development can be 
achieved by reorienting market forces and, hence, 
relying on indirect regulation and market instru-
ments. The draft programme, at any rate, devotes 
                                                                     
of the Environment and Sustainable Development to the House of Com-
mons 2000 (Ottawa: Public Works & Gov’t Services Canada, 2000) 5. 
19 For a survey of different sustainability strategies, includ ing measures 
aimed at realizing greater policy integration, see the 2000 report by the 
German Council of Environmental Advisors SRU, Umweltgutachten 2000, 
BTags-Drucks [German federal parliamentary papers] 14/3363 of 14 
March 2000, para. 5 ff. (an English abstract and table of contents is avail-
able on the Council’s web site at http://www.umweltrat.de). As the Council 
points out, the relevance of sustainability strategies and policy integration 
is to address not only spectacular and headline -making environmental 
hazards, but also ‘creeping’ and incremental changes to our natural envi-
ronment that occur largely without attracting media attention. 
20 Communication, supra note 1 at 32 and 35. 
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considerable space to market incentives and part-
nership programmes with business.21 As part of a 
“Strategic Approach” to attaining environmental 
policy objectives, however, greater reliance on 
market incentives seems problematic for two rea-
sons. 
First, in some of the key sectors that the Commis-
sion indicates as requiring greater integration of 
environmental concerns - agriculture and fisheries 
for example - market mechanisms have only just 
begun to be reintroduced following adoption of the 
Agenda 2000. Market incentives will be of limited 
effect, though, where market forces play only a 
minor role in determining production processes and 
quantitative production targets. 
Second, the mechanisms of the free-market econ-
omy are by their very nature oblivious to the long-
term interests of future generations. Future genera-
tions cannot participate in today’s market transac-
tions to ensure that consumption of non-renewable 
resources or an unsustainable rate of depletion of 
renewable resources occurs only at a ‘price’ that 
reflects their future needs and preferences as well.22 
Moreover, for the ‘sovereign consumer’ - a concept 
that lies at the heart of much of economic thinking 
on environmental quality as a public good23 and that 
derives from modern economics’ ‘methodological 
individualism’24 -, it can be rational to maximize his  
or her utility derived from current consumption by 
passing the costs on to future generations through 
unsustainable depletion rates and waste accumula-
tion.25 Many economists, of course, are not overly 
perturbed by the irretrievable consumption of non-
renewable resources or the unsustainable depletion 
of renewable resources, as they posit the substitut-
ability of most resources.26 
Be that as it may (although my own guess would be 
that with some natural resources their loss cannot be 
compensated for through the enhanced use of hu-
man ‘capital’ or technological innovation, and the 
                                                                 
21 Communication, supra note 1 at pt. 2.3. 
22 See M. P. Pflüger, “Globalisierung und Nachhaltigkeit” [1/99] Zeitschrift für 
Umweltrecht und Umweltpolitik 135 at 141 (noting that due to the inexist-
ent representation of future generations any attempt at discounting bene-
fits accruing to future generations must rest upon the valuations of present 
generations); but see also Revesz, supra note XX at 1016 who argues 
that with respect to harms arising to future generations from present-day 
concumption patterns no discounting is ethically justifiable and will inevi-
tably privilege the inte rests of current generations over those of future 
generations. 
23 M. Common, Sustainability and Policy (Cambridge, U.K.: 1995) 77. 
24 Th. Döring, Subsidiarität und Umweltpolitik in der Europäischen Union  
(Marburg, Ger.: Metropolis, 1997) 41, note 43.  
25 See, e.g., St. Bayer & D. Cansier, “Methodisch abgesicherte intergenera-
tionelle Diskontierung am Beispiel des Klimaschutzes” [1/98] Zeitschrift für 
Umweltrecht und Umweltpolitik 113 at 114 & 116.  
26 Common, supra note 23 at 94 ff. & 182; see also Pflüger, supra note 22 at 
138. 
devastating social consequences27 that the virtual 
elimination of the cod fisheries on the Grand Banks 
off Newfoundland has wrought on Atlantic Can-
ada’s fishing communities would also militate very 
strongly against any overly optimistic assumptions 
regarding substitutability28). But what this admit-
tedly very cursory and brief excursion into the 
realm of economics and market mechanisms has 
hopefully demonstrated is that markets, even on the 
account of most economists, function with an in-
built or inherent bias in favour of short-term or 
present interests to the detriment of the long-term 
interests of future generations. On any account or 
definition of sustainability, it is these interests, 
however, that require strengthening and protec-
tion.29 I doubt whether reliance on market incentives 
will by itself prove sufficient to bring about the 
changes in the way we satisfy our needs that will 
lead to long-term sustainability. 
b) An evolving environmental policy: differenti-
ated standards 
I have already intimated that the overall impression 
one receives from a careful reading of the Commis-
sion’s draft programme is one of continuity when it 
comes to substantive environmental policy. With 
respect to air and water quality, for instance, the 
proposal makes frequent references to legislative 
measures that are already in place and that were 
adopted under the fifth environmental action pro-
gramme or its predecessors.  
                                                                 
27 S. McCorquodale, “The Fisheries Crisis in Newfoundland”, in: D.M. Brown 
& J. Hieberg (eds.), Canada: The State of the Federation 1994 (Kingston, 
Ont.: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1994) 85 ff. 
28 Perhaps more than any other phenomenon of environmental degradation 
in recent years, the decline of the Atlantic cod fisheries provides lurid 
evidence of the limits of a free market economics-approach to managing a 
renewable natural resource, see R. MacCallum, “The Community-Based 
Management of Fisheries in Atlantic Canada: A Legislative Proposal” 
(1998) 21 Dal. L. J. 48 at 57, note 34 (quoting former Canadian fishing 
industry lobbyist as saying “Our philosophy in the early 1990s was that we 
couldn’t just sit here and explain to our b rokers and shareholders: ‘Well, 
the quota went down again and the fishing was bad and I’m sorry. They 
don’t take that for an answer.’” and arguing that pressure was brought to 
bear on the Canadian federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans “to 
make Nature conform to the economic needs of the fishing industry” when 
setting catch quotas). 
29 See, for instance, Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Globale Umweltänderungen, 
Welt im Wandel - Strategien zur Bewältigung globaler Umweltrisiken  
(BTags-Drucks. [German federal pa rliamentary papers] 14 /3285 of 5 April 
2000) 333 (calling for creation of a U.N. Risk Assessment Panel along the 
lines of Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change to advise policy- and 
decision-makers in particular on long-term risks affecting future genera-
tions and to strengthen the international community’s responsibility with 
respect to future generations); E. Brown-Weiss, “The Imperative for the 
Twenty-First Century”, in: W. Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development and 
International Law (London: Graham & Trotman, 1995) 17 at 21 f.; see also 
National Research Council (U.S.), Our Common Journey. A Transition 
Toward Sustainability (Wash., D.C.: N.R.C., 1999) 298 ff. (arguing for 
long-term research into different paths to sustainability the funding re-
quirements of which would be freed from the short-term electoral horizons 
of political decision-makers).  
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In one important respect, however, the proposal for 
a sixth programme conceptually goes beyond exist-
ing provision. The Commission for the first time 
recognizes that conventional emission limit-values 
or ambient quality standards largely represent as-
sumptions about what is tolerable for an average 
(and frequently male) individual - a somewhat un-
real concept that ignores particular health risks 
faced by especially vulnerable groups such as chil-
dren, the elderly, or people with respiratory dis-
eases30. 
The proposal for a sixth environmental action pro-
gramme promises a review and examination of 
existing standards in order to assess to what extent 
they take into account the special health risks faced 
by vulnerable groups.31 Should the Commission act 
on this promise and come up with concrete propos-
als for regulatory reform to reflect the need for a 
more differentiated form of standard-setting, it 
would represent a welcome instance of environ-
mental justice and equity. 
3 The end of subsidiarity and shared respon-
sibility 
While the fifth environmental action programme 
devoted a whole chapter to the concept of ‘shared 
responsibility’32, jurisdictional concerns have 
largely disappeared from the proposal for a sixth 
programme. Indeed, the draft programme does not 
even as much as mention the principle of subsidiar-
ity as one of the guiding principles of Community 
environmental policy (curiously, though, the rele-
vant passage does refer to the integration principle 
laid down in Art. 6 of the EC Treaty - a provision 
directly preceded by the subsidiarity principle in 
Art. 533). 
It is only in the explanatory memorandum to the 
draft decision for adopting the programme that 
subsidiarity concerns are addressed. The memoran-
dum flatly states that the draft programme satisfies 
the requirements of the subsidiarity principle be-
cause the various policy measures it envisages con-
                                                                 
30 As a particularly problematic example of indiscriminate standard-setting 
that ignores the special needs of vulnerable groups one might cite the 
Codex alimentarius’s standards for residues in hormone-treated bovine 
meat which are based on the stereotypical concept of 60-year-old average 
male consumer; the adequacy of the WHO’s Codex alimentarius interna-
tional standards, especially in light of the precautionary principle, was an 
important issue in the EU’s dispute with the United States and Canada 
over the use of growth hormones in bovine meat production, see S. Dei-
mann, Case Comment: EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Prod-
ucts (Hormones), [2/1997] elni-Newsletter 1-12.  
31 Communication, supra note 1 at 39. 
32 See only U. Collier/J. Golub/A. Kreher (eds.), Subsidiarity and Shared 
Responsibility: New Challenges for EU Environmental Policy (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1997) for some of the implications of subsidiarity in envi-
ronmental policy. 
33 Communication, supra note 1 at 65. 
cern transboundary environmental problems or seek 
to remedy environmental problems through trans-
boundary solutions.34 
This is undoubtedly true with respect to problems 
such as climate change or transboundary air and 
water pollution. But as a general statement it ap-
pears at best a gratuitous claim that is by no means 
borne out by all the policy proposals discussed in 
the draft programme. For instance, the proposal 
fails to provide even the slightest hint as to the 
transboundary nature of indoor air quality - a sub-
ject that the Commission believes could require 
remedial measures at the European level35. 
The proposed programme thus highlights once 
again the necessity to clarify roles and jurisdictions 
with respect to environmental policy. It is curious to 
note that, while the draft programme has precious 
little to say on the environmental impact of Euro-
pean air traffic and competition among major air-
ports such as Amsterdam, Frankfurt, or Paris - 
competition that has just led the German authorities 
in Frankfurt to decide on yet another major airport 
extension -, the Commission apparently believes 
some of the effects of such competition (such as 
noise from aircraft operations at airports) should 
become subject to European regulation36. 
The inconsistency that the draft programme mani-
fests by, on the one hand, failing to provide an ex-
haustive treatment of the integration principle (in-
cluding institutional arrangements for its realiza-
tion) and by, on the other, extending the scope and 
purview of European environmental law to yet 
another area makes environmental policy a prime 
target for a more specific vertical division of pow-
ers between the Community and the Member States. 
Under the terms of the December 2000 Treaty of 
Nice and the declarations attached to it, defining in 
more precise terms the allocation of powers within 
the Community and the Member States will be the 
subject of another inter-governmental conference to 
be held in 2004.37 
                                                                 
34 Ibid. at pt. 6. 
35 Ibid. at 47. 
36 Ibid. at 48 ff. On this point, however, the Commission appears to be aware 
of the potential for jurisdictional conflict with the Member States. Hence, it 
only proposes to establish a European framework for combatting noise 
(such as developing uniform standards for measuring) without setting 
concrete noise protection standards at the European level. Still, it is curi-
ous to note that, while the Commission is unable to come up with specific 
policy goals for the preservation of fisheries, it manages to set a precise 
target of reducing by ten percent until 2010 the number of people affected 
by unacceptable noise levels which currently, according to the proposal, 
stands at 100 million - despite the fact that most sources of noise would 
appear to be of a distinctly local nature. 
37 Treaty of Nice, 23rd Declaration, SN 1247/1/01 REVI DQPG, Brussels of 
14 February 2001.  
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The current division of powers encourages the sort 
of inconsistency that continues to bedevil European 
environmental policy.38 By relying on a generic 
term such as the environment in the heading of Title 
XIX of the Treaty and wide definitions of the envi-
ronment in secondary legislation, Community law 
essentially allows the Commission to select more or 
less any aspect of the natural environment and turn 
it into a subject of European environmental policy.39 
It permits an approach of ‘pick and choose’, and 
that largely in accordance with factors other than 
policy consistency. 
A textually more differentiated division of powers 
is of course no guarantee for a more consistent use 
of jurisdiction. As any student of comparative fed-
eralism will know, the real division of powers is 
frequently determined by factors other than the 
language of constitutional provisions.40 Nor will a 
textually more decentralized division of powers 
necessarily lead to more decentralized environ-
mental policy.41 
                                                                 
38 See Döring, supra note 24 at 140. 
39 See, for instance, L. Krämer, EC Environmental Law, 3rd ed., (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1998). 
40 See R. L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 2nd. ed. (Kingston, Ont.: 
Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1999) at 16 for the “social and 
political balance of forces” as the primary determinant in the evolution of 
federal systems. 
41 Witness, for instance, the difference in the degree of centralization in 
environmental policy in the U.S. and Canada: although the text of the U.S. 
constitution appears to establish, on its face, a rather decentralized sys-
tem for the division of powers, reserving, in the Tenth Amendment, all 
powers not specifically allocated to the federal level of government to the 
States, the actual operation of the system has led to considerable cen-
tralization in environmental policy, for a critical assessment see R. L. Re-
vesz, “Federalism and environmental regulation: an overview” in: R. L. 
Revesz et al. (eds.), Environmental Law, the Economy, and Sustainable 
Development (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge U.P., 2000) 37-79. In Can-
ada, the opposite has occurred: a textually very centralizing document 
(the Constitution Act, 1867, formerly known as the British-North-America 
Act) has given rise to one of the most decentralized federal systems in 
which the bulk of regulatory powers in relation to the environment are 
exercised at the provincial level, see F.L. Morton, “The Constitutional 
Division of Powers with Respect to the Environment in Canada” in: K. M. 
Holland et al. (eds.), Federalism and the Environment (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood, 1996) 37-54. 
Allocating specific aspects of environmental policy 
rather than conferring powers with respect to the 
environment as such would, however, change the 
terms of debate. Instead of having to demonstrate 
compliance with the rather amorphous concept of 
subsidiarity - an exercise that under the terms of the 
Amsterdam Treaty’s Subsidiarity Protocol requires 
rather subjective evaluations of the advantages and 
disadvantages of Community measures compared to 
action at by the Member States -, the Commission 
would have to show its initiatives come within the 
purview of a defined policy field or head of power. 
The Commission services would thus have to con-
centrate from the beginning on specific aspects of 
environmental policy.  
Although the initial allocation of jurisdictional 
authority will doubtless give rise to controversy, 
once this issue has been settled it would allow the 
relevant Commission services to be more focussed 
on specifically European aspects of environmental 
policy and set priorities accordingly. Of course, the 
politically interesting question will be to see how 
the Community institutions and the Member States 
will initially go about identifying the specifically 
European aspects of environmental policy.  
4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is fair to say that the Commission 
proposal for a sixth environmental action pro-
gramme leaves one with mi xed feelings. sWhile it is 
encouraging to see the Commission taking a more 
searching look at policy integration, the exercise is 
not entirely convincing. It remains in large part too 
unspecific so that the frequent references to the 
necessity of integrating environmental concerns into 
the Common Agricultural or Fisheries Policy some-
times take on the appearance of paying mere lip-
service to the principle. At the same time, the pro-
posal contemplates Community action in areas that 
are almost certain to spark further jurisdictional 
conflict with the Member States. 
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